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In Henzdndez v. New York,' the Supreme Court held that prosecutors
may strike potential jurors from the venire on the basis of their ability to
speak a language other than English. Courts have consistently treated bi-
and multilingualism as reasonable grounds for excluding individuals
from participation in an institution long considered to be a fundamental
site of civic engagement. Courts seem to fear that bilingual jurors will
disrupt jury deliberations that are carefully cabined by legal procedures,
which include court-sponsored translations of foreign-language testi-
mony. The Henzdndez Court, despite its deference to the prosecutors,
complicated the issue in its plurality opinion by highlighting the central-
ity of language to individual personality and the interpretation of mean-
ing.
It would be common knowledge in the locality that a significant
percentage of the Latino population speaks fluent Spanish, and
that many consider it their preferred language, the one chosen
for personal communication, the one selected for speaking with
the most precision and power, the one used to define the self.'
As the Supreme Court seems to have recognized in Herndndez, suspicion
of bilingualism in the selection of jurors has the bizarre effect of ex-
cluding bi- and multilinguals from participating in courtroom activities
because they are, by the courts' estimations, overqualified.
Courts' clumsy treatment of the bilingual juror reflects a fundamen-
tal deficiency in our legal system. No coherent theory of the nature of
language as a legal category exists. Indeed, language defies simple
definition. It is at once a tool of communication, a lens through which
people orient themselves to the world, and a symbol of allegiance to
culture. It shapes the amorphous concept of identity and organizes the
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concrete details of our lives. Language thus proves difficult to formulate
as a legal construct because it is unclear whether to treat language as
culture, ethnicity, or behavior. Much academic debate swirls around the
question of official English, and political as well as educational contro-
versy surrounds bilingual education. Bi- or multilingual ballots, court-
room translators, and the administration of public services in more than
one language have all been sources of legal and scholarly controversy.
Surprisingly, little effort has been made to understand how these rights or
protections relate to one another and whether they can be understood as
creating a particular status for the linguistic minority in American legal
culture.
Throughout American history, language has informed the ways in
which Americans have understood conflicts among different immigrant
populations. Demands for bilingual education coincided with the nation's
inception and the establishment of German and French language schools
in Pennsylvania and Louisiana, respectively.3 One scholar notes that the
leaders of the Revolution issued key documents, including the Articles of
Confederation, in German and French.4 In the early years of the Repub-
lic, multilingualism was encouraged as a means of accessing scientific
and artistic literature. Many of the states of the Southwest began as bilin-
gual entities, conducting official business in English and Spanish. In New
Mexico, territorial laws had to be translated from Spanish to English.'
Today, bilingualism finds itself in a more precarious position. For
example, contemporary discussions of language policy are dominated by
popular initiatives to abolish bilingual education in public schools in
states such as Arizona and California, where voters have approved ballot
initiatives to replace bilingual instruction with English immersion classes.
6
The combination of sizable immigration flows and a perceived strain on
public resources and public culture have made the citizenship and lan-
guage nexus urgent once again. The debate does not break down neatly
into two camps, one pro-official English and the other pro-minority lan-
guage rights. Instead, the meaning of concepts that undergird the lan-
guage debate, such as inclusion, integration, and assimilation, are them-
selves contested. The debate concerns whether language should be un-
I Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cul-
tural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 290 (1992); see generally
LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY 9-85
(James Crawford ed., 1992) (providing several accounts of the status of language rights
throughout American history).
4 Shirley Brice Heath, Why No Official Tongue?, in LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE
BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY, supra note 3, at 20. 23.
5 Perea, supra note 3, at 320.
6 William Booth & Rene Sanchez, Drug Reform Initiatives Receive Support of Voters,
WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2000, at A48. Voters in Arizona approved the initiative to end bilin-
gual education in public schools in November 2000, following the lead of California vot-
ers' approval of Proposition 227 in the spring of 1998.
[Vol. 36
HeinOnline  -- 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 134 2001
Accommodating Linguistic Difference
derstood as a deficiency to be overcome, a personal characteristic that
deserves protection from discrimination, or a group status that demands
preservation. The answers that existing law provides constitute a patch-
work of protections that lack an underlying conception of a larger politi-
cal or constitutional project.
In this Article, I develop a comprehensive theory of what the legal
status of language and linguistic minorities should be. By looking first to
political and constitutional theory and then to doctrine and practice, I
demonstrate that the concept of "language rights" has meaning in an
American context and is not just reserved for officially multilingual so-
cieties such as Canada or Spain. I ultimately conclude that language is
relevant to the individual's legal status and should be treated as such
through a legal regime that accommodates linguistic difference and its
effects. Accommodation will foster the participation of linguistic mi-
norities by incorporating their linguistic practices into public life and
recognizing that language is simultaneously mutable and constitutive.
This thesis unfolds as follows: First, existing case law treats lan-
guage largely as a matter of antidiscrimination law. Such a narrow view
proves insufficient as a way of understanding how language organizes
people's lives and how linguistic minorities should be treated. A practical
scheme for guiding judicial and legislative treatment of linguistic differ-
ence first requires a theoretical framework for understanding language as
a legal category. The principle of free and equal access to participation in
public life animates the language debate and should be at the heart of any
effort to protect and empower linguistic minorities. Moreover, the ideo-
logical and cultural overtones of that debate suggest the potential to cre-
ate language-based status hierarchies. Free and equal participation by
linguistic minorities remains elusive when their linguistic practices are
regarded as inferior to English-language customs. Reifying the dominant
language in public discourse ensures that institutions of public life will
be remote to those whose orientations encompass other languages.
Second, inherent in this status construction lies a tension between a
commitment to equal participation and functionalist concerns. The argu-
ments in favor of a lingua franca, which emphasize national unity and
efficiency of communication, misconceive the nature of political partici-
pation and elide important demographic transformations underway in this
country. Rather than thinking of political community in terms of a na-
tional conversation, we should understand it as a set of diversified and
diffuse interactions that can occur in communities of all kinds through a
variety of media. I resolve the tension between functionalist and status
concerns by presenting a theory of fluid civic identity, or a vision of citi-
zenship that allows the individual to have multiple foci of affiliation, in-
cluding multiple cultural and linguistic affiliations.
This fluid civic identity more closely approximates the ways in
which people interact with others and shape their private and public lives
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than does a belief in American citizenship based on common culture,
conduct, or practices. This view helps define a community of principle
that enables broad and equal participation in public institutions by mi-
norities in general and linguistic minorities in particular. The assimila-
tionist and perhaps even integrationist thrust of the belief in a common
citizenship no longer maps onto the reality of a nation in which commu-
nities of linguistic minorities are constantly replenished. Even as second
and third generation immigrants become native English speakers, the
combination of increasingly insignificant borders and constant waves of
immigration ensure that linguistic difference exists in this country on a
continuum that will never be absorbed into a monolingual mainstream.
The final challenge becomes crafting conditions that enable multiple
communities with vastly different, "thick" forms of ethnic identity to
interact with one another within a common community of principle with-
out forcing individuals and groups to abandon the affiliations meaningful
to them. The solution is accommodation. Applying a fluid conception of
political community to the language debate does not demand that all lin-
guistic minorities be transformed into monolingual English speakers but
rather that linguistic difference be accommodated and multilingualism be
embraced as a public asset. This theory of accommodation assumes that
linguistic difference, in contrast to race or ethnicity under the existing
legal regime, should be treated as relevant to an individual's status before
the law. While current legal understandings of race and ethnicity neces-
sarily inform the debate over how linguistic difference should be treated,
we need not be bound by the existing doctrinal treatment of these catego-
ries in defining the legal status of the linguistic minority. Instead, we
should broaden the inquiry and look to how the law accommodates other
forms of difference-namely religion-to assist in the development of a
legal theory of language. When consistent with the goal of eradicating
language-based status differences to enable free and equal access and
participation, the state should create space for linguistic minorities, as
linguistic minorities, in public institutions.
In order to give this theory of accommodation meaning, we must
consider the myriad spheres of life in which linguistic difference presents
challenges and adjust the accommodation model to the demands of each
particular sphere. In certain spheres, such as the workplace, linguistic
minorities should be protected against discrimination, even if the state
remains agnostic to the legitimacy of linguistic difference. Linguistic
difference must never create a barrier to the protection of basic rights. In
other spheres, the commitment to accommodation demands that the state
abandon its agnosticism and take steps to preserve linguistic difference,
such as including linguistic minorities in the formation of juries. This
accommodation finds justification both in the nature of language as con-
stitutive and in the unfolding desire of linguistic minorities to maintain a
fluid civic identity, which bi- and multilingualism facilitate.
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Among the issues inevitably raised by these arguments are
(1) whether American citizenship requires us to give up any of our
affiliations; (2) to what extent we must be conscious of differences
among citizens; and (3) whether the state should participate in the per-
petuation of these differences. This Article addresses these issues in three
Parts. Part I sets the ground rules for the language rights debate by dis-
cussing language in terms of what I call the nuttability continuum. One of
the deficiencies in the existing, ad hoc approach to language rights is the
failure to understand that linguistic minorities form a diverse group that
contains everyone from the completely monolingual, non-English-
speaking immigrant to the completely bilingual citizen. The second half
of Part I assesses this conception of language as it relates to various
strands of political theory in order to sketch the vision of political com-
munity that undergirds the Article and to define further the idea of fluid
civic identity.
Part II situates language in a constitutional framework, contextual-
izing it within contemporary legal understandings of other forms of dif-
ference. I first explore how linguistic minorities parallel racial and ethnic
minorities and consider what the law on the latter tells us about how the
law should treat the former. Although our natural inclinations may lead
us to treat language as a function of ethnicity, the race/ethnicity paradigm
does not adequately capture the role of language in the life of the indi-
vidual speaker or in communities of linguistic difference. Thus, in order
to understand how language might be treated "on its own terms:' the sec-
ond section of Part II draws an analogy between language and another
form of constitutionally protected difference: religion. Religion provides
an instructive parallel because, like language, it constitutes identity,
shapes the individual's worldview, and represents a defining feature of
communities of difference. The law struggles to accommodate religious
difference. Extending beyond the race/ethnicity paradigm and exploring
this method of accommodating difference establishes the contours of a
theory according to which language can be accommodated.
Finally, to demonstrate how this theory would work in practice, Part
HI explores the existing law of language and discusses actual language
controversies. This Part moves through the spheres within which linguis-
tic difference has presented legal challenges and discusses how that dif-
ference can be accommodated to advance fluid civic identity. Part III be-
gins from a baseline of antidiscrimination law in the workplace and pro-
ceeds by examining the relevance of language to courtroom proceedings,
education, and the administration of social services, raising the question
of whether linguistic difference is a barrier to be overcome or a status
worth preserving from state-sponsored erosion.
2001]
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I. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Demographic Background Conditions of the Language Debate
Conflicting demographic pressures form an important set of back-
ground conditions for this Article. In short, as non-English-speaking
populations continue to expand in this country, they increasingly resist
the processes of assimilation and engage in self-conscious efforts to pre-
serve the indicia of their non-American origins. At the same time, the
incentive to learn English exerts a considerable force on linguistic-
minority communities that is only intensified by the demands of a tech-
nology-driven and globalized economy. The combination of the sheer
number of linguistic minorities, the strength of their non-American cul-
tural affiliations, and the inevitable effects of living in a country-and
even a world-in which English is dominant complicates decisions about
how far to take linguistic accommodation.
While the theories offered in this Article are not intended to apply
only to Latino communities, the growth and character of this country's
Latino populations make the case for accommodation of linguistic mi-
norities particularly dramatic and highlight the tensions created by the
aforementioned background pressures.7 First, according to Department of
Labor statistics, Latinos are the fastest growing ethnic minority in the
United States; the number of Latinos in the work force will have in-
creased to 10% by the year 2000.8 At present, approximately 31 million
Latinos live in the United States, and sometime between 2000 and 2007
that number will reach 40 million.9 The Census Bureau projects that by
2020 more than 52 million Latinos (representing close to 20% of the total
population) will reside in the United States." By 2050, the Bureau esti-
mates that the percentage will rise to nearly twenty-five." The ethnic
population that represents the most significant source of language con-
troversy is expanding as a demographic unit and becoming increasingly
I As will become clear in my discussion of accommodation in different spheres in Part
III, there are certain types of accommodation that depend on the size and nature of the
linguistic-minority community in question. Other language protections-most notably the
antidiscrimination protections-apply regardless of the size of the community affected.
Moreover, fluid civic identity does not depend on the existence of demographic trends as
significant as those that are shaping the Latino community in the United States. I refer
repeatedly to the status of Latinos as a linguistic minority in order to make the best case
for robust accommodation.
8 Steven I. Locke, Language Discrimination and English-Only Rules in the Workplace:
The Case for Legislative Amendment of Title VII, 27 Tax. TECH L. REV. 33, 44 (1996).
9 Tony Affigne, Latino Politics in the United States: An Introduction, 33 POL. SCI. &
POL. 523, 523 (2000) (citing 1998 U.S. Bureau of the Census statistics).
10 HISPANIC AMERICANS: A STATISTICAL SOURCEBOOK II (Louise L. Homer ed., 1999)
(citing data from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Population Projections of the United States by
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complex as a subgroup of the American political community.'2 This
population growth may stem just as much from births and deaths within
the borders of the United States as it does from immigration. As one po-
litical scientist notes, "between 1990 and 1997, the Latino population, on
the strength of increased child-rearing among Latino families and ongo-
ing immigration, grew four times faster than the overall U.S. popula-
tion.'
13
The Spanish language, spoken in many forms and with varying de-
grees of facility, represents a significant element of this demographic
mix. In 1999, approximately 48% of Latino households spoke Spanish,
33% spoke English, and the remainder spoke a combination of the two
languages.'" According to the 1990 Census, more than 17 million of the
230.4 million Americans speak Spanish at home, and 31.8 million speak
languages other than English. 5 On the eve of the official release of sta-
tistics from the 2000 Census, we can safely assume that the proportion of
bi- and multilinguals has grown considerably over the last decade.
At the same time, evidence measuring the acquisition of language
skills among immigrant populations suggests that Spanish-speaking im-
migrants today are learning English as quickly as their European coun-
terparts of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries." Empirical stud-
ies confirm a classic three-generation pattern of language acquisition: the
first generation is monolingual, the second is bilingual, and in the third,
English becomes the preferred language.' 7 Some studies even suggest that
the rate of "Anglicization" of Spanish speakers is fast approaching a two-
generation pattern.18
Perhaps the most salient background condition of all is the global
dominance of the English language. The extent to which English has be-
come a common international language, coupled with its dominance in
this country, ensure that the incentive to learn English is omnipresent.
Indeed, this incentive has long existed independently of government
sanction and has engendered nearly universal knowledge of the English
12 See, e.g., Affigne, supra note 9, at 525 (citing evidence that ongoing immigration
has made the character of Latino communities more complex, dynamic, and difficult to
organize); Rachel F. Moran, Foreword-Demography and Distrust: The Latino Challenge
to Civil Rights and Immigration Policy in the 1990s and Beyond, 8 L zA L.J. 1 20-21
(1995) (discussing the complex identities of Latinos in the United States).
13 Affigne, supra note 9, at 524.
14 Drucilla Cornell & William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs of
Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
595, 609 (1999) (citing Andrew Pollack, The Fight for Hispanic Viewers: Univision s Suc.
cess Story Attracts New Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1998, at D 1).
1- Perea, supra note 3, at 360.
16 Peter W. Schroth, Language and Law, 46 Ass. J. Cosup. L. 17, 18 (1998).
17 Carol Schmid, Language Rights and the Legal Status of English.Only Laws in the
Public and Private Sector, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 65, 71 (1992).
Is Id.
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language, even in the absence of government-imposed standards.' The
increasingly global orientation of the economy and the international mo-
bility of labor and capital strengthen the incentive. Today, between 94%
and 96% of the American population speaks English at some level, and
85% of English speakers claim it as their native tongue.20
The existence of de facto English-language requirements in this
English-dominant society forms a necessary and important background
condition for the language debate. On the one hand, it can be concluded
that no serious threat to the English language exists, regardless of how
many linguistic minorities populate the United States.2 Moreover, the
existence of informal incentives to learn English obviates the need for
state-sanctioned promotion of a common language. The American politi-
cal community, then, should be able to sustain robust accommodation of
linguistic difference as a counterweight to the homogenizing force of
English dominance. Yet, given that the importance of learning English
cannot be ignored, some may argue that we should instead accelerate the
acquisition of English skills through a narrow understanding of language
rights that aggressively encourages such acquisition, even at the expense
of minority languages. While the issues do not admit to easy resolution,
consideration of sociolinguistics underscores the dramatic need for an
approach to linguistic minorities that embraces and even perpetuates
what may seem like an identity in tension with itself.
B. The Salient Characteristics of Language
Before formulating a theory of linguistic accommodation, this Arti-
cle must examine relevant features of language itself. The field of socio-
linguistics reveals that language has social, cultural, and functional fea-
tures that parallel other ascriptive legal categories but nevertheless re-
quire that language be treated uniquely.
1. Language as Constitutive of Identity
A common refrain of sociolinguistics is that language and identity
formation are intimately linked. "Transmitting information ... the
speaker is using language to make statements about who she is, what her
group loyalties are, how she perceives her relationship to her hearer, and
what sort of speech event she considers herself to be engaged in. '2 In
other words, even when used solely as a communicative device, language
assists in the process of self-definition and in the development of social
'9 See Perea, supra note 3, at 303.
20 Id. at 347.
21 Cornell & Bratton, supra note 14, at 692.
22
RALPH FASOLD, THE SOCIOLINGUISTICS OF SOCIETY, at ix (1984).
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relationships arising from that definition. Language represents a "multi-
purpose instrument."' Given this social function of language, the fact
that it defines the essence of cultural identity should come as no surprise.
Those who share a consensus on language form speech communities.
These communities are defined largely by birth, and linguistic consensus
finds cultural and social expression through them. 4 Whereas ethnic
affiliation may have at one time depended on geographical proximity and
shared occupations, in a modern urban world it is defined in terms of a
need for "political and social support in pursuit of common interest" and
is marked by sources of difference-especially language. 5 Sociolinguist
Joshua Fishman notes:
[Language] is more likely than most symbols of ethnicity to be-
come the symbol of ethnicity. Language is the recorder of pa-
ternity, the expressor of patrimony and the carrier of phenome-
nology. Any vehicle carrying such precious freight must come
to be viewed as equally precious in and of itself. The link be-
tween language and ethnicity is this one of sanctity-by-
association .... Anything can become symbolic of ethnicity ...
but since language is the prime symbol system to begin with and
since it is commonly relied upon ... to enact and call forth all
ethnic activity, the likelihood that it will be recognized and sin-
gled out as symbolic of ethnicity is great indeed."
Fishman's assessment captures the reason that ethnic identity be-
comes impoverished without the linguistic dimension. Given the sym-
bolic and psychological significance attached to language, sociolinguistic
research also reveals that using language to erect boundaries between the
people and their government results in feelings of alienation and political
impotence. 7 Language's strong correlation to personhood renders it a
devastating political tool. The phenomenon observed by sociolinguists in
which linguistic forms are assigned "good" and "bad" status, or prestige
value, underscores the extent to which language and social and ethnic
identity are inextricable.'
2- Henry L. Bretton, Political Science, Language, and Politics, in LANGUAGE AND
POLITICS 431, 434 (William O'Barr & Jean F. O'Barr eds., 1977).
24See NANCY FAIRES CONKLIN & MARGARET A. LOURIE. A Host OF TONGUES 110.
113 (1983).
2 John J. Gumperz & Jenny Cook-Gumperz. Introduction: Language am tie Commu-
nication of Social Identity, in LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL IDENTITY 1. 5 (John J. Gumper ed..
1982).
26Joshua A. Fishman, Language and Ethnicity, in LANGUAGE. ETHNICITY AND INTER-
GROUP RELATIONS 15, 25 (Howard Giles ed., 1977).
7 William M. O'Barr, Boundaries, Strategies, and Power Relations: Political Anthro-
pology and Language, in LANGUAGE AND POLITICS. supra note 23, at 405, 414.
2See CONKLIN & LOURIE, supra note 24. at 115; see also RAU'ii F.ASOLD. LANGGL
IN SOCIETY 4 (1992).
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2. Language as Mutable
When considered from the perspective of the individual and in con-
trast to race, language seems to be a highly mutable characteristic. Un-
like race, language abilities are subject to the constant pressures of the
dominant English-speaking culture and can be dramatically altered and
reformulated over the course of a lifetime. 29 While race and ethnicity may
be subject to similar alteration over the course of generations, unlike lan-
guage, they are not typically subject to complete eradication after two
generations. The appropriate response to this mutability is not to eradi-
cate linguistic difference; indeed, sociolinguistics tells us that language is
tied closely enough to race and ethnicity to make such a response con-
stitutionally problematic. Rather, the response should be to accommodate
linguistic difference, much in the way that the law struggles to accom-
modate religious minorities and to enable the free exercise of religion.
Just as one may lapse in and out of religious devotion or convert to
another faith entirely, language skills can be acquired, ignored, and re-
discovered after periods of disuse. Moreover, just as religion scholars
debate the question of the inalienability of faith, arguing that religion
should be understood as an immutable characteristic and not as an
affiliation freely chosen," sociolinguists present language as a multi-
layered phenomenon whose mutability exists on a continuum, exposing
choice of language as a fictional construct. Thus, the language debate
cannot be understood simply as a conflict between English speakers and
non-English speakers. As two scholars have recently cast it, "The lan-
guage question is not one of English language acquisition; instead it con-
cerns the degree to which English and associated cultural traits com-
pletely replace Latino antecedents in the second and third generations.""
In other words, linguistic-minority communities are made up of individu-
als who have varying levels of facility with and attachment to English
and non-English languages. Given the complexity of speech communi-
ties, the theory of language rights this Article advances does not stop at
establishing a set of protections for those who have not yet acquired
English. Rather, I present language rights in terms of the mutability con-
tinuum, recognizing the insights of sociolinguistics that language and
language acquisition are phenomena woven into the fabric of ethnic
communities and their people.
29 See CONKLIN & LOURIE, supra note 24, at 113 (noting that although most aspects of
language are stabilized by adolescence, changes may continue to take place throughout
life, especially for those whose social reference groups shift).
0 See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in RE-
LIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME COURT 483 (Terry Eastland ed., 1993); Tseming Yang,
Race, Religion, and Cultural Identity: Reconciling the Jurisprudence of Race and Religion,
73 IND. L.J. 119, 132-33 (1997).
1' Cornell & Bratton, supra note 14, at 611.
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Consider, for example, the placement of the following three types of
linguistic minorities at different points along the mutability continuum.
First, the mutability status of monolinguals, whether they are new immi-
grants or long-time residents, is conditioned on not being able to speak
English. While such non-English speakers serve as the primary reference
point against which language controversies are defined, by no means do
they encompass the totality of experience that should inform a coherent
theory of language rights. Bilinguals, who may be either immigrants or
members of the first American-born generation of ethnic communities,
can be described as native speakers of one or two languages. Bilinguals
may also begin as linguistic outsiders whose social and professional suc-
cess depends largely on their ability to assimilate to the linguistic main-
stream. Their "assimilation," however, should be understood as the acqui-
sition of a "new style" added to a retained preexisting one rather than as
a rejection of previous linguistic affiliations) 2
Finally, long-entrenched, fully developed ethnic communities may
consist of speakers of varying degrees of bilingualism, some of whom
may, in practice, speak only English. Some bilinguals may be more com-
fortable speaking English than non-English, whereas other bilinguals
may more frequently and confidently call on their non-English-language
skills. Mexican American communities in the Southwest, which have
maintained their nondominant language even as it has evolved in re-
sponse to centuries of pressure from a dominant, English-speaking cul-
ture, offer rich examples of this continuum. Populated by recent immi-
grants as well as by family lines that have lived in the Southwest since it
was part of Mexico, these communities comprise individuals with dra-
matically different language skills, but for whom both Spanish and Eng-
lish serve as points of reference. Over generations, English and Spanish
have interacted, and both languages have taken on vocabulary and
meaning from one another, forming the linguistic stock of the Southwest.
Indeed, despite the dominance of English, precisely because language is
malleable, the presence of linguistic difference may in fact contribute to
making English a richer, more effective language. Efforts to suppress or
eradicate non-English preclude those languages from contributing to the
vocabulary and idioms of English and from amplifying the English-
speaker's ability to express meaning. Language thus demonstrates its
permeability-its mutable dimension.
The possibility of bilingualism does suggest that language can be an
object of choice. But when we conceive of bilingualism as a complex
phenomenon that is best described by a continuum along which English
and non-English gradually become interlaced, it becomes much more
difficult to conclude that bilingualism can be suppressed by the individ-
ual speaker upon command. Despite language's permeability, the adapta-
32E.g., CONKLIN & LOURIE, supra note 24, at 113.
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tions that linguistic minorities make remain markers of linguistic differ-
ence, inseparable from the cultural communities from which they ema-
nate. Linguistic difference retains an immutable dimension precisely be-
cause it has been interwoven into the linguistic development of the
speaker. Bilinguals do not choose which language they speak; two differ-
ent languages form their speech identities and capacities.
In her work on accents and antidiscrimination law, Mari Matsuda
notes that sociolinguists have demonstrated that accents are culturally
created and situate people socially.33 She argues that even if accent is
changeable and adaptable, no person should be required to alter core
parts of her identity in order to participate in public life. Similarly, the
law's treatment of bilingualism as an individual characteristic that can be
turned off once the threshold of English proficiency has been crossed
misconceives the nature of linguistic difference and diversity. While the
goal of language policy should be to ensure that all people become capa-
ble of speaking English, it should also strive to accommodate linguistic
difference, treating it as a significant feature of complex minority com-
munities.
Ultimately, this discussion has characterized language as more than
purely functional. To be sure, cases may arise in which language is most
appropriately understood as a tool; the positions of 911 operators, air
traffic controllers, and others intimately connected to the immediate de-
livery of public safety services demand a capacity to communicate first
and foremost. But it is by no means clear that monolingualism best ad-
vances the interests of public safety and efficiency of communication.
Moreover, in the vast majority of language-based controversies, where
language marks cultural, group, and political identity, language-based
restrictions should be narrowly drawn and justified by compelling busi-
ness or institutional necessity.
The countervailing demographic developments outlined above sug-
gest the need for an inclusive and dynamic vision of political identity that
can accommodate the diverse speech communities that exist at all points
along the mutability continuum. Theories of integration supported by
assimilationist assumptions and the rush to sustain the dominance of
English as a common social and political language fail to understand
both the linguistic and cultural complexities of the mutability contin-
uum.34 In order to accommodate the demographic trends outlined above,
as well as to respect the centrality of language to identity and orientation,
this Article now turns to fluid civic identity, the notion that it is only by
" Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law and a Juris-
prudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1363 (1991).
-1 For a discussion of the status-related harms that result from a failure to respect the
complex nature of the mutability continuum, see infra notes 104-121 and accompanying
text.
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recognizing and accommodating the multiple affiliations of linguistic
minorities that a viable American political community can be sustained.
C. Fluid Civic Identity and the Incorporation of Linguistic Difference
into Theories of Political Cotnmnity
By fluid civic identity, I mean a form of participation that engages
public life but rejects the claim that participation must occur on the basis
of a thick form of common cultural commitment and with reference to
common conduct or practices. Fluid civic identity, at its core, disavows
assimilation. It offers a vision of the political community intended to en-
able participation in public life and to enhance the individual's access to
the multiple spheres in which participation occurs. A fluid approach to
civic identity meshes with visions of a national community of principle
insofar as that community is structured in terms of free and equal access.
In order to foster engagement and to create free and equal access,
civic identity must be fluid in the sense that the participation motivated
by it must be inclusive and diffuse. By inclusive, I mean that participa-
tion in political and social life cannot require that the participant repress
or ignore meaningful cultural and linguistic affiliations. This inclusive-
ness enables civic identity to be fluid, because it establishes a form of
participation that can accommodate multiple modes of communication
held by single individuals and communities alike. By diffuse, I mean that
participation should be understood as decentralized. The conditions of
participation must allow it to be localized and sometimes fragmented in
the interest of true engagement.
This concept responds to the belief that meaningful civic engage-
ment occurs through a kind of national conversation in which people
centralize their political focus on a common project. Behind this belief
rests an assumption that decisionmaking must occur through the use of
common customs, one of which is a common language. If we define our
overarching community of principle as centered around free and equal
access and participation, it simply does not make sense to structure par-
ticipation in terms of a common national identity. Actual political and
social engagement more frequently occur on less rarefied and more lo-
calized terms, even when national issues are at stake. Indeed, fluid civic
identity can be analogized to theories of federalism that contend that
power is best distributed in a decentralized fashion and that true problem
solving will more likely occur in communities bound by a personalized
form of affiliation.35 A realistic vision of political community must ac-
3- I do not premise my argument on theories of federalism, or on the view that there
are substantive areas of law and public life that are better handled by state government
institutions rather than those of the federal government. I refer to federalism only by way
of analogy.
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knowledge that these affiliations may include geographical, cultural, or
linguistic particularities. Some of these communities may be diverse and
some may be ethnically defined, and the motivation for participation may
stem from both culture and principle. This approach also acknowledges
that participation occurs across diverse spheres that require different lev-
els of involvement at different times in order to sustain themselves-
spheres such as the workplace, the courtroom, the classroom, and the social
realm. A fluid approach to civic identity might even redeem the vision of
a national community, because it accommodates the myriad affiliations
according to which the people of a diverse nation actually frame their par-
ticipation, thereby strengthening their motivation to participate at all.
Fluid civic identity acquires concrete meaning when juxtaposed with
observations about ethnic and linguistic-minority communities. Some
scholars have defined the civic identity of ethnic minorities as reflective
of a "bordered identity," according to which those minorities feel a dual
sense of place and people.16 But Latino identity in particular has been
described as "widely inclusive and fluid ... not statically determined by
one single experience of commonality."37 The metaphor of the border,
therefore, does not accurately capture an arguably emerging trend in the
Latino community specifically and among ethnic minorities generally.
Cultural and linguistic minorities who seek access to mainstream Ameri-
can life while longing to retain a connection to an ethnic cultural heritage
need not live in liminal ethnic spaces or find themselves caught between
two worlds-one present and American, one past and foreign. Instead,
the concept of fluid civic identity, according to which the features of an
ethnic identity may be incorporated into public life, strengthens an ex-
isting but conflicted desire among minorities to participate in the main-
stream without repressing an ethnically or linguistically different past.
I contend that the nature of immigration at this stage in history, cou-
pled with a legal and social climate more tolerant of ethnic and racial
difference, has created a social context in which ethnic minorities seek to
retain the characteristics that make them culturally different from the
American mainstream. In other words, the paradigm of the immigrant
bent on assimilation is not only no longer accurate, but also, in many
communities, anathema. Again, the Latino community puts this conclu-
sion into clear relief. Scholars writing on the Latino population have
noted that
They have been here for 450 years and for 45 seconds ....
They are establishing Spanish as a second language in the
United States alongside English .... They are breaking the
36 E.g., Yxta Maya Murray, The Latino-American Crisis of Citizenship, 31 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 503, 506 (1998).371d. at 512.
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melting pot. They want to assimilate and to remain separate, to
be part of the mainstream and to retain their own identity. Not a
national identity with a geographic enclave, not another Quebec,
but identity conferred by a larger culture of history, myth, geog-
raphy, religion, education, language, and affairs of state.l
Latinos desire a profoundly antiassimilationist form of integration. Over
the last year, a media frenzy has erupted over the increasing cultural and
political significance of the Latino population. At the heart of the report-
age on the demographic explosion stands a recognition that second and
third generation Hispanic Americans are increasingly reluctant to allow
their ties to Latin America to erode as the result of the passage of time.
Consequently, the definition of "American" itself is changing to include
features of Latin culture that until recently were considered foreign. t'
As national borders decline in significance, the inflow of linguistic
minorities promises to continue indefinitely,4 continually replenishing
linguistic-minority communities such that a complete transition of these
communities to the English-only model will no longer be possible. This
trend will sustain what I have called the mutability continuum. Because
of the proximity of Latin America and the increasing interdependence of
the nations of the Americas, Spanish-speaking linguistic minorities in
particular are likely to retain geographic and cultural affiliations that will
be marked by linguistic difference.4' The ability to use Spanish publicly
will be integral to the willingness of such groups to incorporate them-
selves into the American mainstream. Given the likelihood that demo-
graphically powerful communities intend to maintain this dual affiliation,
multilingualism should be regarded as a resource rather than as a threat
to national unity. The bi- or multilingual individual thus becomes a com-
plete public personality rather than a conflicted individual caught be-
n THOMAS VEYR, HISPANIC U.S.A. 1 (1988).
39 See, e.g., Affigne, supra note 9, at 524. For an example of the journalistic reporting
on this phenomenon, see Brook Larmer, Hispanics are Hip. Hot. and Making Histon.
NEWSWEEK, July 12, 1999, at 48. In a related story, it was noted that whereas Latinos over
thirty-five are more likely to identify themselves as American, those under thirty-five are
more likely to identify themselves as Hispanic or Latino. despite their removal from the
immigration experience. This generational change in attitude demonstrates that demo-
graphic changes in the Latino population are likely to be accompanied by a concomitant
desire to sustain a self-consciously Latino community. See John Leland & Veronica Cham-
bers, Generation N, NEWSWEEK, July 12, 1999. at 52.
4Cornell & Bratton, supra note 14, at 608 (noting also that Latinos in particular have
family networks that keep them tied to their countries of origin).
4 In their analysis of the economic costs of English-only policies. Cornell and Bratton
emphasize that, in a transnational world, it would be foolish to assume that homogeneity
reduces costs in all cases. Id. at 658. The notion that a common language produces
efficiency gains does not square with the demographic reality of a globalized world or of
an American Southwest increasingly affected by Latin American immigration.
2001]
HeinOnline  -- 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 147 2001
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
tween two worlds and separable into the private (non-English-speaking)
person and the public (English-speaking) one.42
Ultimately, given that my goal is to encourage broad and inclusive
participation in civic life, the salient characteristics of language as de-
scribed above suggest that accommodation should be pursued as a way to
structure public life according to the principle of fluid civic identity for
several reasons. First, accommodation helps counter the sense of aliena-
tion that linguistic and ethnic minorities feel from mainstream politics
and social life. Recognition of linguistic difference and the acceptance of
multilingualism as an asset will help bring people who might otherwise
disengage from public institutions into the public sphere, serving the in-
terest of broad and equal participation. Second, as the Supreme Court has
recognized, bilingual individuals inhabit two communities and can serve
as a bridge to bring those communities together.43 Fostering bilingualism
creates an intermediate space through which non-English speakers and
the dominant culture can interact. As the Supreme Court has stated,
"Language permits an individual both to express a personal identity and
membership in a community, and those who share a common language
may interact in ways more intimate than those without this bond. Bilin-
guals, in a sense, inhabit two communities, and serve to bring them
closer."44
Finally, accommodation recognizes that language, identity, and ori-
entation are closely connected, and that as a result, attempts to elide lin-
guistic difference set a baseline for participation that is not only unwork-
able but fundamentally unfair. Such a baseline forces minorities to
choose either an integration that will lead to the attenuation of constitu-
tive cultural practices or isolation and disempowerment.
The concepts of fluid civic identity and accommodation are, of
course, susceptible to critiques from various theoretical camps. In order
to clarify the parameters of my theory, a brief detour into some of the
political theory that pervades legal scholarship is necessary. I focus on
three schools of thought. The civic republican school, according to which
the political community should be regarded as a world of common
meaning so as to sustain political commitment, presents the first major
42 For example, multilingualism has formed the basis of social and educational policy
in nations such as India in order to ameliorate the consequences of colonialism in a way
that sustains the ethnic language alongside the dominant national language. See FASOLD,
supra note 22, at 8-12 (describing the development of multilingual nations).43 See Hernindez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 370 (1991) (holding that though the use
of the peremptory challenge to exclude potential jurors on the basis of ethnicity violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in this case the prosecutor
provided good reason for striking jurors based on their ability to speak Spanish). Of
course, Justice Kennedy speculates in the same breath that linguistic difference may also
be divisive. Id. at 371. The Court does not reach the question of whether language is a
subset of ethnicity or race but at least recognizes the importance of language to identity
and the resulting political consequences of that connection.
44 Id. at 370.
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challenge. But ultimately, the brand of common citizenship emphasized
by civic republicans proves elusive as a practical matter and divisive as
an aspiration. Liberal theory, with its emphasis on principle-based par-
ticipation and consensus, elevates understandings of citizen participation
beyond a call for common cultural practices. It also raises questions,
fundamental to the language debate, concerning the extent to which the
introduction of personal affiliations into the political dialogue jeopard-
izes efforts to achieve free and equal access. But liberal theory leaves
unclear how or whether inescapable cultural differences should be al-
lowed to enter into the political conversation. Multicultural theory thus
offers valuable insights in the language context, as it helps explain why
ethnic and cultural difference should be recognized-and even embraced-
in public life. At the same time, it raises the possibility that such incorpo-
ration, if allowed to unfold unchecked, may threaten the existence of a
political community whose participants are capable of engaging one an-
other on common ground. Ultimately, my goal is to find a way to incor-
porate certain multicultural insights into the parameters of the liberal
political conversation.
1. Civic Republican Understandings of Participation
Perhaps the most formidable obstacle to a fluid conception of civic
identity is the belief in the need for a common, historically defined iden-
tity-a common heritage to which all citizens feel connected. In the legal
literature, the civic republican school of thought most closely approxi-
mates the English Only movement's call for common Americanness.
Stated succinctly, the basic goals of the revival of civic republicanism in
the historical and legal academies include: (1) to understand the role that
republican theory has played in shaping our institutions; and (2) to de-
fend a view of our institutions as designed to improve the deliberative
capacity of citizens so that they may better participate in political life and
government.45 The overarching project, according to Cass Sunstein, is to
harness the human capacity to take charge of history-a process that can
only happen through public citizenship in a community consciously and
jointly shaping its policy.46 On one level, republican theory seems conge-
nial to a vision of fluid civic identity that strives to enhance the access of
all citizens to public life. Proponents of republicanism emphasize the
45 In his contributions to the republican revival, Cass Sunstein delineates four defining
features of the theory: (1) deliberation in politics, which subjects private interests to criti-
cal scrutiny, and which is made possible by civic virtues; (2) the equality of political ac-
tors, which eliminates sharp disparities in political participation; (3) a vision of univer-
salism, exemplified in the notion of a common good; and (4) the primary importance to
citizenship of participation in governmental processes. Cass R. Sunstein. Beyond the Re-
publican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1540-42 (1988).
6Id. (citing HANNA PITKIN, FORTUNE IS A WOMAN" GENDER AND POLITICS IN THE
THOUGHT OF NICOLO MACHIAVELLI (1984)).
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need for political engagement as a constitutive interest of the person.
This engagement involves "the ongoing revision of the normative histo-
ries that make political communities sources of contestable value and
self-direction for their members." 7 Understood in these terms, republican
theory seems to tolerate the acceptance of difference in the political
community precisely because of its awareness that the contours of that
community are constantly contested and evolving.48
Despite this acceptance of a dynamic community, the emphasis in
republican theory remains on commonality. For example, in his discus-
sion of the theory, Frank Michelman counterpoises the concepts of plu-
ralism and remembrance. While pluralism doubts or denies our ability to
communicate in ways that change others' views on normative questions,
remembrance of the origins of our system in certain historical public acts
can deeply inform our understanding of what it means for a people to be
both "self-governing and under the law."49 The debate as conceived by
Michelman involves a contested recollection of some kind of common
past upon which citizens draw to shape their identity as a people."0 In
other words, the foundations of the political community consist of a dis-
cursive myth of American identity, whose features may be debatable, but
in whose basic truth all citizens trust." This vision of national cohesion,
exemplified in cases such as Minersville v. Gobitis,52 runs throughout Ameri-
can history, suggesting the historical role of republican theory in shaping
our relationship to the political community and to the state." The joint
work among citizens that represents the hallmark of republican theory
can occur only when citizens are willing to identify common terms, even
as they enter the conversation from perspectives of difference.
By contrast, fluid civic identity assumes that the terms of the conver-
sation are moving targets. For participation to be a realistic possibility,
citizens' multiple affiliations must be embraced and not subsumed.
Michelman himself wonders if the extension of the "circle of citizens" to
include genuine diversity compromises republican thinking about juris-
47 Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1495 (1988).
48 Id. at 1502. Michelman refers to this element of republican community as the ca-
pacity for "jurisgenerative politics" and insists that it play a role in any explanation of
citizenship or participation. Id.49 1d. at 1507.
0Id. at 1513.
11 Id. at 1514.
52 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (holding that a requirement that students recite the pledge of
allegiance did not violate the First Amendment), overruled by W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that Jehovah's Witnesses could not be compelled to
pledge allegiance to the flag at the beginning of the school day). For further discussion of
Barnette, see infra note 131 and accompanying text.
1 See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, A Book of Laughter and Forgetting: Kalnan's
"Strange Career" and the Marketing of Civic Republicanism, Il l HARV. L. REv. 1025,
1068 (1998) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LittERALISMI
(1996)).
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generative politics.-4 Michelman wants to reclaim republicanism from its
"ancient context of hierarchical... communities" and reframe it in terms
of the modem longings for equality of respect and liberation from as-
criptive social roles. 5 Yet, in liberating citizens from ascriptive identities,
it becomes hard to ignore the flip side: that republicanism might also
wrest citizens from meaningful cultural affiliations and practices, such as
language, that orient them to the world and to one another."
When understood in this way, the republicans appear to be engaging
in work similar to that of English Only activists. Potential citizens must
be transitioned into the political community, the story goes. For example,
certain forms of bilingual education- seem clearly compatible with and
necessary for the forging of strong, communal ties. The courts' concerns
with ensuring that all children, regardless of national origin, be given the
tools to live the good American life echo this longing for a common civic
purpose or a shared understanding of long-term aspirations. The commu-
nitarian belief that the "members of a political community have a collec-
tive right to shape the resident population"5' lies at the heart of some
courts' understanding of bilingual education as an object of popular con-
trol.59 Moreover, Part III demonstrates that the language debate in the
educational context concerns not only the production of functionally lit-
erate Americans but also the formation of culturally literate Americans.
This view of language rights considers how to translate power to the citi-
zen. However, its methods involve melting linguistic difference into
mainstream identity as minority affiliations become subsumed by histori-
cally defined commonality. By contrast, my vision of fluid civic identity
holds that for participation to be meaningful, citizens must be allowed to
draw from their diverse practices and affiliations.
Finally, perhaps the most pronounced divergence of fluid civic iden-
tity from republican theory stems from the latter's almost exclusive em-
phasis on the government-centered aspects of citizenship. In the republi-
can political community, little space exists for the personal to shape one's
4 See Michelman, supra note 47, at 1505.
55 Id. at 1526.
-6 n her critique of the modem-day republicans' efforts to abandon repubhcanism's
historical tendencies toward homogeneity and the tyranny of the majority Linda Kerbr
expresses doubt that the republicans can have their cake and eat it too. She questions the
feasibility of removing from a theory intimately tied to a historical phenomenon those
traditional features its rebuilders wish it not to have. Linda Kerber. Making Republicanism
Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1668 (1988). "American dissenters:' Kerber argues. "tradition-
ally want liberalism with their republicanism; a large state with participatory democracy; a
neutral state with substantive visions of the public good; minority rights with majonty
rule" Id. at 1672.
57 The minority view of bilingual education (which argues that curricula should not
only teach English but also reinforce affiliations with the culture of origin) would seem
incompatible with this republican form of integration.
5
'NtICHAEL VALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 52 (1983).59See, e.g., Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
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identity as a citizen. At this point, liberal theorist Bruce Ackerman's du-
alist theory sharpens the picture. The concept of participation he intro-
duces makes room for the quasi-public and private dimensions of citizen-
ship.' The descriptive qualities of his dualist theory-that citizens need a
respite from times of political mobilization-also represent dualism's
liberating potential. The dualist understanding of how politics unfolds
suggests that it is perfectly acceptable in a constitutional regime for the
people to retreat from the common political community into their various
local communities. While this should not be taken as an endorsement of
ethnic isolationism or selfishness, the concept of the private citizen in-
cludes the freedom to live and work in a private and quasi-public way
according to one's own normative or comprehensive theories of the
world. Implicit in dualism lies a recognition that political participation
can be diffuse and occur in numerous contexts that are at different stages
of remove from the traditional sphere of participation-namely, voting.
To make participation meaningful as a principle, we must recognize that
different kinds and levels of participation foster civic engagement. In the
context of linguistic minorities, accommodation of linguistic difference
makes sense because it enables such varied participation.6"
Ultimately, language rights could be formulated in a manner consis-
tent with republican theory. If crafted as a tutelary right, or a right to be
taught English, language protection can be designed to prepare people for
citizenship functionally and to enable linguistic minorities to affiliate
with the discursive myth of the American dream central to republican
theory. However, this view of the political community constrains efforts
to accommodate linguistic difference and sidesteps the demographic and
social forces outlined above. From the strictly republican standpoint, ex-
tensive accommodation proves problematic for two reasons: (1) active
state participation in the preservation of affiliations that compete with the
public identity central to republican citizenship would frustrate the proc-
esses of jurisgenerative politics; and (2) broad, as opposed to token, rec-
60 See I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 295-322 (1991).
61 Not surprisingly, Michelman locates a characteristic strain in civic republicanism
that respects a non-state-centered notion of citizenship and encompasses not just formal
participation in affairs of the state but also the citizen's presence in public and social life at
large. Michelman, supra note 47, at 1531. Similarly, Sunstein points to de Tocqueville's
understanding of a variety of groups, some in local government, others purely private, that
furnish alternatives to purely state-based participation. Sunstein, supra note 45, at 1578.
Sunstein rejects the classical understanding of republicanism, which draws a sharp distinc-
tion between public and private interests, in favor of a universalism that recognizes social
difference in politics. Id. at 1563. Yet, as noted above, the extent to which social differ-
ences are allowed to influence the political process, and the extent to which the same proc-
ess can be devolved to include non-public activity while still pursuing the republican
agenda, remain contested. Ultimately, a theory that purports to incorporate liberty and
equality, public and private, and commonality and difference, without any consequences or
sacrifices, gives rise to suspicion. The effort to decentralize the notion of participation only
renders more problematic civic republicanism's emphasis on a common heritage as a
guiding force behind participation.
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ognition of the existence of non-public- and non-state-centered possibili-
ties for citizenship compromises the republican vision of a constant form
of deliberative participation. Given that this republican formulation fails
to capture the nature of participation in a simultaneously pluralistic and
globalized society, a liberal, dialogic approach to political participation
may offer a better alternative.
2. Liberalism, Dialogue, and the Acconunodation of
Linguistic Difference
In its simplest form, liberalism does not take a stand on any sub-
stantive theory of the good. Principles of neutrality prohibit anyone who
holds power from asserting that "his conception of the good is better than
that asserted by any of his fellow citizens, or that, regardless of his con-
ception of the good, he is intrinsically superior to one or more of his fel-
low citizens "'62 Some theorists point to the rhetoric of neutrality as sup-
portive of the vision of a color-blind Constitution or the view that a po-
litical culture can exist unmarked by any difference other than the differ-
ence of opinion.63 Yet, while theorists of the neutral state claim that it
does not condone a way of life but rather intervenes only to adjudicate
conflicts between ways of life, this position itself arguably endorses a
conception of the good.64
Ultimately, debating whether the state acts neutrally when it serves
as a mediator of conflict among different comprehensive belief systems
does little to advance our understanding of citizenship. Rather, what
should concern us is how the state structures that mediation, and whether
the liberal view accommodates the "diversity of human types;'-' Through
its emphasis on promoting dialogue among citizens, contemporary liberal
theory offers a viable theoretical basis for the accommodation of linguis-
tic difference and the promotion of free and equal participation.
Bruce Ackerman's liberal theory, in particular, depends on the exis-
tence of neutral dialogue. He defines "political talk" as a device for or-
ganizing citizens who would otherwise be free to follow different paths
to the good life: "The task of political conversation is to make it possible
62 BRUCE ACKERIAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11 (1980).
63See, e.g., William Galston, Defending Liberalism, 76 Am. POL. Set. REv. 621. 622
(1982).
"4See id at 625. Galston describes the neutral state as follows: ignorance about the
good implies relativism, which mandates tolerance, which in turn requires a neutral state,
which demands that all individuals be treated as equals and in a manner that neither pre-
supposes nor imposes what we lack. Id. Because individuals are morally equal. the state
must be morally neutral. Id. Galston embraces this neutrality but at the same time contends
that liberal societies that rest on the belief that the development of individual capacities is
an important element of the good are the most conducive to individual development. See
id. at 627.651& at 627.
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for each citizen to defend his power without declaring himself intrinsi-
cally superior ... -. "66 In essence, neutral dialogue seeks to build a com-
mon conversational referent, despite difference. Yet unlike republican
theory, neutral dialogue appears not to demand that difference be tran-
scended, but only that difference be subject to criticism so that citizens
may develop their identities in conversation with one another rather than
in isolation. 67 In the public forum, citizens engaged in dialogue may find
things to talk about besides the moral truth or cultural superiority, such
as how people who disagree about the moral truth might nonetheless ap-
proach the problem of peaceful coexistence. 61 Precisely because the lib-
eral state does not aim to discover moral truths, citizens must recognize
themselves as under certain dialogic obligations to one another.69 The
liberal state's "first principles of rationality" demand that each citizen be
able to offer a reason in defense of her position when asked to do so by
those who may be disadvantaged by her exertion of power.70 Unlike the
republican vision, the aim of social justice in a liberal state, according to
Ackerman, should not be about constructing a new, or metapolitical,
community, but rather about designing institutions that will guarantee
individuals the right to live as they choose.7 There is, in the end, no con-
versational victor.
72
Similarly, recognizing that a public conception of justice must be in-
dependent of controversial philosophical and religious doctrines, John
Rawls offers the notion of an "overlapping consensus. 73 Public agree-
ment among citizens on the principles or convictions that are common to
their comprehensive worldviews constitutes this consensus. Social unity
is not based on all people affirming the same conception of the good.
Instead, citizens shape political culture by publicly accepting a political
conception of justice that regulates the basic structures of society. Rawls
writes, "A political conception is at best but a guiding framework of de-
liberation and reflection .... [I]f it has narrowed the gap between the
conscientious convictions of those who accept the basic ideas of a con-
stitutional regime, then it has served its practical purpose. 7 4 To achieve
an agreement akin to what Rawls imagines, it is necessary that citizens
define the parameters of justice as fairness through cooperation or as co-
66 ACKERMAN, supra note 62, at 359.
67 The republican view of neutrality, if it can be called neutral, calls for consistent ap-
plication of the correct substantive theory. Contrast this view with the liberal belief that a
neutral state must allow members to live their lives according to their own substantive
theories of the good.
8 Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5, 8 (1989).
61 Id. at 10.
70 ACKERMAN, supra note 62, at 372.
11 Id. at 376.
72 Ackerman, supra note 68, at 19.
71 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1996).
74 Id. at 156.
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ordinated activity based on fair terms-virtues critical to a constitutional
regime. According to Rawls, to avoid relying on comprehensive doctrines
to define a political conception of justice, the terms of social cooperation
must be consistent among citizens.' For social agreement to be genuine,
people must be situated fairly. As this Article emphasizes, the parameters
within which citizens define an overlapping consensus or realize their
sources of agreement must be inclusive in order to account for a dynamic
view of the individual person as citizen.
The search for commonality thus requires ongoing dialogue among
people. For example, Rawls recognizes that free persons must be re-
garded as capable of revising and changing their views of the good and
should therefore not be defined according to a particular conception of
the good.76 This constant redefinition of self suggests that people should
be free to understand their civic identities and their relationships to one
another as fluid. At the heart of dialogic theory appears a concern similar
to the principles at the heart of fluid civic identity: free and equal access
to political dialogue must be possible in order to enable citizens to nego-
tiate their differences and achieve consensus in the face of these differ-
ences. Dialogic theories in general attempt to mediate between different
moral and ethical visions of the good life and define points of common-
ality on which people with different and ever-changing normative views
of the world can agree. Because agreement among people who hold
vastly different comprehensive views of the world will prove difficult,
social institutions must be structured to facilitate communication. Given
the differences among people that Rawls himself recognizes as vital, if
cooperation is to be possible, the political conversation and the structures
of public life must be shaped to account for these differences. Rather
than focus on how people may actually reach reasonable agreement when
they hold different conceptions of the good life, this Article concerns
itself with how political and social institutions should be structured to
make this conversation possible.
One of the questions that emerges when we consider the political
community in dialogic terms is the method or orientation of that conver-
sation itself-the question of language. The liberal conception of dia-
logue implies more than literal conversation. Even when people speak the
same language, words are filtered through different sets of expectations
that are shaped by a host of biases and affiliations. Perhaps dialogue is
best understood as the unfolding of relationships through communication
within communities, among communities, and between citizens and the
institutions that represent them. Within this framework, dialogue and the
sense of civic identity fostered by dialogue can be fluid. In a world filled
with linguistic minorities, such communication necessitates institutions
75 Id. at 157-58.76 1d. at 72.
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and practices that accommodate the needs of participants and accept the
tools of conversation, including linguistic tools, as they exist. When con-
sidered in the context of the language debate, then, liberal dialogic theory
gives rise to questions similar to those sparked by republican theory.
Such questions include: (1) whether the state is responsible for making
citizens capable dialogic participants; (2) how a state interested in pro-
moting dialogue should defend the rights of citizens to participate; and
(3) whether liberal dialogue permits the infiltration of personal
affiliations into the political conversation.
While the accommodation of linguistic difference may promote free
and equal access and participation, it also creates a space in public life
for personal, ethnic, and cultural affiliations. Because language repre-
sents more than a conversational tool, the accommodation of linguistic
difference requires the acceptance of personal cultural attitudes in the
political conversation. One cannot be a sincere and committed participant
in a dialogue about the future of the political community without having
a source of meaning on which to base one's contributions. The goal of
accommodating linguistic minorities is to preserve the means by which
these minorities express and derive meaning.
Whether this structural introduction of personal affiliations into the
dialogue among citizens undermines the liberal attempt to define public
life in terms of a community of principle proves a difficult question to
answer. The greatest potential deficiency of liberal dialogic theory as a
means of understanding how linguistic minorities should be treated may
well prove to be its aversion to including personal affiliations within the
dialogic parameters. Free and equal participation depends upon language
accommodation, but that accommodation may give rise to certain costs
that liberal theorists may not be willing to bear.
Accommodation of linguistic difference need not threaten the basic
project of creating an overlapping consensus. A person's linguistic affilia-
tion may be closely linked to a culture-based, principled vision that re-
jects equality and free participation. However, language itself, at its core,
is not an ideology or normative worldview. Rather, language provides an
individual with her orientation to the world around her, including her
orientation to a cultural identity. Accommodating linguistic difference
does not require acceptance of all of the normative views expressed via
that difference, nor is it synonymous with accommodation of culture.
Nevertheless, accommodating linguistic difference will introduce per-
sonal commitments into the political conversation that will at least com-
plicate efforts to foster cooperation among citizens, perhaps simply by
virtue of introducing a degree of linguistic distance among citizens." In
" Rawls' view of the public and the political differs from the definition of those same
concepts that undergird my theory of fluid civic identity. Whereas Rawls' overlapping con-
sensus seems to be focused on purely political discussion understood in electoral and rep-
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order to justify the creation of some linguistic separation among partici-
pants in the political conversation and to examine more fully the role that
personal commitments play in the formation of a meaningful civic iden-
tity, this Part concludes with a consideration of theories of culture,
autonomy, and difference.
3. Multicultural Theories of Participation
The primary value of culture-based theories of autonomy stems from
their recognition that personal, ethnic, and cultural affiliations form im-
portant components of public identity and the ways in which people ex-
press themselves in the public sphere. Multiculturalism can take the form
of state support and protection of ethnic or religious practices. In its most
aggressive incarnation, rather than rely on accommodation within a common
community of principle to account for difference, culture-based theory
supports the creation of ethnic enclaves within larger nations as the ulti-
mate vindication of cultural autonomy. The promotion of such culture-
based segmentation frustrates the effort to create a fluid civic identity
that permits people to retain or acquire multiple affiliations as part of
their public personas. While fluid civic identity can support the rights of
citizens to retreat into their culturally defined communities in search of
meaning for living or personal values, it calls primarily for structuring
public institutions in a manner that discourages such retreats as rejections
of participation in public life. However, because the extent to which such
differences should be included in public life remains unclear in the work
of liberal theorists, it is useful to turn to multicultural theorists such as
Will Kymlicka for guidance, despite the above reservations.
Kymlicka, perhaps the foremost proponent of multicultural political
theory, begins his analysis of multicultural citizenship by charging liber-
als with having failed to discuss explicitly the rights of ethnic and na-
tional minorities. s He contends that individual freedom is intimately
bound to membership in one's national group and that this fact must be
incorporated into definitions of citizenship.-9 In other words, ethnic mem-
bership, as membership, constitutes identity, such that a person acting in
public life cannot be divorced from her affiliation with a national group.
The capacity to participate, or to be an autonomous agent in political
culture, demands the "availability of meaningful options [which depend)
resentative terms, the theory of accommodation presented in this Article covers a broader
range of institutions, perhaps lessening the tension over the extent to which the ts'o vtewo
are willing to allow personal affiliations to enter into public discussion. Part of the thrust
of a fluid approach to citizenship is a recognition that civic identity is forged through par-
ticipation in multiple spheres. Public life is more varied than political life, strictly under-
stood. To sustain a principle of free and equal access, the public should ba understood as
encompassing the multiple spheres of citizenship.
78 WILL KYAMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 51 (1995).
791d. at 52.
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on access to a societal culture and on understanding the history and lan-
guage of that culture."80 Indeed, perhaps the best lesson to draw from
multiculturalism is that the affiliations that tie people to their communi-
ties can be robust and varied. My vision of fluid civic identity not only
recognizes that access and participation require such feelings of affilia-
tion but also acknowledges that these feelings can be tied to multiple
identities and multiple media.
In order to bring such ethnic affiliations into the public sphere ef-
fectively, Kymlicka offers a conception of group rights that regards
groups of people, as defined by particular characteristics, as political ac-
tors."' This conception of group rights shares an important feature with
fluid civic identity: namely, the recognition that participation by cultural
minorities in mainstream political life is possible once we accept that the
impulse to participate may be shaped in large part by the practices of and
ties to culturally defined groups. For Kymlicka, liberal protections of
freedom of association prove insufficient to give minority cultures the
political recognition they require. 2 The liberal fear may be that group
rights will undermine the sense of cooperation that holds liberal societies
together. However, group rights can be designed so that they do not iso-
late people from the political community but rather include minorities
and promote participation. 3 Moreover, a group-based citizenship need
not imply that the rights of citizenship will be substantively differenti-
ated. Instead, groups may pursue their interests as groups based on the
needs of the group-a process that encompasses the diffuse and commu-
nity-based nature of participation.
Kymlicka concludes that most liberal theorists have in fact recog-
nized that citizenship does not merely represent a legal status defined by
a set of rights and responsibilities. Rather, citizenship expresses an iden-
tity, which in a democratic, multinational state becomes increasingly
80 Id. at 83. At this point, Kymlicka makes a distinction that seems to dissolve later. He
argues that, unlike immigrants, national minorities (such as the Quebecois or Native
Americans) have the sort of societal cultures that should be protected because immigrants
arrive intending to integrate into mainstream culture, Id. Not only does this fail to describe
accurately contemporary waves of immigration, it fails to account for the fact that immi-
grants cannot shed their cultural ties immediately upon arrival. Moreover, the same auton-
omy arguments attach to those who arrive in new countries, even if by choice.
81 Id. at 130. To be sure, Kymlicka recognizes that the demands of some groups may
exceed what liberalism can accept. Internal, illiberal restrictions on the rights of minority
group members may fly in the face of basic liberal precepts. For instance, certain groups
may not seek a community within which individual freedom and personal autonomy are
valued and promoted. Kymlicka is willing to accept that, although tolerance is a liberal
value, promoting freedom and autonomy may require intolerance toward illiberal group,%.
Id. at 153-54.
2 See id. at 107-08.
81 Indeed, Kymlicka notes that first- and second-generation immigrants who remain
proud of their heritage are also among the most patriotic citizens of their new countries,
and that the desire for group or poly-ethnic rights is a desire for inclusion that is consistent
with participation in, and commitment to, mainstream institutions. Id. at 178.
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difficult to reconcile with a conception of citizenship based on common
culture or purpose.84 A commitment to group-differentiated rights can
change how minorities participate in public life without encouraging
them not to participateY For ethnic minorities, the recognition of their
status as ethnically different may prove critical to their ability to affiliate
freely with their adopted political community. In other words, recogni-
tion of difference is central to any act of fostering among minorities a
sense of loyalty to the American nation.
16
In general, Kymlicka's multicultural perspective seems to depend on
the existence not of a diversity of ethnicities but of actual nations of peo-
ple capable of advancing legitimate claims to self-government, such as
the Quebecois, Puerto Ricans, Palestinians, and indigenous peoples. If
the public acceptance of difference depends on a preexisting bargain with
the dominant political community, Kymlicka's ideas will be difficult to
generalize, particularly in the United States. Moreover, if our under-
standing of culture-based rights relies on the presence of actual national
communities, the ability to deal with the rights of immigrants will be
constrained. Using the status of nations within nations to define our multi-
cultural aspirations inhibits progress toward a fluid civic identity where
cultural and linguistic minorities will remain free to change their orien-
tations to the political community, as Rawls suggests free people must be
able to do.
However, if we define the multicultural goal not as creating separate
political communities for minorities but as enabling them to participate
in the existing one, the recognition of difference does not promote bal-
kanization, nor does it depend on the existence of a precise set of histori-
cal circumstances. Ultimately, the accommodation of linguistic minori-
ties does not require a robust theory of group rights. We can still main-
tain our civil rights laws' orientation toward the protection of the indi-
vidual and nevertheless recognize that the individual will engage in pub-
lic life through her multiple community affiliations. Taking a fluid ap-
proach to civic identity that recognizes that an individual's center may
shift over the course of her lifetime not only accounts for demographic
trends but also avoids a futile attempt to foster that which does not ex-
ist-a fixed cultural reference point. Encouraging a fluid form of partici-
pation will ensure that the communities that provide the cultural identity
central to a robust political identity have a fighting chance of surviving as
part of the civic landscape.
84 Id. at 192.
15 Id. at78.
8 Much of Kymlicka's theory depends on the existence of preexisting bargains be-
tween majority and minority cultures. Id. at 119. Throughout his analysis. Kymlicka re-
turns to the question of the terms of the bargain, differentiating between minority groups
that were once distinct societies in the space they currently occupy, and immigrants. %ho
may or may not come with a ready-made community attached.
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The vision of fluid civic identity developed above represents an ef-
fort to identify the preconditions necessary for broad participation in
public life. A fluid approach to civic identity recognizes the fact that ar-
ticulations of a common, historically defined American culture frame
participation in a manner not accessible to all people. Given the impor-
tance of cultural and linguistic affiliations to the act of public participa-
tion, this fictional common culture cannot be given primacy in public
life. The fluid view accepts the liberal notion of a political community
based on principle but adds to that vision the recognition that the struc-
tures created to facilitate cooperation or dialogue must account for sali-
ent differences in orientation, such as linguistic differences. The muta-
bility continuum of language itself demonstrates that a person's and a
community's affiliations can be multiple and changeable. Language af-
fects the ways in which people orient themselves both to the world and to
one another. Within a linguistic-minority community, there may be mul-
tiple orientations marked by varying degrees of closeness to the country,
culture, and language of origin. To sustain a community of principle
through cooperation, we must recognize that free and equal access re-
quires accommodation of the multiple affiliations that are a part of lin-
guistic minorities' lives. Active participation requires that this accommo-
dation occur across the myriad spheres of public and semipublic life. En-
gagement can be fostered by participation that is allowed to be at once
inclusive and diffuse and that is facilitated by the accommodation of dif-
ferent practices and orientations.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
To determine how fluid civic identity meshes with our constitutional
traditions, we must consider how language relates to the various catego-
ries of difference with which American constitutional law typically deals:
race, ethnicity, and religion. As compared to extant doctrine concerning
these forms of difference, a constitutional law of language does not exist.
In both scholarship and case law, legal understandings of language on its
own terms are remarkably underdeveloped. Language as a marker of dif-
ference has been largely subsumed into the category of ethnicity, and the
standard cultural assimilation story has obscured linguistic difference as
a feature of identity that should be contemplated when discussing the
American rights regime. This Part demonstrates how language fits be-
tween existing lines of constitutional analysis and why the constitutional
traditions that emphasize a deliberative political culture on the one hand
and the protection of individual rights on the other are best advanced
through the accommodation of linguistic minorities. It first explores how
linguistic difference relates to the race-based integration narrative as well
as discussions of difference, color-blindness, and status-based subordi-
nation. Because language fits only awkwardly into existing law designed
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to integrate and protect racial and ethnic minorities, however, this Part
then turns to consider what light the constitutional accommodation of
religious difference sheds on the ways in which linguistic difference
should be treated by the lav and incorporated into our institutions.
A. The Relevance of Race and Ethnicity to Language as a
Legal Category
Courts and scholars alike commonly assess language-based claims in
terms of doctrines elaborated to protect and integrate racial and ethnic
minorities. When language controversies arise, courts traditionally frame
the legal question in terms of whether the discrimination alleged is tan-
tamount to intentional discrimination based on race and not whether
there has been impermissible discrimination based on language. In this
section, I argue that language should not be analyzed as if it were race,
and that for two reasons, efforts to understand language as its own legal
category should not depend on existing legal approaches to race.
First, the courts themselves remain undecided about the relationship
between race and language and therefore offer few guidelines for making
language-based claims using race-based doctrine. For example, in
Henidndez v. New York, 87 the Court's consternation over how to treat lan-
guage was evident. In his plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy upheld the
use of peremptory strikes against potential bilingual jurors and found that
the case did not require the Court to resolve "the more difficult question
of the breadth with which the concept of race should be defined for equal
protection purposes. 88 Despite declining to treat language-based distinc-
tions as race discrimination for the purposes of Batsons analysis, Justice
Kennedy both recognized the close relationship between language and
ethnicity and acknowledged that bilingualism is a complex phenomenon
in its own right.90 In her concurring opinion, however, Justice O'Connor
concluded that "[n]o matter how closely tied or significantly correlated to
race the explanation for a peremptory strike may be, the strike does not
implicate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on race.", j In
other words, language is not race and therefore does not deserve the same
level of protection. As Part III demonstrates, the lower courts have only
further confused this issue, underscoring the conceptual difficulties of
using doctrine on race to deal with language-based claims.
Second, the race/ethnicity paradigm does not help the cause of ac-
commodating linguistic difference because current, color-blind legal in-
m500 U.S. 352 (1991).
JId. at 371.
89Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that peremptory strikes based on
race alone are impermissible).
90 Herndndez, 500 U.S. at 371.
9, Id. at 375 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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tuitions concerning race are overtly hostile to accommodation. Language
and ethnicity are powerfully connected, suggesting that they should be
treated similarly. However, current doctrine that declares race and eth-
nicity to be irrelevant to the individual's legal status92 undercuts this Arti-
cle's basic assumption that linguistic difference bears directly on the in-
dividual's ability to participate freely in public life. Thus, once we set
accommodation as the goal, the courts' current framework for evaluating
race provides limited guidance for achieving that goal.
Of course, the race/ethnicity paradigm is not entirely inapposite. De-
spite its limitations, particular elements of extant law on race and ethnic-
ity support the possibility of accommodation, and there are ways of un-
derstanding the courts' current approaches to racial integration and
equality that are congenial to the accommodation of linguistic difference.
Indeed, understanding language as a difference that should be accommo-
dated in order to promote equal participation could contribute to a re-
evaluation of the law's conclusions on the links between race, culture,
and behavior. Perhaps the language debate will lead to a realization that
race and ethnicity, because of their connection to cultural practices, are
relevant to a person's capacity and desire to participate in the public
sphere. Understanding language on its own terms, coupled with an
awareness of the profound connection between language and ethnicity,
may well support a reorientation of the color-blind paradigm to permit
forms of race-consciousness targeted at achieving equal participation.
Such a rethinking would enable those concerned with pressing language
accommodation in the courts to explore fully the links between language
and ethnicity without risking the courts' creation of a language-blind
paradigm that would thwart accommodationist efforts.
We may leave open the possibility of reorienting the law's treatment
of race to reflect what the language debate teaches us about the relation-
ship between culture and behavior. Insofar as we seek doctrinal guide-
lines for accommodating language, however, this Article must accept the
limits of the race paradigm and draw whatever possible from existing law
to support a theory of accommodation. The limitations and possibilities
of the race paradigm appear most clearly in two different strands of the
current color-blind approach to race: desegregation jurisprudence and the
tiered scrutiny regime of equal protection analysis. This section demon-
strates that while it is possible to develop a conception of integration
consistent with fluid civic identity, the law's reluctance to link equality
with the recognition of difference renders an integration-oriented, color-
blind approach incomplete. I conclude that the language question instead
9'See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that strict
scrutiny should be applied to all racial classifications); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 500, 515-16 (1989) (emphasizing that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
equal protection applies to individuals, and that a benign purpose for a racial classification
carries little weight as a state interest).
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should be approached as a matter of resolving status conflicts. Fluid civic
identity requires an approach to difference that recognizes the discrimi-
natory consequences of eliding difference in the name of color-blind
equality. Linguistic minorities, while first class citizens as English speak-
ers, should not become second class citizens as speakers of non-English.
1. The Meaning of Integration
Courts and legislators often understand linguistic difference as a bar-
rier to be overcome in the process of integrating cultural minorities into
American life.93 For example, the prime "training grounds" for citizen-
ship-the public schools-are understood by courts as forums designed
in part to exert a socializing influence and create common interests
among students.' Linguistic difference, in this context, may be a barrier
to equal citizenship insofar as such equality emanates from a shared con-
ception of political or social identity.' However, one need not regard in-
tegration solely or even primarily as a cultural objective. The kind of in-
tegration at the heart of fluid civic identity focuses on the removal of
structural impediments to the advancement of minorities.
If we begin our definition of integration with reference to the princi-
ple as espoused in Brown it Board of Education,"b the difficulty of using
an integration paradigm to accommodate difference emerges immedi-
ately. Some theorists argue that, taken to its natural conclusion, Brown
denies minority cultures separate status and encourages minorities' equal
participation without regard for their differences. 97 Will Kymlicka, for
example, characterizes Brown and the civil rights movement as impedi-
ments to his vision of ethnic justice because they engendered a color-
blind vision of the law:
But the influence of Brown was soon felt in areas other than race
relations, for it seemed to lay down a principle which was
equally applicable to relations between ethnic and national
groups. According to this principle, injustice is a matter of ar-
bitrary exclusion from the dominant institutions of society, and
93 E.g., Equal Educational Opportunities Act ("EEOA") of 1974. 20 U.S.C. § 17031 f)
(1994) (requiring that educational agencies take appropriate action to overcome language
barriers in schools); Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding
that the replacement of bilingual education with English immersion could constitute ap-
propriate action to overcome language barriers).
9- See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675. 681 119861: Ambach v.
Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 77-78 (1979) (citing social science research on the role of public
education in teaching values).
95 For an analysis of how courts have treated language in the education context, see
infra Part I1I.B.3.
9 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
97 E.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 78, at 59.
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equality is a matter of non-discrimination and equal opportunity
to participate. Viewed in this light, legislation providing sepa-
rate institutions for national minorities seems no different from
the segregation of blacks. The natural extension of Brown,
therefore, was to remove the separate status of minority cul-
tures, and encourage their equal participation in mainstream so-
ciety.98
Yet, this formulation of "integration" as equal participation could prove
congenial to accommodating linguistic difference if understood as some-
thing other than a call for racially and ethnically balanced communities
and institutions. An integrationist principle based on a belief in free and
equal access need not be assimilationist or require that people shed im-
portant differences. Equal access could mean the right to participate in a
public life that is not necessarily organized around a racially balanced
and ultimately homogenized mainstream.
Elements of the Brown decision itself support a principle of inte-
grated citizenship that accommodates difference. Brown connected citi-
zenship to personal qualities and correlated citizenship status with free-
dom from feelings of isolation that stem from a condition of difference.
The difference the Court targeted for eradication in Brown was not racial
difference but rather the difference of circumstance. This distinction im-
plies that racial justice demands mutual tolerance and respect, not same-
ness. In his analysis of Brown, David Strauss notes that the decision's
emphasis on the status of blacks in the community links the case to what
he calls the "stigma" and "subordination" concepts of discrimination, or
the popular modern notion that certain state actions are discriminatory
and constitutionally impermissible because they reduce the minority in
question to the status of a subject race." The desire to avoid stigma rests
in part on the concept of affiliation that, as I argue in Part I, proves cen-
tral to effective participation in public life.
The way in which the integration story begun by Brown has unfolded
challenges a balance-oriented approach to integration but may also be
useful as support for the accommodation of difference, even though the
courts may not have intended such a result. The most recent desegrega-
tion jurisprudence rejects the creation of racial balance in the public
schools as a constitutionally legitimate goal. Not only has the Court for-
98 Id. at 58-59. To be sure, Kymlicka problematizes this version of Brown. He does so
by (1) differentiating national minorities from black Americans. and (2) arguing that de-
stroying separate institutions for national minorities burdens them with the "badges of
inferiority" in the same way that separate institutions for blacks had racially discriminatory
consequences. Id. at 60.
99 David A. Strauss, Discrininatory Intent and the Taming of Brown. 56 U. Cmii. L.
REV. 935, 948-49 (1989).
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bidden states to use the suburbs to integrate inner-city schools."" but it
has also held that districts cannot be held responsible for segregation in
schools that is caused by voluntary residential segregation."" In effect,
the law's attempt to treat all people neutrally and as free agents in their
decisionmaking has provided justification for the existence of noninte-
grated communities. While those who favor integration might see these
decisions as undermining egalitarian aspirations, the decisions also
reflect a reality about the nature of civic identity that can be used to
benefit minorities seeking accommodation of their difference. At the
heart of these decisions stands a recognition of the rights of communities
to define themselves through their own choices about where and how to
live.'0 - Whatever its merits as a matter of education policy, the long line
of Brown progeny helps us to realize, at least in principle, that the proc-
ess of dismantling racially determined barriers to the institutions of pub-
lic life need not be synonymous with the creation of racially and ethni-
cally balanced communities. The courts have fashioned a principle of
integration based on equal access rather than on racial balance that
reflects a simultaneously inclusive and diffuse conception of participa-
tion. In other words, if we understand integration in terms of creating a
national community based on an overarching principle of free and equal
access, the organization of smaller communities within that national
community may be defined through private choices based on difference
as long as the public and quasi-public institutions that overlie such com-
munities are designed to accommodate the differences that emerge.
Extending the traditional integration paradigm to the language de-
bate ultimately exposes the difficulty of applying a balance-oriented ap-
proach to linguistic minorities. For example, desegregation has repeat-
edly frustrated efforts to advance bilingual education curricula. The pro-
vision of funds for bilingual instruction depends on the existence of a
critical mass of non-English speakers and is undermined by the drive to
11" Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 748-49 (1974) (holding that there can be no in-
terdistrict remedy absent an interdistrict violation). In Missouri t Jenkins. 515 U.S. 70.
102 (1995), the Court held that one of the main goals in school desegregation cases should
be to return school districts to local control. Indeed, the focus of school desegregation
jurisprudence has shifted from integrating the public schools to ensuring that the public
schools provide appropriate remedial and compensatory programs as well as sufficiently
equal educational programs. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); James E. Ryan,
Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 261-62 (1999).
101 E.g., Armour v. Nix, 446 U.S. 930 (1980) (upholding the lower court's ruling that
Atlanta school officials could not be required to remedy school segregation resulting from
residential segregation).
10 Critical race theorists further complicate the integration story by demonstrating that
the assumption that all blacks should seek integration-an ostensibly neutral rule imposed
by courts on the race conversation in the name of Brown-is in fact an assimilationist %,-
sion that exposes color-blindness as a fiction. See Jerome M. Cuip. Jr.. Black Peope in
White Face: Assimilation, Culture, and the Brown Case, 36 Wsi. & \IRy L. Rts.% 665.
678-79 (1995).
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avoid the isolation of racial and ethnic groups.103 There are a number of
ways to interpret this phenomenon. First, if bilingual education is meant
to help linguistic minorities assimilate, then assimilation depends in part
on segregation. Nevertheless, this segregation only further entrenches
linguistic difference by ensuring that linguistic-minority communities
remain geographically and probably culturally cohesive, frustrating as-
similative goals. Second, to the extent that our vision of equal justice
depends on the rights of individuals to make choices about how to con-
struct their communities, the ability of racial and ethnic minorities to
maintain ties to their non-mainstream identities must be included in that
vision. Regardless of whether bilingual education serves as an integrative
device or as a means of preserving cultural difference, its existence,
made necessary by the presence of linguistic minorities in the first place,
underscores the cultural complexity of the total political community. A
balance-oriented integration paradigm simply cannot handle the chal-
lenges raised by communities of linguistic difference.
By contrast, the recognition of the importance of self-defining com-
munities to politics fits nicely with a fluid approach to civic identity. Be-
cause individuals hold multiple affiliations that give their participation in
public life context and meaning, treating the political actor atomistically
proves inconsistent with the very nature of public participation. A fluid
model of politics rejects the notion of a common political center toward
which individuals owe allegiance and replaces it with a dynamic model
within which actors affiliate freely with multiple groups and political
identities as they participate in public life. This trend toward multiplicity
may seem anathema to the traditional integrationist ideal, but it proves
perfectly consistent with the realization, outlined in Part I, that participa-
tion occurs in myriad spheres and is motivated by multiple orientations.
Thus, participation by and access for minorities can be fostered to the
extent that political and social institutions are able to incorporate salient
differences, such as language diversity, into their parameters, even as
hopes for the creation of a racially balanced but neutral mainstream fall
by the wayside.
2. The Language Debate as Status Conflict
When we move from the integration context, the underlying princi-
ples of which are sufficiently malleable to create room for the incorpora-
tion of linguistic difference into public life, to traditional equal protec-
tion analysis and the tiered scrutiny regime, the possibilities for accom-
modation using race-based doctrine are more limited. The courts' current
color-blind approach actively prohibits state decisionmaking based on
103 E.g., Rachel F. Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75 CAL. L. Riv.
321. 357-58 (1987).
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certain categories of difference absent the elusive compelling state inter-
est. Because language has a functional component and bears on the
speaker's capacity to participate in public life, it would be inappropriate
to add language to the list of suspect classes as currently understood. In-
deed, scholarly critiques of color-blindness point to the very drawbacks
that render strict scrutiny a problematic test to use in accounting for the
role that language plays in defining social and legal relationships. Schol-
ars note that the failure of color-blind constitutionalism to recognize dif-
ference saddles courts with an inability to appreciate the social positions
that correspond to race and ethnicity"'0 The treatment of race as a fixed,
immutable trait allows courts to consider race as an "'objective, apoliti-
cal" characteristic and therefore as a characteristic divorced from social
context.105 When race is understood this way, color-blind strict scrutiny
seems appropriate because color-consciousness is more likely to lead to
discrimination through the invidious use of racial classifications than to
remediation of discrimination. In other words, in the name of race neu-
trality, courts are required to overlook the social realities that correspond
to racial classifications and ultimately end up ignoring the persistence of
racial subordination.
Existing scholarship offers an alternative to the color-blind interpre-
tation of equal protection guarantees. The formulation of equality as an
antistatus or antisubordination principle, while marginal as a doctrinal
matter, captures the social reality of linguistic minorities and provides
constitutional justification for efforts to accommodate linguistic differ-
ence. 10 6 The failure to account for factors such as linguistic difference
when devising policies or laws designed to integrate minorities into pub-
lic life threatens to inhibit free and equal participation. Linguistic mi-
norities may be constrained not just by communication barriers but by
discrimination that stems from the cultural construction of language.
Considering the language debate in terms of status conflict thus adds a
second dimension to the language-equality narrative by more explicitly
defining, in cultural terms, the discrimination that linguistic minorities
face. By considering the status-based approach to understanding differ-
104 E.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 Si.%N. L.
REv. 1, 18 (1991).
105 Id. at 27-36. The treatment of race as an immutable characteristic is further under-
mined by the increasingly multiracial nature of our society. The more multiracial the
population, the more likely it is that race will come to represent an affiliation to which an
individual may, in some sense, choose to subscribe. Like language, race can be said to
exist along a mutability continuum. This recognition underscores the need to reconsider
the formal, categorical approach to race in favor of an equal protection jurisprudence de-
signed to help courts understand how race and the practices associated with race relate to
the individual's capacity to participate in public life.
106For an example of the antisubordination approach. see Kenneth L. Karst. Citizen-
ship, Race, and Marginality, 30 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1. 1 (1988). Karst locates in the
equal citizenship principle of the Fourteenth Amendment a prohibition against the treat-
ment of groups or individuals as members of an inferior caste.
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ence, we move one step closer to completing a framework within which
to ground fluid civic identity in actual legal practice.
Throughout American history, controversies surrounding linguistic
difference have centered around calls for national unity and have been
inflected by value- and culture-laden overtones. The debates have never
been strictly about the efficiency of communication. Lawyers have long
understood the cultural dimension of language controversies. The state
attorneys in Meyer v. State °7 defended the state's proscription against
language instruction before the ninth grade with the following argument:
To allow the children of foreigners ... to be taught from early
childhood the language of the country of their parents was to
rear them with that language as their mother tongue. It was to
educate them so that they must always think in that language,
and, as a consequence, naturally inculcate in them the ideas and
sentiments foreign to the best interests of this country. The stat-
ute, therefore, was intended ... to require ... that until they had
grown into [the English language] and until it had become a part
of them, they should not in the schools be taught any other lan-
guage.'
0 8
The lawyers in Meyer understood that the language a person speaks and
is taught shapes how she thinks and helps determine her cultural
affiliations. The fact that the presence of non-English languages in public
life has historically been seen as a sign of an impending Tower of Babel
suggests that some believe that linguistic minorities pose a threat to cul-
tural coherence that should be vigorously resisted." 9
Critics of the English Only movement situate it in this historical tra-
dition, which has defined American identity through the law of lan-
guage. 10 By aligning the language debate with cultural allegiances, the
English Only movement has set the terms of the debate as the American
versus the foreign, with the English language as the symbol of national
unity. The English Only movement's philosophy reflects the fact that de-
bates over language often involve debates over status. According to the
movement, languages other than English and the cultures with which
they are associated are unintelligible and therefore do not belong in the
public sphere. The movement's goals include the designation of English
as the official language, the restriction of government funding for bilin-
gual education to short-term transitional programs only, and the control
107 Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100 (Neb. 1922).
108 Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
109 But see Perea, supra note 3, at 352 n.455 (noting that the "inability of many persons
to understand Spanish does not make the language itself inherently unintelligible, or tiny
less intelligible than English").
'Old. at 277.
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of immigration to counterbalance the perceived trend toward language
segregation."' In response to the dramatic growth of the Latino popula-
tion, the movement's leaders ask: "Will the present majority peaceably
hand over its political power to a group that is simply more fertile?"" 2
The movement is concerned not just with the perpetuation of a majority
culture, but with the perpetuation of the right culture.
In the public at large, the use of language as a marker of status re-
mains legitimate in a way that similar use of race and ethnicity does not.
In her work on accent, Mari Matsuda observes that employers openly
admit to having discriminated on the basis of accent and feel free to es-
tablish overt workplace regulations restricting the use of non-English.
She writes, "we come up against the insider/outsider culture of domi-
nance that is so fundamental to our understanding of the universe that we
don't see it as ideology.""3 Language-based differences are seen as le-
gitimate tools of social ordering. Indeed, sociolinguists themselves rec-
ognize that in different social contexts languages have different prestige
values. As Juan Perea notes in his discussion of sociolinguistics, "dis-
course itself.., and the ordering of discourse ... reflect hierarchy and
relationships of power in society.""' Efforts to relegate languages other
than English to the so-called private sphere suggest a desire to preserve
status hierarchies, much as the characterization of domestic violence and
sexual harassment as part of the personal sphere reinforces gender hier-
archies. Even the protection of linguistic difference as a liberty interest
beyond the reach of the state-the approach taken by the Court in Meyer
v. Nebraska' --reinforces a hierarchy according to which the dominant
language controls public discourse and decisionmaking, even as linguis-
tic difference is allowed to persist in people's private lives.
This picture of the language debate provides a concrete example of
the cultural and legal theories that describe social relationships in terms
of status-based dynamics. For example, in his development of a constitu-
tional approach to the dismantling of status hierarchies, Jack Balkin ex-
plains that "[t]he Constitution cannot be neutral in cultural struggles be-
cause democracies will not always dismantle unjust status hierarchies on
their own.""' 6 Combatants in culture wars, according to Balkin, fight over
the extent to which existing forms of social stratification should persist or
be transformed.1 7 Like those who have used status-conflict analysis to
assess bilingual education controversies,' 8 Balkin draws from the work
"'Id. at 343.
"2 Id. at 345.
"3 Matsuda, supra note 33, at 1397.
14 Perea, supra note 3, at 352.
15 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
116 Jack Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313. 2367 (1997).
1
7 Id. at 2320.
1 8E.g., Moran, supra note 103.
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of Joseph Gusfield on the temperance movement, who writes: "Each
status group operates with an image of correct behavior which it prizes
and with a contrasting conception in the behavior of despised groups
whose status is beneath theirs."" 9 Resolution of these conflicts requires
that the Constitution be understood to reach not just civil and political
rights but equality of social and cultural status. 20
As the analysis of bilingualism and the mutability continuum pre-
sented in Part I suggests, simply pulling non-English speakers up to the
English-speaking rung will not solve the language-status conundrum. A
view of citizenship that ties theories of equality both to sense of self and
to relative social position' calls for the accommodation of linguistic mi-
norities; the complexity of linguistic-minority communities as embodied
in the mutability continuum suggests that such accommodation should be
broad in order to account for the full range of linguistic difference. A
status-based approach to language rejects symbolic state declarations of a
dominant culture as marked by language in favor of the accommodation
of linguistic difference in the public sphere.
Using this status model allows us to venture outside the color-blind
paradigm to consider how difference affects social position. We need not
rely on race-neutral integration as the only method of redress. The status
model, which defines our constitutional goal as the eradication of forms
of second-class citizenship, could in fact be said to reject the integration
paradigm as an impossible aspiration. According to the status approach,
the processes of social ordering based on difference will constantly frus-
trate attempts to shape a harmoniously integrated mainstream. Moreover,
fashioning a common civic identity through an integration defined in
terms of common practices could require making status-based choices
that might be constitutionally impermissible-a result that would be par-
ticularly likely once we characterize the Constitution's equality princi-
ples as antisubordination requirements. When this status dimension is
combined with a free and equal access principle, the justification for ro-
bust accommodation of linguistic difference becomes clear. Regarding
linguistic-minority practices as less socially desirable than English-
language customs inhibits free and equal participation by linguistic mi-
"
9 
JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 14-15 (2d ed. 1986), quoted in Balkin, supra note 116, at 2331,
12' See Balkin, supra note 116, at 2343-44.
121 Balkin refers to Karst's formulation of egalitarian citizenship as supportive of an
antistatus Constitution. He writes:
[Karst's] equal citizenship principle holds that each individual is presumptively
entitled to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and
participating member. Stated negatively, the principle forbids the organized soci-
ety to treat an individual as a member of an inferior or dependent caste or as a
nonparticipant.
Id. at 2353 n.129.
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norities. The cultural dimension of language highlights the need for a
fluid formulation of civic identity according to which linguistic differ-
ence can be incorporated into the public sphere rather than assimilated
out of it.
Ultimately, challenges arising from conditions of difference tend to
pit cultural diversity against the assimilationist impulse. Attempts to
make public life accessible to racial and ethnic minorities need not coin-
cide with a belief in the value of balance-oriented integration or with
identification of a mainstream. Additionally, a conclusion that govern-
ment can avoid sponsoring assimilation simply by respecting cultural
difference misunderstands the reality of the linguistic minority. Mere re-
spect for linguistic differences will not prevent those differences from
being obstacles to meaningful participation. Moreover, precisely because
of the pressures outlined in Part I and the malleability of language gener-
ally, mere respect will not counter the erosion of linguistic differences,
which has status implications by virtue of the fact that endangered lan-
guages and the people who speak them become marginalized.
For several reasons, existing jurisprudence on race and ethnicity of-
fers an incomplete paradigm. First, while racial desegregation doctrine
can be interpreted to permit the accommodation of difference, it does not
offer coherent justifications or guidelines for that accommodation. Sec-
ond, because the color-blind approach to equality heavily restricts the
extent to which the law can affirmatively take account of race and eth-
nicity, understanding language as a function of race would subject lan-
guage to a strict scrutiny that would thwart accommodationist objectives.
Because language ability may be eroded and the social status assigned to
non-English faces demotion under the pressures of an English-dominant
society, protection of linguistic minorities requires a recognition of dif-
ference distinct in kind from the antidiscrimination protections currently
afforded racial and ethnic minorities.
Once we accept that the appropriate response to the mutability con-
tinuum is not to eradicate the linguistic difference but to treat it as a
status concern that we must legally accommodate, guidelines for that
accommodation must be derived from some other existing source. De-
spite the limitations just discussed, extant equal protection law suggests a
potentially workable, albeit incomplete basis for a cause of action based
on language discrimination: intermediate scrutiny. Creating a language
classification would allow courts to address language discrimination as a
problem on its own terms and not as a problem related to race discrimi-
nation. As will become clear in Part III, accommodating linguistic differ-
ence requires an ability to make subtle distinctions concerning the nature
of language as it plays out in the various spheres of participation. Not
only would the application of strict scrutiny restrict the use of such gra-
dations, but also its emphasis on remedying historical discrimination be-
lies the fact that the language question is addressed to contemporary and
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future-oriented demographics arising from forces such as globalization,
constant immigration, and aversion on the part of minorities to assimila-
tion. But to the extent that language needs a home in equal protection
doctrine, the application of intermediate scrutiny would allow courts to
account for the impact that language has on linguistic minorities' orien-
tation to social and legal institutions while still requiring language-based
distinctions to be connected to a legitimate objective. Rather than assess
language as a function of race, courts could approach language-based
distinctions using a level of scrutiny designed to capture the unique fea-
tures of language.
Yet, while fitting language into the scrutiny regime will help courts
protect linguistic minorities qua linguistic minorities from discrimina-
tion, the complex status concerns surrounding linguistic difference re-
main. As noted above, the eradication of language-based status distinc-
tions requires more than antidiscrimination protection-it requires the
incorporation of linguistic difference into public life. Precisely because
extant doctrine dealing with race rejects the notion that race is relevant to
a person's capacity to participate, we must venture outside the race and
ethnicity context to consider how the law accommodates another form of
difference in order to develop a blueprint for accommodating language.
B. The Accommodation of Religious Difference as a Model for the
Language Debate
Scholars have drawn parallels between Establishment Clause juris-
prudence and opposition to the symbolic effects of English-only legisla-
tion.'22 Decisions such as Engel v. Vitale'23 equate the symbolic power of
government support of particular religious beliefs with an establishment
of religion that threatens oppression and destroys diversity: "[WIhen the
power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is
plain.*" 24 Similarly, declarations of English as the official language sug-
gest government support for a mainstream public culture that compro-
mises diversity and perpetuates language-based status inequalities. The
courts' chosen antidote to the establishment of religion has been the ac-
commodation of religious difference. For a lesson in the accommodation
of difference, this Article turns to the law of religion.
Accommodation of religious difference depends on various princi-
ples, most of which can be applied to some degree to language. Religious
freedom constitutes an element of personal liberty that the law not only
22 Perea, supra note 3, at 363-70.
123 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
124 Id. at 431, quoted in Perea, supra note 3, at 364.
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tolerates but also affirmatively protects. Courts have designed accommo-
dation to ensure that the application of the law is sensitive to the ways in
which religious adherents have chosen to organize their lives around their
beliefs. One scholar has argued that free exercise doctrine is "informed
by the attitude that religion and religious practices are important and
valuable aspects of human experience."' -2 Indeed, the constitutional pro-
tection of religion has been said to be justified by religion's centrality in
the formation of the individual's moral identity.'-" Accommodation also
has deep historical roots that can be traced to the recognition that both
stability and freedom of conscience in a religiously diverse society de-
pend on the state's ability to enable free exercise without giving primacy
to any single belief system. This purpose ultimately requires that gener-
ally applicable laws be adjusted to make the balance possible.
Like race and ethnicity, religion and language constitute identity.
shape the individual's worldview, and represent defining features of
communities of difference. At the same time, the law, which emphasizes
color-blindness when it comes to race and ethnicity, struggles to accom-
modate religious difference by enabling its free exercise. In turning to
religion to develop a theory of language accommodation, I do not mean
to suggest that language bears a stronger resemblance to religion than it
does to ethnicity, nor do I recommend that parties pressing language-
based claims adopt the machinery of accommodation used in religion
case law. Rather, I look to religion to find a justification for accommo-
dating difference. 2 Because language has a behavioral component, re-
ligion offers a rich analogy for the purposes of this Article: the law rec-
ognizes the conduct-oriented aspects of religion as worthy of accommo-
dation, even as it ignores conduct or behavior arguably associated with
race and ethnicity. Additionally, while the law accepts that religious dif-
ference affects how believers interact with the state and in the public
sphere, the state is prohibited from favoring any particular religion. From
the law's perspective, then, no status hierarchies among religions exist.
The question raised by religion as a marker of difference is thus similar
1,_ Gotanda, supra note 104, at 65-66.
126 David A.J. Richards, Sexual Preference as a Suspect (Religious) Clhssification: An
Alternative Perspective on the Unconstitutionality of Anti-LesbianlGav Initiatives, 55 Oito
ST. L.J. 491,508 (1994).
'- Some scholars have used the principles elaborated under the Free Exercise Clause
to develop a theory for how sexual orientation should be regarded by the law. See. eg.. al;
William N. Eskridge, A Jurisprudence of "Comting Out": Religion. Homnosexulit. and
Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law. 106 YA L.i. 2411 t 19971.
Eskridge argues that the overarching principle that emerges from the law of religion is -the
idea of benign religious variation. It is both acceptable and good that we are a nation of
diverse religious communities.... [R]eligious diversity is good because it offers spiritual
and emotional satisfaction to a broader range of people:' Id. at 2429. This notion of benign
variation suggests why the incorporation of linguistic difference into the public sphere
could have stabilizing and liberating benefits similar to those accrued by the acceptance of
religious diversity.
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to the issues raised in the language debates: how can law and society ac-
commodate cultural difference without also compromising a commitment
to a common goal, whether it be the goal of a state neutral as to religion
or the formation of a principle-based political community?
The parallel between religion and language is imperfect for a few
reasons. First, as a category, language falls somewhere between the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses. Whereas the Bill of Rights has en-
shrined one's right and capacity to worship as one pleases, no constitu-
tional directive on language exists. At the same time, and perhaps more
importantly for this Article, whereas the proscription against state entan-
glement with religion operates in constitutional tension with free exercise
principles, no corresponding constitutional prohibition against state in-
volvement in language policy sets limits on the accommodation of lin-
guistic difference. Because language is not synonymous with an ideology
or a belief system, state accommodation of linguistic difference does not
present the neutrality problems that often arise in the accommodation of
religions, which themselves sometimes challenge the commitment to ba-
sic principles of freedom or equality.
Though language is not itself a belief system, its intimate connection
to ethnicity does suggest that linguistic differences may be attached to
culturally defined, normative worldviews. Language does not, however,
inherently reject the concept of a community of principle. Language is
more properly understood as a set of practices that orients individuals to
the various possibilities for structuring their normative takes on the
world. Indeed, examples of state-sponsored multilingualism run through-
out American history and have not given rise to the kind of state ortho-
doxy or factional infighting that the Establishment Clause was enacted to
prevent.'28 It is the failure to accommodate language that results in the
sorts of consequences the Establishment Clause is meant to avoid-the
privileging of certain beliefs at the expense of diversity and freedom. Thus,
to the extent that the Establishment Clause exists to prevent religion-
based oppression, the limiting principle behind it need not be applied to
the accommodation of language-particularly because accommodating
linguistic difference will not likely reverse the dominance of the English
language. To the extent that a limiting principle for linguistic accommo-
dation is necessary, however, I argue that accommodation should be per-
mitted insofar as it is intended to enhance linguistic minorities' partici-
pation in the various spheres of civic life.
Second, scholars distinguish religious communities of shared belief
and common characteristics, guided by a normative authority and inter-
128 See Perea, supra note 3, at 284-323. While Perea also raises countervailing tensions
in favor of the exclusive use of English, the point is that state sponsored multilingualism
does not present establishment problems of constitutional proportions. See Perea. supra
note 3.
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pretive identity, from racial and ethnic communities. The protection of
religious freedom is arguably, at its core, about safeguarding the funda-
mental freedom of conscience-a principle difficult to apply to language.
Of course, this may be too stark. While ethnic communities may lack the
normative "belief system" of religions, the former do have "a shared
history, a community, which ... asserts a tug on its members'" '' that
generates feelings of affiliation and belonging in ways similar to religion.
Like religion, language shapes an individual's orientation to the world at
large and to the people around her, affecting the way in which she under-
stands social relationships and processes social stimuli. Because religious
beliefs shape how believers function socially and politically, a theory of
simple respect or tolerance proves insufficient. Because "belief and ac-
tion cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments;'I! ' accommo-
dation of religious behavior becomes necessary to protect the religious
system as a whole. Similarly, language itself affects linguistic minorities'
capacities to function politically and socially. Given the mutability con-
tinuum, mere tolerance of, and respect for, linguistic difference will not
protect it from erosion. A theory of accommodation thus seems just as
important to the preservation of language as it does to the preservation of
religion.
Accommodation of religious minorities affords them the ability to
live consistently with the law without having to compromise religious
principles. Similarly, the accommodation of linguistic minorities would
give them what native English speakers possess inherently-the ability to
function and participate within American social and political institutions.
Just as free exercise jurisprudence ensures that the law remains sensitive
to the ways in which religious adherents have chosen to organize their
lives, the law should take account of the ways in which language organ-
izes the lives of linguistic minorities. This section examines the princi-
ples at work behind the courts' efforts to accommodate religion, a form
of difference with which language shares important features.
1. Legal Attempts to Accommodate Religious Difference
Without question, the Supreme Court's religion-related jurispru-
dence speaks of the importance of common ground. However, even as the
Court appeals to what could be described as assimilationist principles, it
recognizes the importance of preserving certain distinctive features of
individual religious communities. Though the balance the Court has struck
has not always been in favor of difference, the case law in this area at
least acknowledges a tension between difference and assimilation. The
1-9 STEPHEN CARTER, DIssErr OF THE GOVERNED 69 (1998).
1-0Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (upholding exemption for Amish
community from requirement of public school attendance after the eighth gradei.
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Court has tried to resolve this tension with reference to traditions of par-
ticipatory democracy, the rights of the dissenter, and the diffusion of
power away from a dominant cultural group.
For example, in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,"' the
Court upheld the rights of school children who were Jehovah's Witnesses
to refrain from saluting the American flag as part of their school's daily
programs. Despite previous articulations of the importance of this sym-
bolic activity to national unity and to the inculcation of patriotism among
school children, 3' the Court held that the right to self-determination sup-
ported the students' exception to pledging allegiance to a common com-
munity. 33 While the decision did not turn on the fact that the students
were members of a particular religious minority, implicit in the Court's
defense of the free speech rights of the dissenter was a recognition that
beliefs emanating from a dissenter's minority point of view may justify
exempting her from an affirmation of the symbols and myths that pro-
mote a common American identity. The Court wrote, "As governmental
pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more bitter as
to whose unity it shall be .... [W]e apply the limitations of the Constitu-
tion with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse
or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization."'-'
In Sherbert v. Verner,'35 one of the foundational cases in the devel-
opment of the theory of religious accommodation, the Court explored the
extent to which generally applicable legislation might burden free exer-
cise rights. The Court held that a statute disqualifying a Seventh Day
Adventist from receiving unemployment benefits because she conscien-
tiously refused to work on a Saturday-her Sabbath-imposed a burden
on her free exercise of religion.3 6 The Court contrasted the policy, which
forced the appellant to "choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits," with the state's observance of a Sunday
Sabbath, noting that the majority of believers in the state were not re-
quired to make the same choice.'37 In other words, in order to ensure that
the state treated the Seventh Day Adventist and the majority of believers
equally, the Court recognized the need to accommodate the appellant's
religious difference. Additionally, the Sherbert Court established that to
justify burdening the free exercise of religion, the state must demonstrate
that it has a compelling state interest.
01 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
32 E.g., Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
"31 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624.
1 ' Id. at 641.
135 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
136 Id. at 403.
1
37 Id. at 404.
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Sherbert v. Verner and cases like it -s illustrate that when the state
defines its relationship to its individual citizens, it must respect and ac-
commodate differences among citizens that reflect identity or belief
rather than elide them through ostensibly neutral legislation. According
to the Court, accommodation is justified as long as it does not render the
recipient an unproductive member of society. Indeed, the goal of creating
productive citizens often demands the accommodation of difference.
When applied to linguistic minorities, effective accommodation requires
that the state make room for linguistic difference in the public sphere
rather than ignore its existence or attempt to eradicate it.
The Court significantly curtailed its accommodation of religion in
Employment Division v Smith.39 In Smith, while the Court recognized
that generally applicable laws may sometimes require exceptions for re-
ligious minorities, it drew the line at making an exception to the drug
laws for members of the Native American church who use peyote in their
religious rituals.140 This refusal to accommodate a minority religious
practice may well reflect the Court's concern for public health and safety
rather than its suspicion of the accommodation of religion as a principle.
Moreover, neither Justice O'Connor and the three dissenters in Smith nor
Congress found the majority's weakening of the compelling government
interest requirement for burdening religious minorities entirely persua-
sive. Snith thus generated heated public debate over the accommodation
of religion, prompting Congress to pass the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act ("RFRA"),' 41 which guaranteed expansive accommodation of the
practices and policies of religious organizations by resurrecting Sherbert
v. Verner's compelling state interest requirement.
-4 2
While the scope of the accommodation of religion as a technical
matter of law has been restricted in recent years, as a matter of public
debate the question remains open, and strong support for expansive ac-
commodation exists. For example, in her concurrence in Smith, Justice
O'Connor criticized the Court for allowing the government to prohibit,
without justification, conduct mandated by a religion so long as it applies
the prohibition universally. 4 Though agreeing with the Court's decision
138 E.g., Frazee v. IlL. Dep't of Employment Sec.. 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding that a
refusal by a Christian to work on Sundays did not permit the state of Illinois to deny him
unemployment benefits); Thomas v. Review Bd.. 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding, in an 8-1
decision, that Indiana's denial of unemployment benefits to a Jehovah's Witness. % ho left
his job at a munitions factory based on his religious objections to war. violated the Free
Exercise Clause).
139494 U.S. 872 (1990).
'4 Id. at 890.
14142 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
142 Though the Court later invalidated RFRA as applied to the states in City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997), it did so on the grounds that the law exceeded Con-
gress's power to pass remedial legislation under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and not based on opposition to principles of accommodation.3Smith, 494 U.S. at 893 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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to uphold the Oregon law, she recognized the need for active state in-
volvement in ameliorating differential harm to cultural minorities. 14 In
her concurring opinion in City of Boerne v. Flores,'45 Justice O'Connor
agreed with the Court's invalidation of RFRA on federalism grounds but
dissented from the Court's disposition of the case. She wrote that the
Court should have used Boerne to reexamine the holding in Smith, which
she continued to believe was wrongly decided, and to reinstitute the
compelling state interest test.'
4 6
[T]he Free Exercise Clause is not simply an antidiscrimination
principle that protects only against those laws that single out re-
ligious practice for unfavorable treatment. Rather, the Clause is
best understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to par-
ticipate in religious practices and conduct without impermissi-
ble government interference, even when such conduct conflicts
with a neutral, generally applicable law.'47
Justice O'Connor concluded that, in following Smith's lead, the lower
courts have abandoned efforts to reasonably accommodate religious
practices, thereby undermining the free exercise of religious liberty.48
In a subsequent interpretation of Smith, the Court further compli-
cated the accommodation issue by holding that "[flacial neutrality is not
determinative" of a law's constitutionality because "[t]he Free Exercise
Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked as well
as overt."'49 In invalidating several city ordinances that regulated or
banned animal sacrifice, the Court in Church of the Luktmi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah noted that any legislative effort designed to persecute or
oppress a religion or its practices is constitutionally impermissible, de-
spite its facial neutrality. 50 Several of the Justices urged that the Court
reconsider Smith, emphasizing that efforts to narrow the Court's free ex-
ercise jurisprudence run counter to principles of accommodation and re-
ligious liberty."'
A closer look at two particular cases in which courts have struggled
over whether to accommodate religious minorities will advance our un-
derstanding of accommodation. In Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of
l,4 Id. at 902-03.
145521 U.S. 507 (1997).
146 Id. at 547 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141 Id. at 546 (citations omitted).
148 Id. at 547.
149 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993).
ISO Id. at 542.
"I' E.g., id. at 564-77 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that efforts to confine Sherbert
and other like cases to the granting of unemployment benefits have been repeatedly re-
jected by the Court).
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Education52 and Board of Education of Kirvas Joel Village School Dis-
trict v. Grumet,151 the courts grappled with requests for accommodation
that they ultimately determined to be impermissible. While the courts
rejected the groups' claims for state recognition of their religious differ-
ences, the reasoning of the various opinions in these two cases neverthe-
less suggests how cultural minorities might be accommodated by a ma-
jority with countervailing interests. Moreover, the religious minorities in
these cases sought simultaneously to opt out of public institutions when
it suited their religious agendas and to enjoy the benefits of those institu-
tions when participation in them proved consistent with their belief sys-
tems. By contrast, the accommodation of linguistic minorities proposed
in this Article involves a reorientation of existing political and social
spheres to incorporate linguistic difference into public life rather than the
creation of an opt-out alternative. While this reorientation may change
the character of those spheres, this Article's theory of linguistic accom-
modation searches for ways to promote engagement rather than encour-
age disengagement. Despite these differences, Mozert and Kirvas Joel
raise questions that are instructive in the language context.
2. Straddling the Insider/Outsider Divide
As devout Christians, appellants in Mozert sought to have their chil-
dren exempted from a reading program at their public school.'- They
believed that the curriculum exposed the children to literature anathema
to their fundamental religious values. The Mozert plaintiffs wanted at
once to be part of and exempt from the public school system, defining
their participation in the public institution according to the dictates of
their minority worldview. They wished to be neither insiders nor outsid-
ers.1 55 Rather than allow the state to perpetuate what it perceived to be an
unresolvable tension, the Sixth Circuit suggested that the parents send
their children to private school or teach them at home.Y In other words,
the court could not sanction state involvement in such divided loyalty.
The court held that the school's requirement that students follow a pre-
scribed reading program did not create an unconstitutional burden under
the Free Exercise Clause, because it did not force them to affirm or deny
a belief or to engage in a practice prohibited by their religion.'
152 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
153 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
154Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060.
155 See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg. He Drew a Circle That Shut Ate Out: Assimihtion.
Idoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARv. L. REv. 581, 590
(1993).
1-6Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1067.
M Id. at 1069.
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The Mozert court justified its holding first by appealing to the views
of educators who regard public schools as an "assimilative force" that
brings together diverse and conflicting elements in a pluralistic society
on a broad but common ground.' The court extended this reasoning by
pointing to Supreme Court jurisprudence advocating the teaching of tol-
erance in schools as essential to a democratic society.'59 The religious
difference in question challenged the court's tolerance-based conception
of democratic politics, according to which participants respect one an-
other's differences without taking affirmative positions on those differ-
ences. In response, the court conflated pluralism and assimilation, im-
plying that when in conflict, the latter should trump the former. The as-
sumption that society's ultimate aspiration should be to achieve com-
monality despite differences of worldview undergirded the court's condi-
tional toleration of pluralism. This move suggests the possibility that
such a tolerance-oriented understanding of diversity may work against
the preservation of difference.
Scholarly commentary elaborates the complex and problematic
quality of the tolerance principle defined in the Mozert opinion and offers
reasons why the case may have been wrongly decided. One scholar ar-
gues that the court's refusal to allow the students to opt out of the reading
program while remaining part of the rest of the public school curriculum
demonstrates that "participation in general society 'estopped' the plain-
tiffs from objecting to assimilation."' 60 She also states that the court's
"agnostic" support of the principle of toleration in effect undermined the
respect for individual beliefs that toleration would seem to require.' 6'
Moreover, she points out that the court ignored the possibility that its
decision would estrange the children from their parents as well as from
their parents' community of belief:' 6 in the Mozert plaintiffs' eyes, "[t]he
standpoint of neutrality estranged the children from their parents' tradi-
tion by turning religious absolutes into matters of personal opinion."'16
Religious accommodation thus proves a hollow guarantee when it re-
quires religious communities to separate themselves from public institu-
tions in order to be accommodated at all. Religious pluralism and diver-
sity-ends embraced by the court-seem doomed from the outset as long
as accommodation is ultimately defined in assimilationist terms.
As in the most difficult cases of religious accommodation, the rela-
tionship among tolerance, assimilation, and the accommodation of differ-
ence lies at the heart of language controversies, making the former a use-
ful parallel for understanding the latter. While the Mozert court's opinion
I'8 Id. at 1068 (quoting Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 69 (1979)).
159 Id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
160 Stolzenberg, supra note 155, at 637.
161 Id. at 630.
162 Id. at 609.
161 Id. at 612.
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on religious accommodation opposes partial, belief-based separation
from public life, it does not preclude something akin to fluid civic iden-
tity. Linguistic minorities seeking to retain their multiple cultural and
linguistic affiliations while participating in public institutions have an
easier case than the Mozert plaintiffs did. The parents in Mozert rejected
participation in a culture of diversity on ideological grounds. By contrast,
because language is tied most closely to capacities for understanding and
not to a normative belief system, accommodation of linguistic difference
does not reject participation in public institutions. Once linguistic mi-
norities are recognized as having public status as linguistic minorities,
they gain the capacity to participate in all spheres of civic life.
Finally, as has been noted previously, in the language context, the
lack of a constitutional provision similar to the Establishment Clause
leaves the door open for broad accommodation. The current color-blind
approach to equal protection could be said to amount to a type of estab-
lishment clause forbidding active state perpetuation of certain kinds of
difference. The comparison of language and religion, however, demon-
strates that language constitutes the kind of difference that the courts
should not ignore. As with religion, the law must face the challenges
raised by linguistic difference by accommodating that difference to the
greatest extent possible. At the same time, parameters of liberal toler-
ance, which forbid accommodation of religious difference for those
seeking split participation, need not be invoked when the difference pre-
senting the challenge is not, at its core, an ideological or normative one.
Whereas the infiltration of religion into the public school curriculum
would create serious constitutional problems, the recognition of linguis-
tic difference in the formulation of curricula would not threaten the de-
velopment of a state orthodoxy. Moreover, the incentive to learn English
delineated in Part I exposes as merely rhetorical the notion that a Tower
of Babel will ensue if linguistic minorities are accommodated.
Indeed, the presence of an incentive to learn English creates the very
tension that accommodation should be designed to alleviate in the inter-
est of sustaining diversity. The power of the dominant language to erode
minority languages should be balanced by the facilitation of participation
by linguistic minorities at all points along the mutability continuum.
Opting for accommodation instead of tolerance guards against the forced
assimilation of linguistic minorities. In addition, to the extent that the
erosion of linguistic difference is simply inevitable, we can prevent the
dislocation of linguistic minorities who retain non-English affiliations
through accommodation. The bilingual individual will ultimately serve as
a model who can simultaneously operate in an English-speaking world,
armed with her cultural affiliations as legitimate markers of political
identity, and in communities of difference, armed with her understanding
of majority culture as a source of power. Accommodation structured
around such a model should be acceptable to courts worried about state-
2001]
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sponsored balkanization and state entanglement in normative questions
of belief.
3. State-Sponsored Separation
The case of Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School Dis-
trict v. Grumet 64 offers a variation on the accommodation sought by the
Mozert plaintiffs. Rather than demanding the right to opt out of select
portions of the public school curriculum, appellants in Kiryas Joel de-
fended an arrangement under which the state directly sponsored separate
educational institutions for their minority religious community. Though
the majority of the children of the Village of Kiryas Joel, a legally incor-
porated community of Satmar Jews organized pursuant to the laws of
New York, attended private religious schools, the handicapped children
of the community required special education services that the private
schools did not have the resources to provide. 165 In response to the trauma
experienced by the handicapped children upon being sent to public
schools in the neighboring district, the New York State legislature desig-
nated Kiryas Joel as a separate school district eligible for public funding
for special education." 6 The Supreme Court found the statute to be an
impermissible delegation of state authority to a group defined by its
common religion. 67 Because the Kiryas Joel district did not receive its
governmental authority as one of many communities eligible for such
treatment under a general law, the Court found that there could be no as-
surance that the next religious community seeking its own school district
would receive funding. '61 The arrangement thus constituted an impermis-
sible preference of a particular religious group. 69 This case of religious
difference forced the Justices to join the debate over the extent to which
the state should be involved in the perpetuation of that difference.
In holding that the Establishment Clause had been violated, the
Court drew a line that proves useful in determining what other forms of
difference the state may sponsor directly. Where the issue in an accom-
modation case is the extent to which the state has been fused with reli-
gion, a distinction must be drawn between a government's purposeful
delegation of authority on the basis of religion and a delegation of power
to individuals whose religious identities are incidental to their receipt of
civic autonomy. 70 According to the Court, accommodation does permit
religiously homogenous groups to exercise political power, so long as
164 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
1
65 Id. at 691-92.166 Id. at 693.
167 Id. at 690.
168 Id. at 703.
169 Id. at 704-05.
170 See id. at 699.
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that power is conferred without specific regard to religion.'"" Applying
this analysis to the language context, in which no Establishment Clause
neutrality requirement exists, the delegation of state benefits to minority
groups as minority groups may be permissible as a form of accommoda-
tion of difference.
In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy offered a slightly different in-
terpretation. He concluded that New York's action constituted impermis-
sible, state-sponsored segregation, reasoning that the state's recognition
of group difference became impermissible once the state participated in
undoing the "weld[ing] together" of minority communities commanded
by the Constitution. 72 According to Justice Kennedy, the state creation of
a minority school district undermined the effort to form a common politi-
cal community. At the same time, Justice Kennedy rejected the Court's
contention that an accommodation proves invalid because of the risk that
other groups might not be granted the same accommodation and argued
that such a limitation constitutes a needless restriction on the legislature's
right to respond to unique problems.'7
As Justice Kennedy's concurrence illustrates, accommodation of dif-
ference need not raise the slippery slope problem: the accommodation of
one unique group need not require the same treatment for all groups that
might be able to claim similar status.' Instead, accommodation of dif-
ference should be calibrated to respond to the constraints of the particular
sphere of public life in which accommodation is sought and to the nature
of the minority seeking the accommodation. The scope of the state's role
should be defined by determining the significance of the harm threatened
by a failure to accommodate and by whether the accommodation sought
involves opting out of the institution in question.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia formulated a version of accommodation
that not only sidesteps the Establishment Clause problem but also lends
support to a group-based view of power distribution. He distinguished
between the state's delegation of authority to a church and the facts of
Kii-yas Joel: New York delegated power to a group chosen according to
its cultural characteristics, not according to its belief system or status as
a religion.175 According to Justice Scalia, "The neutrality demanded by
the Religion Clauses requires the same indulgence toward cultural char-
acteristics that are accompanied by religious belief""7 Justice Scalia also
identified a deficiency in the Court's reading of the religion clauses:
,71 Id. at 706-07.
'17-Id. at 728-29 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173 Id. at 722-23.
174 This recognition proves critical to justifying a controlled approach to the accom-
modation of linguistic minorities, particularly in the spheres where accommodation de-
pends on the existence of a sizable community of the minority language speakers.175 See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 734 (Scalia. J., dissenting) (quoting Wright v. Rocke-
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while the Court struck down New York's scheme on the grounds that it
violated a principle of neutrality, that invalidation was itself not neutral
because it contributed to the weakening of a minority community defined
by cultural characteristics that could have been legitimately accommo-
dated under the Constitution.'77
Of course, accommodation of difference need not extend as far as
the state-sponsored separation struck down in Kiryas Joel. Despite the
Court's invalidation of the scheme, we can reconstruct from the various
opinions a recognition that the state has some latitude in taking into ac-
count cultural differences in its decisionmaking, particularly when those
differences bear on the abilities of the people in question to participate.
The Court's reasoning in Kiryas Joel thus coincides with a vision of fluid
civic identity according to which minorities seek accommodation not to
separate themselves from the public sphere but to engage in the institu-
tions of public life. This inclusion requires an accommodation of cultural
characteristics, the oversight of which would make inclusion ineffective
or even impossible. Accommodation of linguistic minorities allows them
to participate in the majority culture, but with the recognition that differ-
ent forms of communication are necessary to make their participation
effective.
Behind the theory of accommodation lies a belief that social and po-
litical value can be derived from the preservation of cultural minority
groups. In his analysis of Kiryas Joel, Abner Greene defends the exis-
tence of minority cultural communities by arguing that the American
constitutional order is best understood in terms of "permeable sover-
eignty" that allows homogenous communities to exercise public as well
as private power.'78 He essentially parallels this view of power to the fed-
eralist design and its interest in the diffusion of power to normative
communities from which state power can be checked.'7 9 To be truly lib-
eral, or agnostic with regard to normative, belief-centered matters, the
state must be willing to intervene when majoritarian consensus leads to
differential harm. 8° The New York state legislature took precisely this
kind of action in creating the Kiryas Joel School District. Greene defends
this view by revealing inconsistencies in the Court's treatment of com-
munities of difference. Specifically, he points to the lesson of Milliken v,
Bradley:
[C]itizens may, of their own volition, move away from other
citizens ... and still govern themselves as a public entity. They
may not ... use this public power to exclude [others], but if the
77Id. at 748.
178 Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUNI. L. Ruv.
1,4(1996).
179 Id. at 5, 17,52.
180 Id. at 9.
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public power... runs in effect to a group homogenous as to re-
ligion or race, then it is wrong to say that the government has
"segregated" . . . .181
If the Court wants to protect the private choices of citizens to define the
parameters of their communities, state accommodation of those choices
should not be withdrawn automatically when minority groups exercise
them. Given that language represents a no less salient basis around which
people organize their lives and identities, despite the fact that language
lacks a clearly definable ideological component, this conclusion is no
less relevant to language than it is to religion.
But the view of accommodation that depends on the preservation of
homogenous communities of difference may be problematic for linguistic
minorities. Dissident subcultures are more easily identified than commu-
nities of linguistic difference. The "new ethnicity" is not, after all, bound
by geography.In The Satmar sect, with its well-defined worldview, con-
trasts dramatically with communities defined by linguistic characteristics
existing along the mutability continuum. Indeed, the fluidity of the muta-
bility continuum and of a civic identity that encourages multiple orienta-
tions presupposes that there will be some level of engagement with peo-
ple outside the linguistic-minority community. The mutability continuum
demands a flexibility for which the notion of permeable sovereignty
based on the existence of autonomous subgroups cannot fully account.
Accommodation should not be designed to create language enclaves but
to make it possible for linguistic minorities to incorporate the dominant
language into their identities and communities without being coerced
into assimilation. This view of linguistic accommodation need not in-
volve the delegation of state power to linguistic-minority communities in
the same vein as the Kiryas Joel scheme, but as the following discussion
indicates, this approach does justify expansive accommodation.
4. Conclusions on the Religion-Language Parallel
The Supreme Court's recognition of the right of culturally defined
communities to separate themselves from the laws that govern reached a
high point in Wisconsin it Yoder. 8 ' In that case, the Court recognized the
right of Amish parents to remove their children from public schools after
the eighth grade.'8 Ironically, the more segregated a religious group de-
mands to be, the less likely courts will use the rhetoric of commonality
and national unity to militate against its claims for accommodation.
181 Id. at 45.
See Gumperz & Cook-Gumperz, supra note 25, at 5.
406 U.S. 205 (1972).1
9 Id. at 218.
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While the Court may be willing to ignore self-segregation selectively in
the case of religion, it remains wary of involving state power in the per-
petuation of difference. Much Court doctrine, however, establishes that
discrimination based on religion depends heavily on a healthy theory of
accommodation.'85 That theory has several characteristics. First, princi-
ples of associational liberty often require that the state respect differ-
ences among citizens. The Constitution enshrines the value of religious
diversity, and in elaborating the reasons for protecting such diversity,
courts consistently point out that religion defines an individual's world-
view and shapes her interactions with other people. Both of these fea-
tures are also inherent in language. Second, the Court remains concerned
that seemingly neutral legislation neither harm religious minorities nor
interfere with fundamental free exercise rights. The state's "neutral"
preference for English, to the exclusion of other languages, threatens the
same kinds of harm as religious preferences: discrimination against the
minority that leads to disengagement by that minority from the public
sphere.
Finally, in its struggles over how to accommodate minority religious
communities, the Court has recognized that communities of difference
must somehow be taken into account as the state defines its relationship
to the body politic. While the Court's accommodation of religious mi-
norities in this regard has been less generous, the lesson to be drawn
from this branch of religion law is that minority communities defined by
their differences shape the ways in which individuals orient themselves
to the public sphere. The Court's reluctance to accommodate minority
religious communities stems from an aversion to state entanglement with
groups defined by their religious beliefs. In the case of language, how-
ever, the threat of entanglement carries less serious consequences.
Though robust linguistic accommodation may require state support for
minority cultural practices, language as a system orients individuals to
the world around them without prescribing a particular normative view of
that world. State involvement with linguistic-minority communities thus
does not threaten the creation of a state orthodoxy or the possibility of
ideological repression.
In the end, whereas the claims of religious minorities seeking ac-
commodation often involve requests for exemptions from generally ap-
plicable laws or mainstream institutions, the type of accommodation ad-
vanced in this Article encourages participation by incorporating linguis-
tic difference into the public sphere. Of course, linguistic minorities, tied
as they are to ethnic communities, may want to retreat into those com-
munities rather than enter into the linguistic and cultural mix of a diverse
society. But it is precisely because such tendencies are inescapable that
an effective approach to participation must be fundamentally antiassimi-
1
8
1 E.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981).
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lationist. If we come to understand civic identity as fluid, then it becomes
possible to envision a scenario in which minorities remain free to live
their day-to-day lives as part of culturally defined communities but are
nevertheless connected to the body politic by public institutions designed
to accommodate salient differences in the interest of broad participation.
Whereas accommodation counterbalances the "opt-out" impulse, the
failure to accommodate, by ensuring that some linguistic minorities will
remain isolated, may actually encourage the tendencies toward balkani-
zation that assimilationists fear. An analysis of the law of language pro-
vides an understanding of how these principles of accommodation might
work in practice.
M. THE LAw's TREATMENT OF LINGUISTIC DIFFERENCE
In Valeria G. v. Wilson, 186 a federal district court reviewed the legal-
ity of California's Proposition 227, which replaced bilingual education in
public schools with English immersion programs."" The court concluded
that, though the language debate necessarily focuses on national origin
minorities, it is in truth a neutral debate about "which system will ...
enable [children] to function as American citizens and enjoy the oppor-
tunities and privileges of life in the United States."'," Decisions like Vale-
ria G. demonstrate that some conception of language rights does exist in
American legal culture. Language acts as a factor in the decisions con-
cerning the distribution of resources, in the education of people for life
and citizenship, and in efforts to achieve social integration. A survey of
the cases through which courts have come to terms with the relationship
between language and these issues reveals that the character of the lan-
guage debate depends on the sphere in which it arises. What separates
court decisions conceptually is whether the controversy in question con-
cerns the capacity to speak English, the propensity to speak a foreign
language, or the right to participate in the privileges and duties of citi-
zenship in a language other than English.
In exploring the different ways in which courts have treated lan-
guage, this analysis begins with an antidiscrimination baseline, reasoning
that, regardless of the size or power of the linguistic-minority commu-
nity, no person should be discriminated against because of her linguistic
status. The effort to protect linguistic minorities from discrimination has
been most elaborate in the spheres of the workplace and the classroom.
Because linguistic difference affects the ways in which people integrate
themselves into communities and institutions, this analysis continues by
examining those spheres in which bilingualism should be regarded as an
186 12 F Supp. 2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
1L7 Id. at 1012.
'1Id. at 1014-15.
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asset and in which the law must account for the fact that communities
along the mutability continuum will always exist. Through the discussion
of the courtroom, the classroom, the commercial sphere, and the admin-
istrative state, it becomes apparent that to accommodate linguistic differ-
ence, the state may have to participate to some degree in the perpetuation
of that difference.
The vast majority of the cases that have dealt with the status of non-
English speakers in the various spheres involve Spanish speakers, which
should come as no surprise given that Latinos represent the largest lin-
guistic-minority group in this country.'89 Indeed, the fact that courts have
most frequently mediated language controversies involving Spanish-
speaking minorities underscores the irony of identity-based politics: to
demonstrate a condition of powerlessness, a group must in fact have a
modicum of power, even if that power is merely strength in numbers. But
as was emphasized at the outset, the principles and policies elaborated in
this Article are not limited to the protection of the right to speak Spanish,
and the legal treatment of Spanish speakers can be extrapolated to de-
scribe the status of linguistic minorities generally.
That the doctrinal development of language rights has unfolded pre-
dominantly in relation to Latino communities raises a few questions.
Should the scope of the protection afforded a linguistic minority be a
function of the percentage of the population that speaks that particular
non-English language? What is enough of a language to accommodate?
Is it possible that the more familiar a language is, the more easily public
institutions will be able to accommodate that language? The problem of
where to draw the line in deciding which linguistic minorities should re-
ceive which forms of accommodation will not admit to a simple, princi-
pled solution given the extraordinary number of languages. While certain
language rights, such as the right to be free from discrimination based on
language ability or preference, may easily extend to all linguistic minori-
ties, the language rights that require more robust accommodation, such as
the right to receive an adequate education or the right to have access to
certain public services, require affirmative state action and may therefore
necessitate that distinctions be drawn based on the size of linguistic-
minority communities.
The difficulty of the questions posed above underscores the fact that
appreciating the unique status of language gives rise to complex policy
problems. This analysis does not definitively resolve these concerns by
articulating a comprehensive blueprint for accommodation in the differ-
ent spheres. Instead, this analysis identifies the challenges raised in each
sphere, notes the ways in which courts have dealt with them, and offers
suggestions as to how accommodation in each sphere can be made most
1989 See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
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consistent with the principles of equal access and civic engagement that
inhere in the concept of fluid civic identity.
A. The Antidiscrinination Baseline and Language Regulations
in the Workplace
Courts have long grappled with how to apply antidiscrimination
protections to linguistic minorities in order to ensure them equal protec-
tion under the laws. The contours of this language right have been shaped
predominantly in the context of workplace antidiscrimination suits.
1. Workplace Regulations and Title VII
Regulations established by employers that restrict the languages
their employees may speak while on the job have been a common source
of language-based antidiscrimination suits. A recent study found that ten
percent of a sample population of employers admit to practicing dis-
crimination based upon an individual's foreign appearance or accent."'
Many who engage in such discrimination find nothing surprising or inap-
propriate about differentiating among employees according to their lan-
guage abilities.' Employers generally premise their language restric-
tions on a desire to make customers feel comfortable. The concern that
the customer not feel alienated by the speaking of non-English not only
privileges the comfort of monolingual English speakers but also evinces
an assimilationist assumption that public spaces must reflect common
practices in order to remain harmonious. This phenomenon and the judi-
cial opinions that confront it reflect confusion over whether language
restrictions are tantamount to impermissible racial classifications. In the
antidiscrimination context, courts struggle with how to characterize lan-
guage, revealing the inadequacies of current law for assessing language
discrimination.
Not all courts have failed to appreciate the impracticality of English-
only workplace policies. In Gutierrez r. Municipal Court,' 2 the Ninth
Circuit evaluated California's Proposition 63, or the California Official
English Declaration, which included a provision authorizing these work-
place regulations. The court declared the provision to be a "symbolic
statement" rather than a meaningful measure to achieve efficiency in
government and business operations and invalidated the state's language
regulations on the premise that they did not meet the business necessity
requirement established by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
19ORosINA LIPPI-GREEN, ENGLISH WITH AN ACCENT: LANGUAGE. IDEOLOGY. AND
DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 157 (1997).
191 Id.
192 838 PE2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988) (striking down an English-only workplace rule).
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sion ("EEOC"). 193 Because the regulation in question affected both work-
related and non-work-related intra-employee conversations, the meas-
ure's prohibition of Spanish speaking proved to be too sweeping for the
court to accept. In fact, the court found that employees' abilities to speak
Spanish, referred to by defendants as threatening to create a Tower of
Babel, were actually essential in servicing non-English-speaking cli-
ents." 4 The court concluded that the argument that all employees must
speak English to reduce the fears and suspicions of English-speaking co-
workers "has an adverse impact on other persons based on their national
origin. Existing racial fears or prejudices and their effects cannot justify
a racial classification."' 95
In paralleling the language restriction to a racial classification, the
Gutijrrez court based its invalidation of the workplace policy on the
grounds that it constituted a form of prejudice closely akin to national
origin or race discrimination. However, dicta from the court's opinion as
well as the dissent's quarrel with the court's analysis reveal that the case
involved a complex set of issues surrounding the relationship between
language, culture, and the scope of antidiscrimination law. For example,
the court emphasized that the EEOC regulations in question were prem-
ised on the possibility that English-only rules may "create an atmosphere
of inferiority, isolation and intimidation."' 96 The court elaborated on the
relationship between language and national origin by noting that identity
is tied to the use of one's primary tongue, which not only conveys par-
ticularized concepts but also underscores cultural affiliations.,' In con-
necting the workplace restriction with the creation of an atmosphere of
isolation and intimidation, the court suggested that cultural affirmation
contributes to a positive sense of self that should be encouraged among
employees.
In his dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Kozinski
identified a legitimate business necessity in the regulation. The employ-
ers, in order to assist supervisors in understanding the work conversa-
tions of their subordinates, legitimately sought to prevent employees
from concealing the meaning of their conversations by not speaking
English. 9 In reaching this straightforward conclusion, Kozinski pre-
193 Id. According to EEOC guidelines, an English-only rule is a burdensome condition
of employment that might mask national origin discrimination and must therefore be
justified by business necessity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1994). The guidelines currently
assess English-only rules as follows: (1) a rule applied at all times will be presumed to
violate Title VII and will be closely supervised; and (2) a rule applied only at certain times
may be permitted where an employer can show it is justified by business necessity. Id.
§ 1606.1(a).
19 Gutijrrez, 838 F.2d at 1042.
191 Id. at 1043 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984)) (emphasis
added).
196Id. at 1039 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1987)).
197 Id.
198 Gutihrrez v. Mun. Court, 861 F.2d 1187, 1191 (9th Cir. 1988) (Kozinski, J., dis-
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sented his view of language's status. He contended that the United States
has been able to avert the language agonies experienced by countries
such as Canada because, as "a nation of immigrants, we have been will-
ing to embrace English as our public language, preserving native tongues
and dialects for private and family occasions"199 Kozinski appealed to a
standard assimilationist narrative according to which immigrants shed
their non-American cultural affiliations in public spaces, such as the
workplace, as part of an affirmation of their new civic identities as cul-
tural Americans.
Understood in this framework, the business necessity justification
treats linguistic-minority status as a barrier to integration into public
life.200 The Gutidrrez court suggests, however, that the nature of interper-
sonal relations in the workplace proves more complicated and varied than
a straightforward assimilationist narrative would allow. According to the
court, there must be space for employees to engage in personal conversa-
tions in the languages most accessible to them; furthermore, the presence
of non-English in the workplace could well advance business interests by
facilitating communication with a public increasingly marked by linguis-
tic diversity.20' A general prohibition on non-English in the workplace
represents an overly blunt instrument in service of a crude vision of the
American public sphere.
2. The Bilingual/Monolingual Divide
In Garcia v. Gloor,2 2 the Fifth Circuit complicated the discrimina-
tion question by distinguishing bilingual workers from their non-English-
speaking counterparts. 23 Offering a theory of language mutability, the
court found that no language protections attached to the bilingual
worker.2°  In other words, once someone has acquired English, language
can no longer be considered a function of her national or cultural iden-
tity. Instead, language becomes a choice-a mutable characteristic. In
sustaining the workplace language restriction, the court made no attempt
to determine whether valid business reasons for the English-only rule
existed. The status of the worker as bilingual enabled the court to con-
clude that the regulation did not impose a functional burden on the
speaker.2 5 The court therefore deferred to the employer's construction of
the regulation.
senting from denial of rehearing en banc).
,99 Id. at 1187.2
0 In this context, by "public life" I mean not just citizen participation in government.
but relations and communications in civil and economic society
20! Gutijrrez, 838 F2d at 1042.
202- 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
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The Ninth Circuit recently tackled this divide in Garcia v. Spun
Steak Co.2°6 In defense of its workplace restrictions on the use of non-
English, the employer offered the standard "work place harmony"
justification. °7 The court found that genuine issues of material fact ex-
isted as to whether an employee who did not speak English was ad-
versely affected by an English-only rule.20s Yet the court also concluded
that employees who spoke both Spanish and English failed to show that
the English-only requirement had significant adverse effects on the terms,
conditions, or privileges of their employment in violation of Title VII.2°
For the Spun Steak court, the fact that bilingual workers had the capacity
to communicate in English militated in favor of sustaining the regula-
tions.
Similarly, in Dimaranan v. Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Cen-
ter,210 the court evaluated a workplace rule established by a hospital ad-
ministration that prohibited a nurse from speaking Tagalog while on duty.
The court held that (1) the hospital's restriction of the use of Tagalog by
nurses working in a particular unit during the evening shift did not con-
stitute an English-only rule; and (2) the language restriction was moti-
vated by an attempt to promote workplace harmony within the unit and
not an attempt to discriminate on the basis of national origin.2 " In other
words, because the rule did not apply comprehensively to all non-English
speakers, it did not constitute the kind of English-only rule that courts
have found to violate Title VII. The court further noted that for a plaintiff
to prevail on a Title VII disparate treatment claim, she must prove with
circumstantial evidence of animus that the employer intended to dis-
criminate against a particular group.212 In this case, the rule evinced no
animus because the person who instituted the policy had been the plain-
tiff's benefactor and was concerned not with the use of Tagalog in the
nursing wards but with the breakdown of unit cohesion among nurses.2"'
The Dimaranan analysis resembles the reasoning in another major
workplace regulation decision: Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.21 In Jurado,
a disc jockey challenged his termination for his refusal to stop speaking
Spanish on his radio broadcasts. 215 The Ninth Circuit held that (1) the
206 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993).
207 Id. at 1483.
208 Id. at 1488.
20
9 Id.
210 775 F. Supp. 338 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
"I Id. at 342. The court also held that the plaintiff had established that her demotion
and transfer were partially motivated by impermissible retaliation for her filing charges
with the EEOC and a Title VII lawsuit. Id. at 347. Thus, while the language directive itself
did not violate Title VII, the demotion of the plaintiff did do so because Title VII protects
the right of employees to oppose management policies. Id.
212 Id. at 343.
213 Id. at 343-44.
214 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
21- Id. at 1408.
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plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment;
(2) the plaintiff failed to show that he was engaging in protected activity
because his Spanish-language broadcasts did not constitute opposition to
management policy; and, most importantly, (3) the plaintiff's claim that
the English-only regulation disproportionately disadvantaged Hispanics
was without merit because the plaintiff was bilingual.21 The court con-
cluded that the station manager had the right, as a businessperson, to base
his station policy on his belief that the Mexican and black audiences
were not essential to the success of his station..
2 17
The plaintiff in Jurado based his civil rights claim not only on his
own right to speak another language while performing his job-the same
claim made in Dinaranan-but also on the importance of making the
radio station's broadcasts accessible to the Spanish-speaking communi-
ties of Los Angeles. The court treated the first part of his claim as inco-
herent given that the plaintiff had the capacity to broadcast in English.2'8
He, and those similarly situated, could not have been disadvantaged by a
rule that did not prevent them from fulfilling their job description as en-
visioned by their employers. Moreover, the court rejected his group-
based claim, elevating the radio station's right to define its target audi-
ence above the right of the disc jockey himself to define the community
to be served by the station.2 9 Community-based claims advanced by the
plaintiff had no place in the antidiscrimination analysis applied by the
court. The success of the station did not depend on its ability to reach
monolingual Spanish speakers, and as a result, the court found that the
language regulation could not have been motivated by racial animus.'
Indeed, the Jurado plaintiff's community-based claim was weak. In
Los Angeles, the airwaves are likely full of stations and programs tar-
geting Spanish speakers. For the purpose of developing an accommoda-
tionist practice, however, the element worth highlighting is the court's
conditioning of the extension of antidiscrimination protection to lan-
guage on the claimant's capacity to speak English. In the Jurado court's
view, the ability to speak English may justify discrimination based on the
decision to speak non-English. Language restrictions are increasingly
evaluated from the premise that language represents a mutable charac-
teristic and is therefore not a proxy for race or ethnicity. As a conse-
quence, policies based on language can be easily justified by business
necessity.? 1
2 16 1d. at 1409-13.
217 See id at 1411.
218 Id.
219 Id
0 Id. at 1410.
z'For example, in Prado v. L. Luria and Son, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Fla.
1997), the court dismissed EEOC guidelines as not having the force of law and found that
"choice of language, like other behaviors, is a matter of individual preference." i. at 1354.
The court also found, in response to Prado's claim that managers' and employers' ridicul-
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To the extent that antidiscrimination law should be concerned with
protecting individuals from harm resulting from non-merit-based dis-
crimination, the manner in which courts have treated bilinguals in the
workplace proves problematic. In his analysis of the English Only
movement, Bill Piatt stresses that "mutability analysis fails to take into
account the individual's interest in viewing the world through his or her
culture. It also fails to inquire whether less restrictive measures are avail-
able to satisfy the majority's concerns, rather than resorting to blanket
denials of the right to another world view."222 In bifurcating linguistic-
minority status into bilingual and non-English-speaking categories, the
Gloor, Spun Steak, Dimaranan, and Jurado courts transformed the anti-
discrimination mandate into a functional protection, or a protection of an
individual's capacity to understand basic English. These courts separated
language protection not only from the national origin paradigm but also
from the realities of the mutability continuum.
A recent challenge to a government requirement that public school
teachers in Puerto Rico pass a Spanish-language version of the certifi-
cation exam further reflects the tensions that emerge from courts' efforts
to deal with language controversies in antidiscrimination terms. In
Smothers v. Benitez,223 the federal district court tried to fit the language
question into the structures of antidiscrimination law. The court reasoned
that minorities could be protected by identifying language ability with
national origin. 24 "New languages can be learned and old ones forgotten;
however, the knowledge of a language, insofar as it is an ethnic charac-
teristic, leaves identifiable traces like accents, surnames, and behavior
patterns.... Where these traces are used to discriminate against a certain
group, language becomes an indicia of national origin" '2 -" The court
questioned the regulation based on its observation that the English-
speaking plaintiff, as a minority, stood to be disadvantaged by the ma-
joritarian political process and therefore deserved antidiscrimination
protection from language restrictions. "The use of one's language is an
ing of her accent created a hostile work environment, that the "mere utterance of comments
which the employee deems offensive is not, alone, conduct so severe or pervasive as to
create an objectively hostile or abusive environment." Id. at 1356. The court predicated this
conclusion on the fact that Latinos were not in the minority in the Luria work force. Id.
Prado's lack of technical minority status cast suspicion on her allegations of a hostile work
environment based on language discrimination. The combination of the court's view of
language as a preference and the fact that other workers of the same ethnicity surrounded
Prado supported the employer's business necessity justification, suggesting that courts may
be willing to separate language from national origin-but not with the intention of giving
language itself protected status.
222 BILL PIATT, ONLY ENGLISH? 180 (1990).
221 806 F. Supp. 299 (D.P.R. 1992).
224 Id. at 306.
225 Id. Other courts have also held that language may be considered as a proxy for na-
tional origin under equal protection analysis. E.g., Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511
(9th Cir. 1986) (holding that classifications based on language are tantamount to
classifications based on national origin).
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important aspect of one's ethnicity, and should not be sacrificed to gov-
ernment or business interests without good cause."' r' 6 Because of the par-
ticular vulnerability of language minorities, the court closely scrutinized
the motivations of the Department of Education with a kind of height-
ened rationality test and ordered that discovery be conducted to deter-
mine whether discriminatory intentions motivated the regulation. -
Despite the court's efforts, antidiscrimination law proved inadequate
to account for the concerns at play. First, the court noted that courts tra-
ditionally have had difficulty dealing with the monolingual/bilingual di-
vide.2 In the case of monolinguals, language has been understood as a
pretext for ethnicity and therefore as an impermissible basis on which to
discriminate. However, once an ethnic minority has acquired English-
language skills, it appears as if courts no longer regard language as a dis-
criminatory classification. Language's ties to ethnicity depend entirely on
its status as a tool and not on its status as a marker of identity or orienta-
tion, underscoring that courts tend to view language in purely functional
terms.
Similarly, the Smothers court concluded that unless the language law
in question can be linked with national origin, strict scrutiny should not
be applied.229 If the burden placed on the linguistic minority cannot be
traced to intentional discrimination based on national origin, the Equal
Protection Clause cannot be used to protect the linguistic minority.2 '
Thus, the courts' antidiscrimination approach to language rights offers an
incomplete and sometimes awkward way of thinking about language.
Once courts divorce language from race and national origin, they become
unable to recognize that language restrictions form structural impedi-
ments to participation and create disincentives for civic engagement,
even absent deliberate, race-based discrimination. The Smothers court at
least broached this tension:
[S]hould laws arise which threaten rights like the access to so-
cial services, or education, or employment, or voting, which are
not fundamental rights, yet are important to the existence of a
group in society, there should be a mechanism for examining
those laws other than the dull instrument of the rational relation
226 Smothers, 806 F. Supp. at 309.
-7 Given that many private schools in Puerto Rico are bilingual, the court also Sur-




23 The court's reasoning in Olagues, 797 F.2d at 151 I, cited by the Smothers court.
points to a similar conclusion. The Olagues court distinguished rules that simply invol'e
general classifications between English-speaking and non-English-speaking individuals
from rules that use language as a means of isolating a particular group. Only the latter can
be invalidated under equal protection analysis. See id.
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test. The traditional rational relation test may not adequately
balance the interests involved where the majority language
group burdens minority language groups. Any law which uses
language as the basis for classification should be closely exam-
ined to see whether its effect is unduly burdensome to any par-
ticular language group for impermissible reasons.
231
Ultimately, the deficiencies of the antidiscrimination paradigm for
dealing with linguistic difference, which are highlighted by the work-
place regulation cases, also arise repeatedly in the contexts of the court-
room, the classroom, and the administrative state. Seemingly neutral
policies of general applicability inhibit linguistic minorities' access to
institutions of civic life. To understand how accommodation can be ex-
panded beyond a strictly antidiscrimination approach, this analysis now
turns to those threatened spheres.
B. A Preservationist Framework and Accommodation in the Courtroom,
the Classroom, and the Administrative State
This section explores the spheres in which the accommodation of
linguistic difference has the potential effect of preserving minority com-
munities and recognizing the reality of the mutability continuum. Ac-
commodation in these spheres expands language rights from a limited
view based on liberty concerns to a view that emphasizes the equality
dimension of participation, acknowledging the importance of community
in legal institutions. In the final analysis, rather than merely protecting
linguistic minorities from discrimination, the accommodation of linguis-
tic minorities in the preservationist spheres creates a space for public
expression of linguistic difference and incorporates linguistic minorities
as linguistic minorities into public institutions, even going so far as to
permit a relationship between the state and its citizens that does not de-
pend on the capacity to understand English.
1. Language Rights in the Private Sphere
The rights to speak languages other than English and to pass that
language on to one's children have long been recognized as fundamental.
In Meyer v. Nebraska,32 the Supreme Court struck down a statute forbid-
ding foreign-language instruction in the public schools until after the
eighth grade. The Court defined the activity prohibited by the statute as a
liberty interest. "That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in or-
der to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and mor-
2' Smothers, 806 . Supp. at 308.
232 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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ally, is clear; but the individual has certain fundamental rights which
must be respected"2 3 Though nodding in the direction of the Nebraska
legislature's desire to shape a "homogenous people,' 2 the thrust of the
Court's opinion defined foreign-language instruction as sufficiently
harmless to constitute a matter of private concern-private in the sense
that it remained beyond the authority of the state to proscribe. --- In other
words, given that language instruction did not pose a threat to public or
civic order, the state could take no position as to its legitimacy as a peda-
gogical choice. Though the Court's opinion in Meyer abounds with refer-
ences to particular visions of the public good, its ultimate conclusion
proves to be a neutral one intended to foster freedom of choice and to
preserve a private sphere in which cultural differences might find expres-
sion.
While this case establishes an important background condition for
the language debate in that it links the preservation of culture to funda-
mental liberty concerns, it provides little guidance for the accommoda-
tion of linguistic minorities in the public sphere. This section challenges
the assumption, implicit in Meyer, that linguistic and cultural difference
should be considered as part of the private sphere, or as one of the rights
of the autonomous family. Instead, linguistic difference should be ac-
commodated in the public sphere, based on principles of equal access
and community-supported participation in civic life. Indeed, the right to
have a familial culture or to sustain cultural autonomy in the private
sphere proves anemic if not supported by a public accommodation of that
culture. Particularly in the case of language-as the mutability contin-
uum suggests-ignoring linguistic difference in public and social spaces
leads to the erosion of that difference. As linguistic difference becomes
marginal and irrelevant to the public lives of individuals and communi-
ties, it loses its legitimacy in home and family life as well.
The first step in accommodating linguistic difference in the public
sphere in a preservationist sense leads to the commercial realm. For ex-
ample, in 1988 the city of Pomona, California enacted an ordinance that
required businesses that advertised with signs in foreign characters to
devote at least half of their signs to English alphabetical letters. In Asian
American Business Group it City of Pomnona,1- 6 the court struck down the
ordinance as unconstitutional. The decision acknowledged that language
has expressive features that fall under the parameters of the First
Amendment but yet resolved the dispute by analogizing language to na-
tional origin in an uncomfortable balancing of First and Fourteenth
Amendment concerns. 7 The court found that language could be used as
-1
3 Id. at 401.
234 Id. at 402.
235 Id. at 403.
2 716 F. Supp. 1328 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
2-
7 Id. at 1332.
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an expression of national origin, culture, and ethnicity and recognized
that cultural identity is intimately tied to language.238 The ordinance in
question therefore amounted to content-based regulation, and because it
bore no relationship to the commercial function of the sign, it failed First
Amendment scrutiny. 239 Moreover, the court concluded that, although an
equal protection claim generally must show an intent to discriminate, the
challenged ordinance was explicitly based on national origin and was
therefore facially discriminatory and invalid.240
The court found that the content-based restriction resulted not be-
cause Pomona regulated what businesses could advertise but because it
regulated how they could advertise. The content to which the court re-
ferred was the expression of ethnic and linguistic identity through a non-
English sign, whose meaning changed when juxtaposed with English
words.241 This attempt to straddle the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments-to predicate a finding of impermissible content regulation on the
restriction of an expression of ethnic identity-reflects the difficulties
courts have had in coming to terms with the legal significance of lan-
guage as a category. As will be demonstrated below, the courts' underde-
veloped conception of language often leads them to frame the language
debate in First Amendment terms when their underlying concern is really
equal access.
Perhaps a better way to understand what was at stake in the City of
Pomona decision is to frame the case in terms of a community's right to
structure its business and social relations as it chooses. The defense of a
commercial sphere in which linguistic minorities can transact business
without having to defer to the dominant language-the sphere essentially
protected in City of Pomona-supports the perpetuation of linguistic-
minority communities. A liberty interest becomes a community interest.
Yet even the English Only movement tolerates the use of non-English in
private and quasi-private settings; the movement itself emphasizes that its
proposals would not prohibit the use of languages other than English in
unofficial situations, such as in communication among family members,
in religious ceremonies, or in private business.2 42 What English Only sup-
porters may or may not apprehend, however, is that this cultural auton-
omy in the private sphere suffers if it does not translate into the public
sphere. A community's interests that are tied to the ability to engage in
transactions in non-English become diminished if those interests cannot
be expressed in public institutions as well. To resolve these tensions, this
238 Id. at 1330.
239 Id. at 1331.
210 Id. at 1332.
241 Id. at 1330.
242 See U.S. English, In Defense of Our Common Language ... . in LANGUAGE LOYAL-
TIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY, supra note 3, at 143,
145.
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section now considers how the state might adopt accommodationist prin-
ciples to allow for such expression as it shapes its relationship with lin-
guistic minorities.
2. Linguistic Difference in the Courtroom
In the courtroom, two different accommodationist challenges
emerge: (1) the need of non-English speakers for services such as trans-
lators and bilingual attorneys to protect their rights as defendants; and
(2) the task of factoring linguistic difference and bilingualism into the
composition of juries. While courts have made considerable efforts to
accommodate the non-English-speaking defendant, few attempts have
been made to accommodate bi- or multilinguals in the formation of the
jury. Courts regard language ability-both the inability to speak English
and bi- or multilingualism-as reasonable bases for excluding individu-
als from the jury. This view of language has the effect of excluding entire
communities from participation in courtroom processes. This section
briefly considers the rationale courts have used to accommodate the non-
English-speaking defendant and then challenges the reasons courts have
given for excluding bilinguals from the jury, suggesting why a theory of
accommodation requires that linguistic minorities not be subject to per-
emptory strikes based on their language abilities.
a. Accommodating the Defendant
It seems almost axiomatic that the individual defendant should not
be disadvantaged by her linguistic difference when she becomes part of
the legal system. When thrust into an adversarial relationship with the
state, the defendant must be able to understand the processes by which
the allegations against her are proven and through which her freedom is
negotiated by her lawyer and the government. The constitutional rights to
counsel and against self-incrimination would otherwise be meaning-
less. -243 To ensure that this critical form of accommodation occurs, it
should be part of the responsibility of the court, when it appoints coun-
sel, to ensure that linguistic difference has been taken into account. In
communities with large linguistic-minority populations, finding a bilin-
gual attorney will probably not tax the resources of the court. Linguistic
minorities living in comparative isolation, however, are less likely to
have access to the full panoply of protections, suggesting that the rights
of the defendant depend on the nature of the community in which she
lives. The degree to which linguistic difference can be accommodated
thus depends, at least in part, on the existence of communities of linguis-
2'43 But see, e.g., United States ,'c rel. Torres v. Brierton. 460 F. Supp. 704. 706 (N.D.
Ill. 1978) (holding that no right to a bilingual attorney has ever been found).
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tic minorities-a connection that should not be forgotten in discussions
of assimilation and diversity.
Most reported cases that allege inadequate accommodation of the
defendant revolve around the appointment of an unqualified interpreter or
the outright denial of an interpreter.24 In Negr6n v. New York, 45 the Sec-
ond Circuit held that a Spanish-speaking homicide defendant was entitled
to the services of a translator and that the failure to provide a translator
rendered the trial constitutionally infirm. The court's failure to accom-
modate linguistic difference prevented the defendant from participating
in his own defense in any meaningful way. The court pointed to the right
to cross-examine witnesses and the ability to respond directly and
specifically to testimony as basic elements of fundamental standards of
fairness implicit in the Due Process Clause. 46 More specifically, the court
noted that the defendant did not have the ability to respond to the most
damning testimony of the investigator from the District Attorney's office,
who himself could have testified in Spanish. 47 In other words, even ab-
sent the provision of an interpreter to provide systematic and specific
translation, the court had at its disposal other methods of accommodating
the defendant's linguistic difference.2 4 The Negr6n court's reasoning
suggests that where accommodation is necessary, there is no reason to
privilege English at trial. The court described what the trial must have
been like for the unassisted defendant: "To Negr6n, most of the trial must
have been a babble of voices." '249 The court further noted that if a defen-
dant lacks the ability to consult with his attorney, then "the adjudication
loses its character as a reasoned interaction and becomes an invective
214 See Bill Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human Right to Language, 23
Hous. L. REv. 885, 892 (1986).
24-5 434 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1970).
246 Id. at 389.
247 Id. at 388-89.
248 But see United States v. DeJesus Boria, 518 F.2d 368 (1st Cir. 1975) (holding that
the trial court did not err in failing to require Spanish testimony to be recorded in Spanish
for the benefit of the defendant). In DeJesus Boria, counsel had requested a simultaneous
Spanish translation for her client, asking the court to provide channel-hearing devices car-
rying actual voices of those speaking in an all-English version and an all-Spanish version.
Id. at 370. The court found that such a system would require additional court and personnel
costs and must be left to Congress to create. Id. at 371. Particularly in jurisdictions in
which a significant percentage of defendants are members of linguistic minorities, accom-
modation along these lines would seem to be a good investment of resources in the interest
of protecting defendants' rights. Compare also the courts' accommodation of language
ability in criminal cases with accommodation in civil cases. In Cota v. Southern Arizona
Bank and Trust Co., 497 P.2d 833 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972), the court invalidated a default
judgment on the basis that the lack of English fluency caused the defendant to miss his
court date. Decisions like Cota suggest that other elements of the judicial process, such as
the service of process, summonses, and subpoenas, should occur in languages other than
English when necessary to ensure that the system functions effectively and fairly with
respect to defendants.
249 Negr6n, 434 F.2d at 388.
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against an insensible object.""- Linguistic accommodation thus proves
necessary to ensure that defendants receive not only fair but also rational
trials; defendants not accustomed to asserting their rights against the
authority of the state may not know that they have rights to assert in the
first place?5 1 Accommodation through translation becomes indispensable
to the integrity of the criminal justice system.
The Negr6n decision contrasts with the Seventh Circuit's more re-
cent pronouncement on translation in United States r. RosaY2 The court
held that the district court's failure to provide a Spanish-language inter-
preter at a hearing at which the defendant waived her right to a jury trial
was not an abuse of discretion. This conclusion rested on the court's de-
termination that it was the defendant's responsibility to bring to the
court's attention her inability to understand fully the proceedings."
Whereas in Negrdn, the defendant's language barrier was obvious to the
court, in Rosa, the defendant, who was able to speak some English, did
not appear to the court to have comprehension problems."-
While the decision whether to use interpreters has traditionally been
left to the discretion of trial courts, the Rosa court's conclusions on ac-
commodation fail to understand the nature of language. Given the exis-
tence of a mutability continuum, the degree to which a defendant with
limited English-speaking capacities understands the legal proceedings of
which she is a part cannot be easily determined. Moreover, placing the
burden on the linguistic minority to make her language deficiency known
to the court represents an inadequate form of accommodation. Instead, an
evaluation of the defendant's capacity to understand meaningfully the
proceedings could be part of the court's pretrial responsibilities. If a
deficiency truly exists, the defendant will not be able to express the full
extent of her incomprehension.
Despite these problems, the extensive litigation over courtroom in-
terpretation ultimately reveals that the machinery exists to accommodate
linguistic difference.2 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility
for Interpreters in the Judiciary treats the interpreter as an officer of the
court rather than as a witness or an expert .-6 Mechanisms for accommo-
dating linguistic difference in the courtroom could be built into the
structures of the courtroom and could be governed by the procedural
20Id- at 389.
211 See id. at 390.
2 5946 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1991).
253 Id. at 507.
4Id. at 507-08.
5 The federal courts certify interpreters in Spanish, Haitian Creole, and Navajo; they
"anticipate providing certification in Cantonese, Mandarin, and Korean"; and they "have a
procedure in place to determine 'othervise qualified status' for Arabic. Italian, Russian,
Mien, and Hebrew." Charles M. Grabeau, Protecting the Rights of Linguistic Minorities:
Challenges to Court Interpretation, 30 NEw ENG. L. RE%'. 227, 255 (1996).
256 See id at 309-12, 361-74.
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safeguards and rules that attend all courtroom business. Though the corps
of courtroom interpreters may need to be expanded,257 courts have an in-
frastructure that could even be employed to accommodate linguistic dif-
ference in other areas of courtroom activity-specifically, in the compo-
sition of the jury.
b. The Composition of the Jury
Recent controversies over venue changes in high profile criminal tri-
als involving minority victims, such as Rodney King in Los Angeles and
Amadou Diallo in New York, demonstrate the persistence of the belief in
the jury as an institution that dispenses community justice. A tension ex-
ists between the vision of the trial as governed by rationalized legal and
evidentiary rules and historical understandings of the jury that have em-
phasized its role as a forum for community participation in the admini-
stration of the legal system. Still, the latter remains an important factor to
be weighed in defining who may be excluded from the jury.25 The prac-
tice of excluding non-English speakers and bilinguals from the jury cuts
against this community tradition. Particularly in communities in which
linguistic minorities represent sizable portions of the population and also
account for a significant number of criminal defendants and civil liti-
gants, the exclusion of people with the capacity to understand non-
English for fear of corrupting the "inviolate" jury deliberations with dif-
ferent languages-or different methods of interpretation-effectively
precludes participation by large communities of people. -9 Moreover, at-
tempts to privilege the English speaker as well as the English-language
narrative ignores the realities of a multilingual society, ultimately com-
promising the effectiveness of the legal system by unnecessarily con-
straining the language of the courtroom. The case law on language-based
peremptories demonstrates how linguistic-minority communities are in-
appropriately disadvantaged by a system that privileges English. While
the courts must function predominantly in English for uniformity and
efficiency's sake, a theory of accommodation permits the use of non-
English-language testimony and bilingual jurors in cases in which the
search for truth and the rights of the community to participate would be
served by allowing non-English into the courtroom.
21 As of 1996, only six states had formal training programs for court interpreters. See
id. at 255.
2181 have presented my views on the community function of the jury elsewhere. See
Cristina M. Rodrfguez, Note, Clearing the Smoke-Filled Room: Women Jurors and the
Disruption of an Old-Boys'Network in Nineteenth-Century America, 108 YALE L.J. 1805,
1835-40 (1999).
219 Cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975) (noting that excluding women
from the jury, by excluding an identifiable segment of the population from the administra-
tion of justice, might be inconsistent with the nation's democratic heritage).
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The most recent development in this sphere unfolded in New Mexico
in January 2000. The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the state
constitution prohibits the automatic exclusion of prospective jurors who
do not speak English or Spanish." The district court had issued an order
noting it is the state's duty to provide interpreters for Spanish-speaking
jurors free of charge at every step of the process, from orientation to
trial.26' In response to the New Mexico Supreme Court's affirmation of
the district court, the Attorney General's office announced that the Ad-
ministrative Office of the Court would develop uniform rules and proce-
dures for handling non-English-speaking jurors, including the provision
of interpreters during court proceedings. :6 2
New Mexico's defense of the right of non-English speakers to serve
as jurors exemplifies robust accommodation. Given the demographics of
the state and the interest in fostering inclusive institutions, it makes sense
to include monolingual Spanish speakers-a principle that could be ex-
trapolated to other communities where non-English-speaking populations
are sizable. Even to the extent that New Mexico's decision might not be
feasible for large portions of the judicial system-indeed, as will be seen
below, it is inconsistent with federal case law-the development in that
state alone is instructive.
First, the immediate response of the Attorney General's office high-
lights the fact that state bureaucracies exist to formulate efficient and ef-
fective means of accommodating the courts' recognition of difference.
The fear that the legal system might not be able to provide the extra re-
sources necessary to accommodate linguistic minorities diminishes once
we recognize that the infrastructure exists to handle accommodation.
Second, critics of the decision pointed to the interpretative problems that
would result from the new rule.263 For example, how can courts be sure
that a translator's rendition of English-language testimony to a Canton-
ese-speaking juror will be accurate? Quite simply, in a multilingual soci-
ety, this problem can never be avoided. Foreign-language testimony is
currently translated into English for the English-speaking jury to evalu-
ate. The notion that the use of translators will render jury deliberations
26 See Elizabeth Amon, Breaking a Language Bar in N.. NAT'L LJ., Feb. 7, 20UJU.
at A13 (noting that the New Mexico Supreme Court, in a ruling from the bench in State v.
Gonzales, No. CR-99-139 (N.M. Jan. 19, 2000). held that potential non-English-speaking
jurors cannot be eliminated on the basis of their language skills). As an officially bilingual
state, English- and Spanish-speaking jurors have traditionally served in New Mexico. In its
ruling, the New Mexico Supreme Court quoted from the state constitution. Article VII.
Section 3 of the state constitution reads: "The right of any citizen of the state to vote. hold
office or sit upon juries, shall never be restricted, abridged or impaired on account of re-
ligion, race, language or color, or inability to speak, read or write the English or Spanish
languages.' N.M. CoNsT. art. VII, § 3.
261 Justices: Language No Barrier for Jur " Duty, ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 20. 2000. at
Al.
6 See id.263 See id.
2001]
HeinOnline  -- 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 203 2001
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
"inviolate" represents nothing more than a legal fiction. Jury delibera-
tions are inherently interpretive and to suppose otherwise ignores the way
in which the system functions, even absent the requirement that non-
English-speaking jurors be included.
On the federal level, courts have not grappled extensively with the
question of whether non-English-speaking individuals should be accom-
modated as jurors."M Instead, the battle in the federal courts has been
over the bilingual juror and whether bi- or multilingual jurors may be
stricken based on their language abilities. In Herndndez v. New York,2' 6 -
the Supreme Court found that while the use of peremptory strikes to ex-
clude Spanish-speaking jurors raised a plausible (but not necessary) in-
ference that language might be a pretext for race discrimination, exclud-
ing bilingual jurors through the use of a strike did not violate the Con-
stitution. 266 Like the courts in the Title VII cases, the Court in Herndndez
treated language not as a marker of national origin but as a potentially
mutable characteristic that had bearing on the capacity of the individual
to perform the task in question. Unlike the Title VII cases discussed
above, however, Herndndez left open a few doors.
First, though pointing to the mutable nature of language, the Court
nevertheless identified language as a function of culture: "Language per-
mits an individual both to express a personal identity and membership in
a community, and those who share a common language may interact in
ways more intimate than those without this bond. Bilinguals, in a sense,
inhabit two communities, and serve to bring them closer."267 The Court,
in a sense, recognized the possibility of a fluid civic identity. Second, as
discussed in Part II, in holding that a race-neutral reason for a peremp-
tory challenge means a reason other than race, the Court did not resolve
the more difficult question of the breadth with which the concept of race
should be understood for equal protection purposes. Though the Court
found that the trial court could have reasonably inferred that the per-
emptory strike of the Spanish-speaking jurors had nothing to do with
their status as minorities, the Court did not ignore the relationship be-
tween language and that status.
The dissent took the issue forward a step by insisting that "[ain
avowed justification that has a significant disproportionate impact will
264 But see United States v. Aponte-Suirez, 905 F.2d 483 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that
the English-only requirement of the federal jury selection system did not violate the Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant even though it excluded two-thirds of the
population from the jury). In United States v. L6pez, No. 86 CR 513, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9544, at *1 (N.D. I11. Oct. 15, 1987), the defendant moved for a bilingual jury,
arguing that those who did not speak Spanish would be unable to understand tape-recorded
evidence. The court rejected the challenge on the grounds that no cases have held a bilin-
gual jury to be necessary. Id. at *1-*2.
265500 U.S. 352 (1991).
266 See id. at 371-72; see also id. at 375 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
2"7 Id. at 370 (plurality opinion).
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rarely qualify as a legitimate, race-neutral reason sufficient to rebut the
prima facie case because disparate impact itself is evidence of discrimi-
natory purpose." That the Court adopted the presumption of race neu-
trality inhibited it from reaching the questions Justice Kennedy posed in
the plurality opinion regarding the scope of race as a category. Yet the
Court clearly raised the possibility that language might be considered
something more than a choice or mutable characteristic.2" Just as cases
such as Batson v. Kentucky 70 and Strauder v. West Wirginia -  do not ex-
clusively concern discrimination against blacks but do address the right
of blacks to participate as mizorities on the jury, Herndndez suggests that
linguistic minorities might deserve access to political institutions as lin-
guistic minorities.
Indeed, though the Supreme Court sustained the trial court's conclu-
sion that the prosecutors did not dismiss the Spanish-speaking jurors on
account of their race as marked by their language abilities, the Court did
not reject the possibility that bilingual jurors could serve as jurors-not-
withstanding their capacities to understand translated testimony in its
original language. Facing the reality that bilingual jurors would interpret
foreign-language testimony according to their own comprehension rather
than as stated in court translations, the Court suggested that bilingual
jurors could be held responsible for bringing to the attention of the judge
any discrepancies they find in the translations.2-' In dicta, the Court also
rejected the notion that a Spanish-speaking juror might have undue
influence in a trial conducted in New York City because there is a
significant Spanish-speaking population in that locality.2' Moreover, the
Court expressed concern that a prosecutor's use of a potential juror's lan-
guage abilities might amount to a classification that would effectively
exclude a significant percentage of the population, defined by its ethnic-
ity, from the jury pool. 274
Most courts have taken a stance far less favorable to accommodation
than the unresolved musings of the Herndndez Court. Both before and
after Heinzdndez, lower courts that have grappled with the use of per-
emptory strikes against bilingual jurors have consistently justified their
decisions in favor of exclusion with two basic arguments: (1) discrimination
based on language is not invidious because it is based on an actual abil-
ity; and (2) bilingual jurors may interpret non-English testimony in ways
different from the court, thereby undermining the authority of the court.
26 Id. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
269 Id. at 371 (plurality opinion).
-70476 U.S. 79 (1986).
-1 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
' Herndndez, 500 U.S. at 364.
73 Id. at 363-64.
274 Id. at 363.
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For example, in United States v. Ramos Col6n,275 the court held that
federal requirements that jurors be proficient in English did not result in
jury panels that were unfair cross sections of the community.276 The court
found that the composition of the jury furnished no basis for an inference
of systematic or deliberate discrimination. 277 Because the exclusion of
Spanish-speaking jurors was based on a legitimate conclusion about the
potential jurors' language abilities-features directly relevant to the
trial-the use of the language classification was not invidious in the same
way that striking jurors based on their race or ethnicity would have
been.
278
Some courts have recognized that even language-based exclusions
may be problematic. In Pemberthy v. Beyer,27 9 the district court held that
striking jurors based on "their status as native Spanish speakers," the
characteristic that "in essence, defines [the Latinol community[ ] and
exposes it to irrational discrimination .... is, by definition, a decision to
strike all Latino jurors."280 The district court also noted that the belief that
Spanish speakers would have difficulty accepting court translations of
evidence amounted to a "group-based assumption[ ] about the capacity,
behavior, and trustworthiness of Spanish speakers. 2 18 On appeal, the
Third Circuit nevertheless held that these bases for concern were not sub-
stantial enough to outweigh the prosecutor's interest in peremptorily
challenging a juror because of his ability to understand a foreign lan-
guage.282 According to the court of appeals, language did not map onto
race or ethnicity, though the court recognized that the close relationship
between language and ethnicity requires judges to be sensitive to poten-
tial overlap in motivations. 283
275 415 F. Supp. 459 (D.P.R. 1976).
276 See id. Puerto Rico offers a particularly poignant example of the exclusionary na-
ture of strict English-language requirements. In Ramos Col6n, the court reasoned that even
though Spanish is the language of Puerto Rico, English is the language of the United
States, whose legal institutions govern Puerto Rico. Id. at 465. The court elevated the use
of English in the courts from being merely a practical device to being a "constitutional
imperative." Id. at 465; see also United States v. Aponte-Sulrez, 905 F.2d 483, 491-92 (1st
Cir. 1990). In United States v. Benhumar, 658 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1981), the court concluded
that even though the English proficiency requirement tends to exclude a number of jurors
in Puerto Rico, litigants have an interest in the preservation of a national (as opposed to
local) forum, conducted in a national (as opposed to local) language. This formulation
seems to be targeted at the English-speaking minority rather than to the vast majority of
potential litigants on the island. For those who do not speak English, the right to a national
forum conducted in English is meaningless. Moreover, those who are bilingual most likely
do not compartmentalize their language abilities into a national (English) language and a
local (Spanish) language.27 Ramos Col6n, 415 F. Supp. at 463-64.
2
7
8 Id. at 464.
279 800 F. Supp. 144 (D.N.J. 1992).
Id. at 160.
211 Id. at 162.
282 Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 870 (3d Cir. 1994).
21 Id. at 865. The court did concede, however, that repeated strikes of Spanish-
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The courts' struggle to connect language with race or ethnicity in
order to evaluate the treatment of language in the courtroom exposes the
inadequacies of using traditional antidiscrimination paradigms to ac-
commodate linguistic minorities. Dependence on the race paradigm sets
an "invidious discrimination" standard, yet prosecutors are always able to
articulate a reason, i.e., language ability, for excluding bilingual jurors,
thereby evading the invidiousness issue. The courts' sanction of lan-
guage-based peremptories nevertheless excludes entire communities from
the jury. Regardless of whether that exclusion stems from animus, an
identifiable segment of the population has been removed from a commu-
nity institution, compromising efforts to ensure that defendants are tried
by juries of their peers. Language-based peremptories also close off an
avenue of participation for linguistic minorities. However, any effort to
integrate non-English speakers into public life in general necessitates
incorporating linguistic difference into the particular institutions that
govern the communities that may be defined by their bilingualism. Per-
haps the Supreme Court itself, in Taylor it Liouisiana,- identified a stan-
dard that would circumvent the inadequacies of the race paradigm but
still bar exclusions based on bilingual status. The Court noted the possi-
bility that the exclusion of an identifiable segment of the population from
the jury runs counter to our democratic traditions.2 ,- That segment need
not be defined by a suspect classification in order to be protected. It need
only represent an identifiable community. In countless jurisdictions, lin-
guistic minorities would clearly meet this standard.
The second basic argument used by courts to justify exclusion of bi-
lingual jurors is that these jurors might interpret non-English testimony
differently than court-sponsored translations. For example, in Pemberthy,
the substance of a Spanish telephone conversation was a major issue at
speaking jurors might raise the possibility that the prosecutor was trying to rid the jury of
Latinos. The court concluded that because language ability coincides closely with ethnic-
ity, if such a pattern were to arise, the striker's motivation might be subject to question. Id.
at 872.
In addition to declining to define language ability as an impermissible basis for exclu-
sion, courts have been tolerant of prosecutors' conclusions, based on surface impressions,
concerning a potential juror's language inabilities. See United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d
1313 (2d Cir. 1996) (declining to apply a Batson analysis to the government's striking of a
juror based on her accent because the court concluded the prosecution would have applied
the same standard to a white person with a heavy accent).
Language "deficiencies" sometimes do not come to the attention of the courts. For ex-
ample, in Thornburg v United States, 574 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1978), the defendant challenged
his conviction on the basis that at least one and maybe four of the jurors were unable to
understand English. The court held that too much time had passed to determine if this
situation had biased the trial, and that, in any case, all appropriate language screening pro-
cedures had been followed. Id. at 35-36. Given that such problems are likely to arise %%ith
frequency, particularly in diverse jurisdictions, a court that is prepared to accommodate
linguistic difference is more likely to be able to deal with such language difficulties.
-419 U.S. 522 (1975).
Id. at 537.
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trial, as was the meaning of certain Colombian colloquialisms and the
ability of the police officer who did the translation to understand them. 6
At the hearing, the prosecutor testified that he had stricken every Span-
ish-speaking juror
because [he] felt that the interpretation of the language would
be a very integral part of the case. [He] didn't want one or two
people on the jury who might know Spanish who might disagree
with the interpretation as counsel would put forth to have sort of
like a more important place on a jury. 87
Whereas the district court found that these concerns represented a pretext
for discrimination against the Latino community, the court of appeals
interpreted the prosecutor's statements at face value-as concerns that
Spanish-speaking jurors would have difficulty accepting translations. 88
The recognition that bilingual individuals cannot suppress their language
abilities only exacerbates this fear. The district court in Pemberthy found
that no native speaker could ever set aside her knowledge of a language
and restrict herself to the evidence as presented. Whereas the district
court viewed the resulting exclusion as bias, the court of appeals deter-
mined that it was a legitimate means of guaranteeing a fair trial.
An accommodationist view of the jury would reject this analysis and
contend that the possibility of differing interpretations should not be seen
as a danger. The chance that multiple interpretations might push the jury
closer to the truth should actually be considered an asset. As suggested
by the Supreme Court in Herndndez, bilingual jurors can be instructed to
point out to the judge the deficiencies they perceive in translations. In
addition, jury deliberations are inherently interpretive processes. Even if
the entire proceeding takes place in a single language, the nature of lan-
guage is such that different people may interpret the same statement in a
variety of ways. Issues such as the credibility of witnesses and the be-
lievability of facts are usually left to the jury to resolve. The adversarial
system exists because of a recognition that truth may not always be de-
termined by a sober investigation of the facts. The rules of evidence defer
to lawyers' narrative constructions of their cases by, for example, permit-
ting the admission of reputation evidence to impeach witnesses as well as
defendants.289 Jurors will always bring personal assumptions to their
evaluation of testimony. Given this arrangement, to conclude that a bilin-
gual juror, who might bring to the attention of the court a mistake or nu-
2 P6pemberthy, 19 F.3d at 865; see also United States v. Alcontar, 897 F.2d 436 (9th
Cir. 1990) (upholding prosecutor's striking of two potential jurors who spoke Spanish
fluently and of a third juror who had a thick accent).
287 Pemberthy, 19 F.3d at 863.
288 See id. at 866.
289 E.g., FED. R. EvID. 404, 608.
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ance in the evidence presented to the jury, undermines the "inviolate"
deliberations of the jury ultimately proves incoherent.
3. The Bilingual Education Debate
In the educational sphere, courts generally have treated linguistic
difference as a barrier to be overcome and have regarded the education of
linguistic minorities as a straightforward antidiscrimination issue. In the
Supreme Court's only direct treatment of language to date, Lau v. Nich-
ols,290 the Court held that a school district's failure to provide programs
for non-English-speaking students to assist them in overcoming their
language barriers constituted a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. This decision spawned a host of regulations and statutes that
led to the proliferation of bilingual education programs in public schools
across the country.29' Though Lau frames language in the educational
sphere in antidiscrimination terms, far broader issues are at stake when it
comes to education and language. For instance, in the public schools,
where inculcating self-esteem and forging civic identity represent im-
portant pedagogical concerns, the status implications of linguistic differ-
ence are at their most serious. The extent to which schools should be
participating in the preservation or elimination of cultural differences
inevitably arises as a concern.
Bilingual education is a highly contested policy matter that is be-
yond the scope of this Article. The purpose of this discussion is to em-
phasize that given the importance of education to the general deflation of
impermissible status distinctions, linguistic difference in the educational
sphere should not be regarded as a barrier to be overcome but as a source
of intellectual strength. Curricula concerned with disestablishing language-
based status distinctions must deal with the fact that if linguistic minori-
ties are not educated and made literate in their non-English languages,
their abilities to use those languages and those languages' status will de-
cline. Non-English languages should, at the very least, be regarded as
"civilized" in the sense that formal instruction in them should form some
part of the education of linguistic minorities. The integration of such lan-
guage instruction into the classroom will vary depending on the resources
and demographics of particular school districts. For example, Spanish-
language instruction might be appropriate for all students, regardless of
their linguistic backgrounds, in states such as California and Texas. Ul-
timately, at the same time that schools must recognize the Lau directive
that all students should have equal opportunity to learn and thrive in an
English-dominant world, the accommodation of linguistic minorities re-
414 U.S. 563 (1974).
'91 See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Bilingual Education is Facing Push Toward Abandonment.
N.Y. IMES, May 30, 1998, at Al.
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quires that the overriding aim of language policy in the educational
sphere be to respect meaningfully linguistic difference by regarding non-
English as worthy of study. The history of the legal system's treatment of
bilingual education both acknowledges and criticizes this view.
Prior to the Court's decision in Lau, certain protections for linguistic
minorities had already been crafted. Title VII of the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Schools Act was passed at a time of growing concern for the
status of Mexican Americans in the Southwest. 292 The Act itself did not
require that school districts implement bilingual education programs.
Rather, it created a grant program to help train teachers and administra-
tors and to support educational projects to educate students with limited
English proficiency.2 93 With its decision in Lau, the Supreme Court held
that Title VI required public school districts to remedy language barriers
but declined to mandate the type of remedy that should be employed.29
Though recognizing that the San Francisco school district had the duty to
take affirmative action in rectifying its students' language deficiencies so
that they might have access to a meaningful public education, the Court
left the decision concerning the type of program to best achieve this goal
to the policy debate. The Lau Court declined to reach the equal protec-
tion question, instead finding that the school district had violated Title VI
regulations defining the obligations of government entities receiving fed-
eral assistance.
295
The federal government's interpretation of Lau gave rise to a lan-
guage policy that treated linguistic difference as a barrier to be over-
come, holding that discrimination occurs when non-English-speaking
students are not given instruction in English. The U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") guidelines drafted just prior to
the Lau decision, which became known as the Lau remedies, defined
equal access to education by all students regardless of race and national
origin as requiring school districts to "rectify the language deficiency in
order to open '296 instruction to non-English-speaking students. 29, While
292 See Martha Jim~nez, The Educational Rights of Language-Minority Children, in
LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL ENGLISH CONTROVERSY, supra
note 3, at 243, 244; see also Serna v. Portales Mun. Sch., 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972)
(holding that it would be a deprivation of equal protection for a school district to effectuate
a curriculum that is not tailored to the needs of minority students).
291 Jim6nez, supra note 292, at 244.
9 See Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Lai,
414 U.S. at 563).
295 See Lau, 414 U.S. at 566-69. Congress enshrined this approach to linguistic differ-
ence the same year in the EEOA. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1994). The EEOA provides,
inter alia, that "[nlo State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on
account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by... the failure by an educa-
tional agency to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal
participation by its students in its instructional programs." Id. § 1703.
296 Identification of Discrimination and Denial of Services on the Basis of National
Origin, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (July 18, 1970).
9' See Policies on Elementary and Secondary School Compliance with Title VI of the
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concerned with unequal treatment, the Lau remedies still set as their ul-
timate civil rights objective the rapid acquisition of English by linguistic
minorities and the minimization of separate language tracks in schools.: "
The guidelines did not give bilingualism priority or treat it as a condition
of value. As conceived by the federal government just prior to Lau's an-
tidiscrimination decision, the right to bilingual education consisted of a
right to acquire the language skills necessary to participate in an English-
dominant society.
Subsequently, courts have continued to construe language as a
deficiency to be overcome. In Guadalupe Organization, Inc. it Tempe
Elementary School District No. 3,299 the Ninth Circuit held that Title VI
did not require schools to provide non-English-speaking students a bilin-
gual-bicultural education. Rather, the Guadalupe court read Lau to re-
quire merely that school districts "take affirmative steps to rectify the
language deficienc[ies]" of non-English-speaking students." The Guada-
lupe court did not, however, end its inquiry with a straightforward appli-
cation of Lau. It added an assimilationist conceptual dimension not con-
templated by the Supreme Court. It premised its denial of appellants' re-
quest for bilingual education programs on a theory that "linguistic and
cultural diversity within the nation state, whatever may be its advantages
from time to time, can restrict the scope of the fundamental compact."1'
Linguistic difference represented a barrier to be overcome in the eyes of
the court because the "consent of the people" necessary for the survival
of the nation-state depends on the existence of a healthy political culture,
which "attenuates as it crosses linguistic and cultural lines' -' -" The
Guadalupe court reached beyond the statutory analysis of Lau to con-
clude that the Constitution establishes a compact the contours of which
cannot be mandated by the courts but must be determined by the peo-
ple.30 3 An educational system that transcends "multiple linguistic and
cultural centers"30" represents an essential precondition for this social
working-out of the nature of the political community.
In the wake of Lau, the battle over the appropriate remedy for edu-
cational inequalities created by linguistic difference became a battle over
diversity and its effects on common culture. Courts have not understood
the "right" in question as a right to language but as a right to the English
language. The Court's decision in Lau did acknowledge that enabling
student participation in education requires accounting for linguistic dif-
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 33 Fed. Reg. 4955 (Mar. 23, 1968).
28 See Jim6nez, supra note 292, at 245-46.
2587 F.2d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir. 1978).
300Id. at 1024 (quoting Lau, 414 U.S. at 568).
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ference. This accounting, however, is qualified: to the extent that it takes
time for language barriers to be overcome, language differences must be
acknowledged; 305 the recognition of other languages as legitimate tools
extends only until English can be acquired.
The cultural implications of language instruction have long been de-
bated as well. United States v. Texas3°6 offers a case in point. The court
held that by virtue of its inadequate bilingual educational services, the
state had failed to remedy past discrimination based on ethnicity.3 7 In
assessing the Title VI claim, the court reasoned, "it would make little
sense to conclude that Congress, with the EEOA, after identifying a seri-
ous problem in the nation's schools and requiring affirmative measures to
overcome it, would permit any course of conduct, however ineffectual or
counter-productive, to satisfy its mandate" '308 Though the court recog-
nized that Lau did not require bilingual education, it held that the limited
bilingual education programs restricted to primary lower grades were
analogous to partial desegregation plans.3°9 In other words, to meet the
effectiveness requirements that the court found to be present in Lat, it
concluded that bilingual education programs should not only span the
grade levels, but also be integrated into the entire school curriculum, in-
cluding physical education, shop, and home economics classes.310
The court's call for a comprehensive remedy stemmed both from its
observation that all children would benefit from exposure to diversity and
from its conclusion that eradicating the "deep sense of inferiority [and]
cultural isolation" engendered by historical segregation of linguistic and
ethnic minorities demands more than mere integration. "' The court con-
cluded that "the policy of using English exclusively in the Texas public
schools must be seen, not as neutral or as benign, but rather as one more
vehicle to maintain these children in an inferior position."" ' The status
dimension of the language debate proved inescapable to the court."'
-"- See Lau, 414 U.S. at 568.
3"'6 506 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (entering, inter alia, injunctive relief in the form
of bilingual education for plaintiffs in sweeping desegregation suit), rev'd, 680 F.2d 356
(5th Cir. 1982) (finding that the Texas legislature's 1981 enactment of the Bilingual and
Special Language Programs Act rendered the district court's injunctive relief moot). The
act mandated bilingual education in elementary schools and in school districts with twenty
or more students with limited English proficiency in the same grade. Texas, 680 F.2d it
372.
30, Texas, 506 F. Supp. at 428.
-o0 Id. at 433.
Id. at 436.
110 Id. at 436-39.
3I ld. at 415.
3 I2 ld. at 414.
113 Indeed, recognizing these concerns, the Texas Bilingual Education Act of 1973 had
already established that integration would be better achieved through the implementation
of bilingual education. Id. at 417. (citing Thx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.451 (Vernon Stipp.
1980)). Cf Martin Luther King Junior Elementary Sch. Children v. Ann Arbor Sch. Dist.
Bd., 473 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979). This case raises the possibility that courts might
[Vol. 36
HeinOnline  -- 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 212 2001
Accommodating Linguistic Difference
In the end, even as the court recognized the importance of having a
space for Spanish language in the public school system, it also concluded
that "bilingual education is designed to fill an educational vacuum until a
particular child is able to function adequately in an all-English class-
room."314 The court noted that bilingual instruction as a remedy for un-
lawful discrimination serves as a transitional program. The ultimate goal
of language policy remained transition to the English-speaking main-
stream.
31 5
Most courts have been much less enthusiastic about bilingual educa-
tion, expressing concern that bilingual education programs track and
therefore segregate linguistic minorities from the mainstream student
population with significant consequences for the quality of education
those minorities receive. In Castaiieda . Pickard,' the Fifth Circuit re-
jected a challenge to a bilingual education program premised on the ar-
gument that overemphasis on the acquisition of English-language skills
adversely affected students' cognitive development. The court dismissed
the contention that the Lau guidelines"i? did not establish the teaching of
identify language as a marker of difference that schools should recognize in diversity lan-
guage curricula. The plaintiffs in the case asked the court to require the school district to
take into account the cultural differences of the students in question by recognizing those
differences deliberately in its language instruction. The court expressed concern over the
possibility that English-language instruction that failed to account for, and even devalued,
students' home language systems might erect psychological barriers to learning. See hi. at
1381. The court thus found it "appropriate to require the defendant Board to take steps to
help its teachers to recognize the home language of the students and to use that knowledge
in their attempts to teach reading skills in standard English:' Id. at 1383. The court effec-
tively required that language instruction demonstrate cultural sensitivity.
-,4 Texas, 506 F. Supp. at 419.
315Id. at 441 ("Unless they receive instruction in a language they can understand
pending the time when they are able to make the transition to all-English classrooms. hun-
dreds of thousands of Mexican American children in Texas will remain educationally crip-
pled for life, denied the equal opportunity which most Americans take for granted."
316 648 F.2d 989, 1015 (5th Cir. 1981).
317The court gave limited weight to the Lau guidelines, finding that they were the re-
sult of a policy conference by HEW and had not been developed through the usual admin-
istrative procedures employed to draft administrative regulations. See id. at 1007. More-
over, the guidelines bad been written before Regents of the University of California i.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 912 (1978), declared Title VI to be coterminous with the Equal Protection
Clause and before Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976). established an intent re-
quirement for Fourteenth Amendment discrimination claims.
At the same time, however, section 1703(f) of the EEOA, which makes it unla% ful for
an educational agency to fail to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that
impede equal participation by its students in its instructional programs, codified the essen-
tial holding of Lau. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1994). The Castafieda court noted that the plain
language of the EEOA does not require intent. Castafieda. 648 F.2d at 1001. Thus. while
the validity of Lau as a judicial interpretation of Title VI or the Fourteenth Amendment is
in question, the "essential holding of Lau, i.e., that schools are not free to ignore the need
of limited English-speaking children for language assistance to enable them to participate
in the instructional program of the district, has now been legislated by Congress. acting
pursuant to its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment:' Id. at 1008. The Fifth Circuit
asked whether Congress intended to go beyond Lau, which required schools to take some
action, to require that schools take "appropriate action:' Id.
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English as the primary goal of language remediation. 31s In reaching this
conclusion, the court expressed concern over the labeling of students
with language deficiencies, fearing that limited capacity to speak English
would be conflated with "low intelligence" and that non-English-
speaking students would be tracked into remedial or low-level classes
throughout the public schools.3 t9 This fear, coupled with the fact that the
EEOA does not require school districts to adopt any particular kind of
language program so long as language barriers are effectively over-
come, 320 creates a substantial barrier for those with claims like the plain-
tiffs' in Castafieda, who asked the court to create a bilingual education
requirement.
In the most recent pronouncement on bilingual education, the district
court in Valeria G. held that remedies for linguistic barriers should take
the form of transitional programs, or efforts designed to ensure that all
students gain access to what the court called "the American dream of
economic and social advancement"32' through the possession of the social
good of the English language. This transitional approach to language
protections aims to ease non-English speakers into social and political
life conceived in terms of an English-speaking mainstream. The petition-
ers in Valeria G. challenged the assimilationist version of the right to
language instruction and defended bilingual education on the grounds
that its denial constituted national origin discrimination."' These activ-
ists had an educational vision that embraced the native language during
the acquisition of English with the aspiration of creating bilingual,
bicultural students. While still accepting integration into the larger stu-
dent body as the ultimate goal of bilingual education, this posture reflects
a desire to make languages other than English part of that process.
The court, consistent with the majority of precedent, rejected this
view. In construing the EEOA,323 the court found that
Congress' use of the less specific term "appropriate action" [in
the EEOA] rather than "bilingual education" indicates that Con-
gress intended to leave state and local educational authorities a
substantial amount of latitude in choosing the programs and
318 Castafieda, 648 F.2d at 1006.
319 Id. at 997.
32 See id. at 1008.
321 Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
322 Petitioners argued that Proposition 227 violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 by imposing an unjustifiable disparate impact based on national origin, and they
contended that the referendum, by establishing an English immersion program, denied
linguistic minority students meaningful access to a comprehensive academic curriculum.
See id. at 1022.
2I Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1994).
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techniques they would use to meet their obligations under the
EEOA.
324
The court found discrimination to be a nonissue in the case precisely be-
cause it construed bilingual education to be a mere policy means to the
ultimate end of ensuring that California school children are able to enjoy
the best life in the United States.'!' Because sheltered English immersion
on its face proved consistent with an assimilationist approach to bilingual
education, Proposition 227 did not trigger the discrimination question.
The court noted that no constitutional right to language instruction has
ever been recognized. 326 Instead, the absence of transitional language in-
struction generally constitutes a statutory violation.
In the end, the status concerns in the educational sphere are in ten-
sion with the law's overwhelming conclusion that Title VI and perhaps
even the Equal Protection Clause require language instruction only to
transition linguistic minorities into all-English classrooms. Since Cali-
fornia passed Proposition 227, there has been renewed and vigorous de-
bate over whether bilingual education should be abolished. Voters in Ari-
zona passed a ballot initiative similar to California's in November 2000
that banned bilingual education in public schools.327 By contrast, in New
York City, educators and officials are contemplating offering English
immersion programs as an option, leaving traditional bilingual education
in place-largely in response to the demand for those programs from lin-
guistic minorities. 3- Though recently released data suggest that the Eng-
lish immersion programs in California have had some kind of salutary
effect on the test scores of non-English-speaking students' : ' the claims
of bilingual education advocates still encompass the assumption that
educating children in their non-English language of origin has inherent
pedagogical and intellectual benefits. Banishing all forms of bilingual
education from the public classroom thwarts the development of an edu-
_24 Valeria G., 12 F Supp. 2d at 1017 (citing Castaieda, 648 .2d at 1008-09.
32Id. at 1016.
2 6 Id. at 1024-25.
327 See Booth & Sanchez, supra note 6.
328 See Jacques Steinberg, Answers to an English Question. N.Y. TIsIES, Oct. 22. 2000.
at 37 (noting that despite studies demonstrating that students in bilingual programs have
difficulty transitioning into English-speaking classes, even after as many as eight years.
bilingual education remains supported by parents with a "fierce desire" to have their chil-
dren retain their native language).
329 The test scores of students who would have been in bilingual classes prior to pas-
sage of Proposition 227 have risen along with the test scores of the general student popu-
lation, belying the claim of bilingual education advocates who argued that the abolittion of
bilingual education would cause scores to plummet. Jacques Steinberg, Increase in Test
Scores Counters Dire Forecast for Bilingual Ban, N.Y. Ta.tEs. Aug. 20. 2000. at Al. The
rise in scores cannot be tied strictly to the change in bilingual education programs. how-
ever, as class size has dropped, other educational reforms have been implemented. and test
scores of all students have risen. Id.
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cational and social asset in our increasingly multicultural world-
namely, multilingualism.
The difficulty of resolving this educational challenge ultimately sug-
gests that any reconciliation will have to be left to the policy realm. Of
all the spheres in which language raises access and participation
difficulties, the educational sphere is perhaps the least susceptible to le-
gal influence. Indeed, linguistic minorities themselves hotly contest the
direction that language instruction should take. In California, for exam-
ple, even after the passage of Proposition 227, educators and community
members continue to press the need for at least some instruction in
Spanish.330 Given the deference that courts grant local school districts"'
combined with the contraction of Lau and the courts' reluctance to rec-
ognize the culture-status relationship inherent in educational language
policy, accommodating linguistic minorities in the educational sphere
depends only marginally on legal intervention. Linguistic minorities will
benefit when Americans begin to value their bilingualism as they value
and respect the bilingualism of the well-educated. If we can transcend
our American parochialism to see that bilingualism is in fact a good that
should be cultivated, the principles of access and engagement behind a
fluid view of civic identity will be best served.
4. The Provision of Public Services
The most recent effort to accommodate linguistic difference in the
provision of public services transpired in Alabama. In Sandoval v. Ha-
gan,332 the Eleventh Circuit upheld a permanent injunction against the
Department of Public Safety's enforcement of the English-only Amend-
ment to the state constitution.333 The Department had instituted a policy
requiring all portions of the driver's license examination process to be
administered exclusively in English; interpreters, dictionaries, and other
aids were forbidden. The State Attorney General justified the policy by
citing the need to preserve the safety and integrity of the licensing proc-
ess. 34 At trial, evidence introduced by the policy's opponents established
3 See Don Terry, Bilingual Education Lives After All, N.Y. T~iMEs, Oct. 3, 1998, at
A7; see also James Traub, The Bilingual Barrier, N.Y. Tims, Jan. 31, 1999, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 32 (noting that some students choose to stay in bilingual programs even when they
are fluent English speakers in an effort to preserve their minority language).
331 E.g., Castaiieda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1009 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that federal
courts are ill-equipped to determine if action is appropriate, and Congress has given few
guidelines).
332 197 F.3d 484 (1 1th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub non. Alexander v. Sandoval. 121
S. Ct. 28 (2000).
333 Id. at 487. The Amendment contains the following language: "The legislature and
officials of the state of Alabama shall take all steps necessary to insure that the role of
English as the common language of the state of Alabama is preserved and enhanced." Id. at
488 (quoting ALA. CONST. amend. 509).
3
4 Id. at 488.
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that the regulation effectively denied hundreds of state residents driver's
licenses, which in turn affected their ability to obtain employment, child
care services, and other life essentials -- In deciding the merits of the
case, the court relied on the antidiscrimination paradigm.
In invalidating the Department's rule, the court first cited Leu for the
proposition that the decision and its subsequent legislative history "un-
ambiguously notify state recipients of federal funds that English-
language policies, which cause a disparate impact on the ability of non-
English speakers to enjoy federal benefits, may violate Title VI:'76 The
court noted that multiple agency regulations supplement this nondis-
crimination purpose and link English-language policies having disparate
impact with national origin discrimination.337 Though the court framed
the case in straightforward disparate impact terms with minimal discus-
sion of the particular relationship between linguistic difference and the
provision of state services, it predicated its argument on the fact that
certain features of national origin demand accommodation when failure
to accommodate would harm national origin minorities. Though the court
did not find language and national origin to be synonymous, it identified
an unmistakable nexus between the two factors.- s
Of course, not all courts have been as troubled by the disparate im-
pact of monolingual government services. In Soberal-P6rez r. Heckler,"'
the court dismissed a lawsuit seeking the translation of Social Security
forms into Spanish, finding that guarantees against national origin dis-
crimination are not to be confused with access to government by non-
English speakers.' The court simultaneously drew a conceptual line be-
tween protection against discrimination and the right to positive access to
state-administered benefits and characterized linguistic-minority status as
outside the scope of protections afforded by antidiscrimination law. The
court construed the lawsuit as an attack on monolingual government pro-
grams and rejected the implicit assumption of the lawsuit that the Con-
stitution mandated multilingual government. -" The court rejected the na-
31 I. at 489-90. The court also found that the ability of the Department of Public
Safety to accommodate the illiterate and the disabled demonstrated its ability to accommo-
date difference. Id. at 508.
-36 d at 497. It should not come as a surprise that Lau more aptly supports accommo-
dation of linguistic difference in the provision of straightforward public services than in
the educational system, where the policy debate over what constitutes harm to linguistic
minorities is more contested.33 Id. at 499.
-3 Because the court made its decision based on disparate impact analysis. it did not
have to reach the question of whether language may serve as a proxy for national origin.
No claims of animus against linguistic minorities were made in the case. See id. at 509.
3"97 17 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1983).
40Id. at41.
-1 Id. at 42-43 (stating that it was not irrational for the Secretary to choose English as
the language in which to conduct her official affairs (citing Carmona v. Sheffield. 325 F.
Supp. 1341, 1342 (N.D. Cal. 1971))).
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tional origin-language nexus out of apprehension over its potential impli-
cations. Implicit in the court's repudiation of the right to government as-
sistance in languages other than English stood a belief in the preservation
of a set of common public linguistic practices. While celebrating the na-
tion's ethnic diversity, the court refused to require the state to accommo-
date the consequences of that diversity as an antidiscrimination matter.
The parties in Yiliguez v. Mofford-2 fought a similar battle over Ari-
zona's Article XXVIII, the "English as the Official Language" provision
of the state constitution, which required that "[t]his state and all political
subdivisions of this state shall act in English and in no other language.""
The elements of the case augment the antidiscrimination picture pre-
sented by Sandoval and highlight a number of unique difficulties raised
by a failure to accommodate linguistic minorities in the realm of public
services. In Mofford, the trial court invalidated Article XXVIII, express-
ing a concern for the free speech rights of linguistic minorities similar to
the Asian American Business Group v. City of Pomona' court. While
Arizona contended that Article XXVIII only circumscribed the activity
of the state in its sovereign capacity, the court found that a realistic dan-
ger of unconstitutional application existed and therefore declared the ar-
ticle invalid. 345
In its incarnation at the appellate level, Yiguez v. Arizonans for
Official English 6 further revealed the importance of accommodation in
the public services sphere. The Ninth Circuit, after rehearing the case en
banc, held that by using its regulatory powers to require the exclusive use
of the English language, the state violated the First Amendment rights of
public employees. 347 Despite efforts by the Attorney General to narrow
the scope of Article XXVIII, the court accepted the broad meaning given
by the district court 48 In effect, the court found that the article prohib-
ited "the use of any language other than English by all officers and em-
342730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990).
141 ARIz. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 3.
1 716 F. Supp. 1328 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (acknowledging that language has expressive
features).
41 Mofford, 730 F. Supp. at 314.
4 69 F3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), vacated on other grounds by 520 U.S, 43
(1997) (holding that the state government employee's suit became moot when the em-
ployee resigned, and expressing no view on the correct interpretation of the English-only
provision or on its constitutionality).
141 More specifically, the court held that (1) the provision was overbroad; (2) the deci-
sion to speak in a language other than English is expressive conduct that cannot be pro-
scribed permissibly; (3) the state cannot simply prohibit all persons within its borders from
speaking in the tongue of their choice; and (4) the state employee was entitled to nominal
damages. Id. at 920.
141 The court rejected the Attorney General's contention that the article did not apply to
social-service providers. The existence of exceptions for certain acts of public school
teachers suggests that it does apply to DMV employees and the like. Id. at 929.
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ployees of all political subdivisions in Arizona while performing their
official duties."39
The court's invalidation of Article XXVIII on First Amendment
overbreadth grounds, like the City of Pomona court's use of the First
Amendment,35 underscores that courts have difficulty dealing with lan-
guage. The First Amendment angle offers a necessary but awkward doc-
trinal hook for the defense of the more extensive rights which the courts
lack the vocabulary and precedent to address. While the Arikonans for
Official English court may well have been concerned with the free speech
rights of the public employees,35' its larger concern centered around lin-
guistic minorities' ability to access state-provided servicesY - The court
held that Article XXVIII "significantly restricts communications by and
with government officials and employees and interferes with the ability
of the non-English-speaking populace of Arizona to receive information
and ideas. '353 The court regarded the right of the population at large to
receive information about state services as equally important to the rights
of employees to speak in their chosen languages3 - ' This conclusion sug-
gests that the court sought to protect the free speech rights of public em-
ployees, because the employees facilitate communication between the
government and the public it serves.355 In other words, by striking down
the English-only provision, the court ensured that the state's relationship
with linguistic minorities would continue to be mediated through person-
nel who could accommodate the population's differences.) :
Though the court grounded its decision in a principle of toler-
ance of difference, the implications of its emphasis on open access to
state services and the provision of information in an inclusive and em-
powering manner are more robust than basic tolerance might suggest.
The court characterized the provision of governmental services and in-
formation as a matter of public import and underscored a belief that in
order for the state to distribute its resources fairly, it must accommodate
linguistic difference.3- The court distinguished this case from cases
holding that non-English speakers have no affirmative right to compel
state governments to provide information in a language that they can
49 Id. at 928-3 1.
I" City of Pomona, 716 F Supp. at 1331-32.
351 For example, the court notes that the appellant, prior to the amendment of the con-
stitution, was fluent and literate in English and Spanish. and communicated wi th clients in
a combination of English and Spanish as necessary She stopped speaking Spanish on the
job after the amendment passed for fear it made her vulnerable to discipline. Set, Ariznoans
for Official English, 69 F3d at 924.352 Id. at 923, 932-33.
MId. at 941 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council.
425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976)).
-M See id. at 936-37.
-'5- See id.
356 Id. at 933.
3.1 Id. at 940.
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comprehend.358 The court stopped short of identifying a right to complete
accommodation. But in recognizing the utility of bi- and multilingual
employees, the court did point to the need to recognize linguistic differ-
ence in defining an inclusive state-to-citizen relationship.3 9 The court
also implicitly recognized the existence of a mutability continuum, or the
reality that the individuals who require access to state services will al-
ways have diverse language abilities.
Finally, the Arizonans for Official English court, like the Sandoval
court, rejected the national unity arguments made by the defenders of the
English-only provision, concluding that "the state cannot achieve unity
by prescribing orthodoxy."316 While acknowledging the legitimacy of en-
couraging the acquisition of English, the court also deferred to the
American tradition of diversity. In recognizing that non-English can be
used to express solidarity and in understanding that language represents a
complex system of meaning that shapes the individual's orientation to the
world,361 the court presented a more sophisticated understanding of lan-
guage than most other courts have. The risk of alienating linguistic-
minority communities with an English-only rule requires that their lin-
guistic differences be accommodated, not ignored. 6 Though the court
claimed that its analysis did not extend this far, the reasoning of the
opinion leads to the conclusion that the principle of equal access supports
an affirmative right to accommodation in the social services arena. While
the First Amendment approach to language discrimination does not en-
sure that equality principles and citizen participation will be advanced,
the right to receive information, properly understood, is a right to access,
which proves meaningless unless accompanied by the accommodation of
difference.
5. Accommodation in the Political Process
Linguistic accommodation would also be appropriate in the sphere
of the political process itself. Such accommodation would secure a pres-
ervationist approach to language rights with a recognition that politi-
cians, before they become representatives in government, must establish
their relationship with the people based on an understanding of the peo-
ple's salient differences. Indeed, the world of politics is perhaps the most
amenable to linguistic accommodation, as the need to appeal to the peo-
ple who cast the votes provides the driving force behind representative
democracy. Of course, this same process has been largely responsible for
producing the English-only invective designed to appeal to the majority's
I's Id. at 936-37.
119 Id. at 942-43.
160 Id. at 946.
16' Id. at 947.
162 See id.
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patriotism. Such appeals to majority sentiment will become increasingly
irrelevant, however, as the nation's demographics change and if linguistic
minorities become part of the multiple spheres of civic life according to
the parameters set by the preceding discussion.
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 already makes provisions for the is-
suance of bilingual ballots and voting materials.31- The Act includes
Congress's finding that, "where State and local officials conduct elections
only in English, language minority citizens are excluded from partici-
pating in the electoral process;' and as a result, English-only elections
are prohibited.36 In 1975, Congress amended the statute to require that
written and oral voter assistance be made available so long as a single
language group accounts for five percent of the voting population in a
single jurisdiction and where the English literacy rate of the community
in question is below the national average.l" This elaborate triggering
mechanism for bilingual voting assistance suggests not that the right is a
circumscribed one, but that Congress has recognized that the failure to
accommodate language minorities in the electoral process leads to the
disenfranchisement of cognizable sectors of the population.
Opponents of these measures contend that immigrants will be dis-
couraged from making the effort to learn English if they can function
easily, and even vote, without learning English. - 6 Opponents also point
to the fact that certain literacy requirements attend the naturalization pro-
cess, suggesting that all citizens should be able to read English ballots.""
Yet, according to experts, to pass the naturalization test, a prospective
citizen need only command English at a third-grade level, and education
experts designate the fifth-grade level as the dividing line between func-
tional illiteracy and literacy.-" Voting materials frequently are written at a
high school or college level. 69 Indeed, Congress has acknowledged that
to protect the individual right to vote, the existence of communities of
language minorities must be taken into consideration. The danger of dis-
enfranchisement outweighs the possibility that linguistic minorities,
when accommodated, will become complacent about learning English.
To strengthen this protection of the right to vote, there are several possi-
bilities for reform. Though the bilingual voting materials requirement as
-63The language provisions of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974(e
(1994), protect language minorities, which the Act defines as individuals who are "Ameri-
can Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives, or of Spanish heritage:' 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973aa-la(e).
S42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(1).
36 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-la(b)(2)(A)(i)(I). 1973aa-la(b)(2)(AIfii).
36 John Trasvifia, Bilingual Ballots: Their History and a Look Forward, in L %,cGu %GE
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it now stands extends until 2007,370 the continued presence and growth of
language minority communities suggests that the Act's guarantees should
continue. It may even be appropriate to expand the list of language mi-
norities protected to reflect changes in the population and to consider
resetting the points at which bilingual voter assistance is triggered. And
it remains the responsibility of local election officials who preside over
precincts containing the requisite number of minority language voters to
make the bilingual assistance as effective as possible.
Other forms of accommodation might also enhance linguistic mi-
norities' access to the political process. For example, the Federal Com-
munications Commission could promulgate broadcasting regulations re-
quiring certain amounts of airtime to be devoted to political advertise-
ments in non-English; the parameters of this requirement could be set in
a manner similar to the triggering mechanisms used for bilingual ballots.
Indeed, at the heart of the Ninth Circuit's invalidation of Arizona's Eng-
lish-only provision lay a concern for the ability of lawmakers and candi-
dates to communicate with their constituents.37' One town in Texas re-
cently responded to this need by enacting a Spanish-only law requiring
that all public business be conducted in Spanish in order to best serve the
predominantly Spanish-speaking population.7 2 While this action repre-
sents an exclusive extreme, the reality that non-English-speaking popula-
tions will continue to grow as forces in public and civic life cannot be
ignored.
IV. CONCLUSION
The principles elaborated in each of the above spheres-access, in-
clusion, and community-provide a template for extending the accom-
modation of linguistic minorities to all spheres of civic life. Some forms
of the accommodation described above may require the expenditure of
government resources to ensure that all people have equal access to pub-
lic institutions. Other forms of accommodation require a redefinition of
how the law conceives of language and how the state mediates its rela-
tionship with linguistic minorities. Ultimately, the realities of contempo-
rary society necessitate that linguistic minorities be given status before
the law as linguistic minorities and not as citizens on the transitional
road to the English-only mainstream.
Language as a marker of difference and a feature of identity shapes
the status of the linguistic minority in the public sphere and must be rec-
ognized as a relevant characteristic before the law. The theory of accom-
-7042 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(b)(1).
'7' See Yfiiguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 941 (9th Cir. 1995) (en
banc).
72 See Richard Estrada, Spanish-Only Town Ignores Need to Honor a Common Civic
Culture, SUN SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Aug. 24, 1999, at 15A.
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modation articulated here begins with the premise of free and equal ac-
cess. Ensuring that linguistic minorities have equal access to the multiple
spheres of civic life requires a recognition that language profoundly ori-
ents the individual to the people and world around her. The presence of a
mutability continuum in communities throughout the United States re-
quires that the accommodation of linguistic difference be robust if equal
participation is to be possible for people at all points along that contin-
uum. A complete theory of participation must account for the influence
of personal affiliations in facilitating engagement with public and civic
institutions. When individuals feel free to sustain their ties to multiple
communities, defined in part by different languages, communication in
the public sphere will be more open and inclusive, despite the fact that it
may not be in a lingua franca.
This view of participation leads us to the Article's overarching vi-
sion of fluid civic identity-an approach to public life that accounts for
several factors: (1) that participation occurs across diverse spheres of
activity and therefore requires different forms of accommodation; (2) that
linguistic minorities can be integrated into a political community without
an assimilationist agenda; and (3) that localized communities defined
according to cultural practices exist and often represent the sites of the
most meaningful participation in public life. This diffuse and inclusive
vision of public participation represents the best hope for the survival of
a participatory civic tradition in the midst of a society whose diversity
will continue to expand as borders disappear and as the concept of a
common culture becomes increasingly foreign.
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